Nuclear Reactor Protection Systems and Methods

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-2020343009-A1
Application number	US-201414198891-A
Country	US
Kind code	A1
Filing date	Mar 6, 2014
Priority date	Dec 31, 2013
Publication date	Oct 29, 2020
Grant date	—

Abstract

A nuclear reactor protection system includes a plurality of functionally independent modules, each of the modules configured to receive a plurality of inputs from a nuclear reactor safety system, and logically determine a safety action based at least in part on the plurality of inputs; and one or more nuclear reactor safety actuators communicably coupled to the plurality of functionally independent modules to receive the safety action determination based at least in part on the plurality of inputs.

First claim

1 . A nuclear reactor protection system, comprising:
a plurality of functionally independent modules, each of the modules configured to receive a plurality of inputs from a plurality of sensors, and logically determine a safety action based at least in part on the plurality of inputs, wherein each of the independent modules performs a plurality of different independent safety functions with a plurality of unique logic engines each dedicated to implementing an associated one of the different safety functions, and wherein at least some of the plurality of functionally independent modules include multiple input modules coupled between a different one of the sensors and a different safety function module, each of the input modules independently conditioning the input from the coupled one of the sensors and sending a conditioned output to the coupled one of the safety function modules; and one or more nuclear reactor safety actuators communicably coupled to the plurality of functionally independent modules to receive the safety action determination based at least in part on the plurality of inputs.

2 . (canceled)

3 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein individual independent modules include an engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS), and the plurality of functionally independent modules receive a plurality of ESFAS inputs and logically determine an ESFAS component actuation based at least in part on the ESFAS inputs.

4 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 3 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules generate redundant ESFAS voting decisions.

5 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules receive a plurality of reactor trip system (RTS) inputs and logically determine an RTS component actuation based at least in part on the RTS inputs.

6 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 5 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules generate redundant RTS voting decisions.

7 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein each of the plurality of functionally independent modules provides protection against a single hardware failure propagation to any other of the plurality of functionally independent modules.

8 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein each of the plurality of functionally independent modules provides protection against a single software failure propagation to any other of the plurality of functionally independent modules.

9 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein each of the plurality of functionally independent modules provides protection against a single software developed logic failure propagation to any other of the plurality of functionally independent modules.

10 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules include triple redundant signal paths for sensing a reactor trip condition.

11 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules include independent trip voting modules.

12 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules determine a reactor trip condition separately from every other module of the plurality of modules.

13 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules include independent ESFAS actuation voting modules.

14 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules logically determine an engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation for the one or more nuclear reactor safety actuators separately from every other module of the plurality of modules.

15 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules comprise a plurality of safety function modules.

16 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules comprise a plurality of communication modules.

17 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules comprise a plurality of equipment interface modules.

18 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules logically determine the reactor trip in a single-tier voting scheme.

19 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules logically determine the reactor trip in a multiple-tier voting scheme.

20 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 19 , wherein the multiple-tier voting scheme comprises a two-tier voting scheme.

21 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 20 , wherein a first tier of the two-tier voting scheme comprises a majority voting scheme.

22 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 21 , wherein the majority voting scheme comprises a two out of three voting scheme.

23 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 20 , wherein a second tier of the two-tier voting scheme comprises a non-majority vote scheme.

24 . The nuclear reactor protection system of claim 23 , wherein the second tier comprises a two out of four vote scheme.

25 . A method for determining a nuclear reactor trip, comprising:
receiving, from one of an engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) or a reactor trip system (RTS), a plurality of inputs at a plurality of functionally independent modules of a nuclear reactor protection system, wherein at least some of the functionally independent modules include multiple input modules coupled between a different sensor and a different safety function module, each of the input modules independently conditioning the input from the coupled sensor and sending a conditioned output to the coupled safety function module; logically determining, with the plurality of functionally independent modules, one of an ESFAS safety action or reactor trip determination, based at least in part on the plurality of inputs; and based on the logical determination, activating one of an ESFAS component actuator or a reactor trip breaker communicably coupled to the plurality of functionally independent modules.

26 . The method of claim 25 , further comprising limiting, with one of the plurality of functionally independent modules, a single failure propagation to any other of the plurality of functionally independent modules.

27 . The method of claim 26 , wherein the single failure comprises at least one of: a single hardware failure, a single software failure, or a single software developed logic failure.

28 . The method of claim 25 , wherein logically determining, with the plurality of functionally independent modules, one of an ESFAS safety action or reactor trip determination, based at least in part on the inputs comprises:
logically determining, with the plurality of functionally independent modules, the ESFAS safety action or reactor trip determination through a triple redundancy signal path.

29 . The method of claim 25 , wherein the plurality of functionally independent modules provide for at least one of redundant RTS voting divisions or redundant ESFAS

Assignees

• Nuscale Power Llc
• Rock Creek Innovations Llc

Inventors

• Clarkson Gregory Wayne
• Ayala Rufino
• Pottorf Jason

Classifications

• Y02E30/30

  Nuclear fission reactors · CPC title

• G06F11/00

  Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring (error detection, correction or monitoring in information storage based on relative movement between record carrier and transducer G11B20/18; monitoring, i.e. supervising the progress of recording or reproducing G11B27/36; in static stores G11C29/00) · CPC title

• G21D3/04

  Safety arrangements (emergency protection of reactor G21C9/00) · CPC title

• H02H3/05

  with means for increasing reliability, e.g. redundancy arrangements {(for logic circuits H03K19/003)} · CPC title

• G21C7/36

  Control circuits · CPC title