Communication of navigation data spoofing between unmanned vehicles

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9847033-B1
Application number	US-201514866745-A
Country	US
Kind code	B1
Filing date	Sep 25, 2015
Priority date	Sep 25, 2015
Publication date	Dec 19, 2017
Grant date	Dec 19, 2017

Abstract

Techniques for determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of a first unmanned vehicle may be trusted. For example, the first unmanned vehicle may receive an indication related to the data and originating from a second unmanned vehicle over a network. For instance, the indication may indicate that similar data for a similar autonomous operation of the second unmanned vehicle may be untrusted. Based on a level of trust accorded to the indication, the first unmanned vehicle may determine that the data may be untrusted and the autonomous navigation may be directed independently of the data.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
receiving, by a computer system of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), global positioning system (GPS) data associated with an area, the computer system configured to direct a flight of the UAV to deliver an item from a source to a destination based at least in part on the GPS data;
receiving, by the computer system and over a network, a token from a second UAV;
establishing, by the computer system, a communication channel between the UAV and the second UAV over the network based at least in part on the token;
receiving, by the computer system and over the communication channel, an indication of GPS data spoofing detected in the area from the second UAV;
determining, by the computer system, that the GPS data is spoofed based at least in part on an identifier of the second UAV and on the indication of GPS data spoofing; and
directing, by the computer system, a portion of the flight independently of the GPS data that is spoofed.

2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the indication of GPS data spoofing is received from the second UAV over a peer-to-peer network between the UAV and the second UAV.

3. The computer-implemented method of claim 2 , wherein the indication of GPS data spoofing is routed to the UAV from the second UAV through a central station.

4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein determining that the GPS data is spoofed comprises:
determining a level of trust associated with the indication of the GPS data spoofing, wherein the level of trust is determined based at least in part on one or more of: the identifier of the second UAV, a service provider of the second UAV, a spatial proximity between the UAV and the second UAV, or a time when the indication of GPS data spoofing was generated; and
determining that the GPS data is spoofed based at least in part on the level of trust.

5. One or more non-transitory computer readable media comprising instructions that, when executed with a computer system of a first unmanned vehicle, cause the computer system to at least:
access first navigation data of a source external to the first unmanned vehicle, the first navigation data associated with directing an autonomous navigation of the first unmanned vehicle within an area;
receive, over a network, a token from a second unmanned vehicle;
establish a communication channel between the first unmanned vehicle and the second unmanned vehicle over the network based at least in part on the token;
receive, from the second unmanned vehicle over the communication channel, an indication that second navigation data of the second unmanned vehicle is untrusted within the area;
determine that the first navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on the indication that the second navigation data is untrusted; and
direct the autonomous navigation of the first unmanned vehicle independently of the first navigation data based at least in part on the first navigation data being untrusted.

6. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 5 , wherein the first unmanned vehicle is configured to deliver an item available from an electronic marketplace, wherein the source external to the first unmanned vehicle comprises a global positioning system (GPS), and wherein the first navigation data comprises GPS data.

7. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 6 , wherein the first navigation data indicates a first location of the first unmanned vehicle, wherein the second navigation data indicates a second location of the second unmanned vehicle, and wherein determining that the first navigation data is untrusted comprises determining that the first location and the second location are associated with the area.

8. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 7 , wherein the first navigation data is associated with a first time frame, wherein the second navigation data is associated with a second time frame, and wherein determining that the first navigation data is untrusted comprises determining that the first time frame is within a predefined time range of the second time frame.

9. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 8 , wherein the first unmanned vehicle is configured to deliver an item, and wherein the predefined time range is based at least in part on at least one characteristic of the item.

10. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 5 , wherein determining that the first navigation data is untrusted comprises:
determining a level of trust associated with the indication that the second navigation data is untrusted, the level of trust determined based at least in part on a history of untrusted navigation data of the second unmanned vehicle; and
determining that the first navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on the level of trust.

11. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 5 , wherein determining that the first navigation data is untrusted comprises:
determining a level of trust associated with the indication that the second navigation data is untrusted, the level of trust determined based at least in part on an identity of an operator of the second unmanned vehicle; and
determining that the first navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on the level of trust.

12. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 5 , wherein determining that the first navigation data is untrusted comprises determining that a number of additional indications of untrusted navigation data associated with the area exceeds a threshold.

13. A system installed at a central station and configured to communicate with a plurality of unmanned vehicles over a network, the system comprising:
one or more processors; and
one or more computer readable media comprising instructions that, when executed with the one or more processors, cause the system to at least:
access, over the network, first navigation data of a source external to a first unmanned vehicle, the first navigation data associated with directing an autonomous navigation of the first unmanned vehicle within an area;
generate a map associating locations with indications of untrusted navigation data;
access, based at least in part on the map, an indication that second navigation data of a second unmanned vehicle is untrusted within the area;
determine that the first navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on the indication that the second navigation data is untrusted; and
generate a corrective action associated with directing the autonomous navigation of the first unmanned vehicle independently of the first navigation data that is untrusted.

14. The system of claim 13 , wherein the corrective action comprises:
requesting sensor data from navigation sensors of the first unmanned vehicle;
confirming that the first navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on the sensor data; and
directing the autonomous navigation of the first unmanned vehicle based at least in part on the sensor data.

15. The system of claim 13 , wherein the corrective action comprises:
requesting image data of a location of the first unmanned vehicle from an imaging sensor installed on the first unmanned vehicle;
comparing the image data and known image data corresponding to the location; and
confirming that the first navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on the comparing of the image data and the known image data.

16. The system of claim 13 , wherein the corrective action compri

Assignees

• Amazon Tech Inc

Inventors

• Carmack Scott Gerard
• Lakkakula Narasimha Rao
• Sharifi Mehr Nima

Classifications

• H04K3/22

  including jamming detection and monitoring · CPC title

• H04K2203/36

  including means for exchanging jamming data between transmitter and receiver, e.g. in forward or backward direction · CPC title

• H04K2203/22

  for communication related to vehicles · CPC title

• H04K3/90

  related to allowing or preventing navigation or positioning, e.g. GPS · CPC title

• H04K3/65

  using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal · CPC title