Programmable logic circuit for controlling an electrical facility, in particular a nuclear facility, associated control device and method
US-11043949-B2 · Jun 22, 2021 · US
US11961625B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-11961625-B2 |
| Application number | US-202117189038-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Mar 1, 2021 |
| Priority date | Dec 30, 2016 |
| Publication date | Apr 16, 2024 |
| Grant date | Apr 16, 2024 |
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A nuclear reactor protection system includes a plurality of functionally independent modules, each of the modules configured to receive a plurality of inputs from a nuclear reactor safety system, and logically determine a safety action based at least in part on the plurality of inputs, each of the functionally independent modules comprising a digital module or a combination digital and analog module, an analog module electrically coupled to one or more of the functionally independent modules, and one or more nuclear reactor safety actuators communicably coupled to the plurality of functionally independent modules to receive the safety action determination based at least in part on the plurality of inputs.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A nuclear reactor protection system, comprising: a first logic circuit configured in hardware to logically derive a first safety determination based at least in part on a first set of inputs, wherein the first safety determination is associated with an estimated condition of a nuclear reactor or a portion thereof, a second logic circuit configured in hardware to logically derive a second safety determination based at least in part on a second set of inputs, wherein the second set of inputs is separate from both the first safety determination and the first set of inputs, and wherein the second safety determination is associated with the estimated condition and separate from the first safety determination; and a display interface module (DIM) including a first converter circuit and a second converter circuit respectively coupled to the first and second logic circuits and configured in hardware to respectively process the first and second safety determinations or representations thereof and to provide driver functionalities for displaying the first and second safety determinations or a processing result thereof across one or more display panels that is/are directly connected to the DIM, wherein the first and second converter circuits have different designs for preserving one or more forms of diversity in processing the first and second safety determinations. 2. The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein the DIM is preconfigured in hardware settings and/or connections between circuit components therein to generate panel drive signals based on processing the first and second safety determinations, wherein the panel drive signals are configured to operate the display panel to communicate the first and second safety determinations. 3. The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 2 , wherein the first converter circuit, the second converter circuit, or a combination thereof comprises a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) configured in hardware to generate the panel drive signals. 4. The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 2 , wherein the DIM is configured in hardware to generate the panel drive signals without executing software instructions. 5. The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 4 , wherein the hardware configuration of the DIM is dedicated to generating the panel drive signals and is unable to selectively implement a different function. 6. The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 2 , wherein the first logic circuit, the second logic circuit, and the DIM are physically separate and independently operated circuits that are configured in hardware to operate without interacting with a common or centralized processor for reducing hardware-based single-point limitations. 7. The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 2 , wherein the DIM is configured in hardware to serve as a display driver for the display panel. 8. The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , further comprising: a monitoring and indication bus (MIB) communicatively coupled to the first logic circuit, the second logic circuit, and the DIM, the MIB configured to communicate status and/or diagnostics information associated with the nuclear reactor protection system to the DIM for displaying on the display panel, wherein the status and/or diagnostics information includes the first and second safety determinations or representations thereof. 9. The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 8 , further comprising an MIB communication circuit configured in hardware to operate as a dedicated master for the MIB by controlling communication of data exchanged over the MIB. 10. A nuclear reactor protection system, comprising: a first logic circuit configured in hardware to logically derive a first safety determination based at least in part on a first set of inputs, wherein the first safety determination is associated with an estimated condition of a nuclear reactor or a portion thereof, a second logic circuit configured in hardware to logically derive a second safety determination based at least in part on a second set of inputs, wherein the second safety determination is associated with the estimated condition; a display interface module (DIM) coupled to the first and second logic circuits and configured in hardware to process the first and second safety determinations or representations thereof and for displaying on a display panel that is directly connected to the DIM; a monitoring and indication bus (MIB) communicatively coupled to the first logic circuit, the second logic circuit, and the DIM, the MIB configured to communicate status and/or diagnostics information associated with the nuclear reactor protection system to the DIM for displaying on the display panel, wherein the status and/or diagnostics information includes the first and second safety determinations or representations thereof; and a control circuit communicatively coupled to receive the first and second safety determinations from the first and second logic circuits, the control circuit configured to generate a safety action signal based on the first and second safety determinations, wherein the safety action signal is configured to control a nuclear reactor safety actuator to address the estimated condition; and the safety action signal is communicated over the MIB; and wherein the DIM is configured to generate one or more panel drive signals configured to operate the display panel to communicate a status of the nuclear reactor safety actuator according to the first and second safety determinations. 11. The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 10 , wherein: the first logic circuit includes two or more circuit groupings, wherein one of the circuit groupings is configured to logically derive the first safety determination and remaining of the circuit groupings is configured to logically derive one or more redundant determinations associated with the estimated condition; the control circuit is configured to generate the safety action signal according to a majority of values indicated by the first safety determination and the one or more redundant determinations; further comprising: a safety function bus including two or more bus paths, wherein each of the two or more bus paths (1) individually couple one of the two or more circuit groupings to the control circuit, (2) is isolated from other paths in the safety function bus, and (3) is separate and independent from the MIB. 12. The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 11 , wherein the DIM is configured to generate a panel drive signal based on a mismatch between the first safety determination and the one or more redundant determinations, wherein the panel drive signal represents a diagnostics information associated with the estimated condition. 13. A method of operating a nuclear reactor protection system, the method comprising: using a first logic circuit, logically determining a first safety determination based at least in part on a first set of inputs, wherein the first safety determination is associated with an estimated condition of a nuclear reactor or a portion thereof, using a second logic circuit, logically determining a second safety determination based at least in part on a second set of inputs, wherein the second set of inputs is separate from both the first safety determination and the first set of inputs, and wherein the second safety determination is associated with the estimated condition and separate from the first safety determination; and according to a predetermined hardware configuration of a display interface module (DIM), using a first converter circuit and a second
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