Control system
US-2016332597-A1 · Nov 17, 2016 · US
US9800610B1 · US · B1
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-9800610-B1 |
| Application number | US-201514850989-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B1 |
| Filing date | Sep 11, 2015 |
| Priority date | Sep 11, 2015 |
| Publication date | Oct 24, 2017 |
| Grant date | Oct 24, 2017 |
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The disclosed computer-implemented method for defeating relay attacks may include (1) buffering, in a memory buffer, an encoded signal that has been sent to a remote device, (2) detecting, within a time interval of the encoded signal being sent, a second signal that corresponds to the encoded signal, (3) determining that a strength of the second signal is above a predetermined threshold, (4) determining, based on the strength of the second signal being above the predetermined threshold, that the second signal represents a relay attack, and (5) initiating a security action to defeat the relay attack. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A computer-implemented method for defeating relay attacks, at least a portion of the method being performed by a computing device comprising at least one processor, the method comprising: buffering, in a memory buffer, an encoded signal that has been sent from a computing device to a remote device; detecting, within a time interval of the encoded signal being sent, a second signal that corresponds to the encoded signal; determining that a strength of the second signal is above a predetermined signal strength threshold, which is calculated based on a strength of an echo of a test signal sent from the computing device; determining, based on the strength of the second signal being above the predetermined signal strength threshold, that the second signal represents a relay attack; initiating a security action to defeat the relay attack. 2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein detecting the second signal that corresponds to the encoded signal comprises: comparing content of the second signal to content of the encoded signal in the memory buffer; determining that the content of the second signal is identical to the content of the encoded signal. 3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the second signal is received at a frequency of the encoded signal such that the second signal may interfere with reception of the encoded signal by the remote device. 4. The computer-implemented method of claim 3 , further comprising: transmitting a second encoded signal to the remote device; detecting, within a time interval of sending the second encoded signal, a third signal, wherein the third signal is received at a frequency of the second encoded signal such that the third signal may interfere with reception of the second encoded signal by the remote device; detecting a fourth signal, wherein a content of the fourth signal is identical to the content of the encoded signal. 5. The computer-implemented method of claim 4 , wherein: the encoded signal includes a value in a code sequence; the second encoded signal includes a subsequent value in the code sequence. 6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , further comprising calculating, based on the strength of the second signal, an estimated distance of a signal relay device from the computing device. 7. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the security action comprises at least one of: notifying an administrator of the relay attack; broadcasting an audible alarm; denying access to a function controlled by the computing device; activating a secondary security system. 8. A system for defeating relay attacks, the system comprising: a buffering module, stored in memory, that buffers, in a memory buffer, an encoded signal that has been sent from a computing device to a remote device; a detection module, stored in memory, that detects, within a time interval of the encoded signal being sent, a second signal that corresponds to the encoded signal; an analysis module, stored in memory, that: determines that a strength of the second signal is above a predetermined signal strength threshold, which is calculated based on a strength of an echo of a test signal sent from the computing device; determines, based on the strength of the second signal being above the predetermined signal strength threshold, that the second signal represents a relay attack; a security module, stored in memory, that initiates a security action to defeat the relay attack; at least one physical processor configured to execute the buffering module, the detection module, the analysis module, and the security module. 9. The system of claim 8 , wherein the detection module detects the second signal that corresponds to the encoded signal by: comparing content of the second signal to content of the encoded signal in the memory buffer; determining that the content of the second signal is identical to the content of the encoded signal. 10. The system of claim 8 , wherein the detection module receives the second signal at a frequency of the encoded signal such that the second signal may interfere with reception of the encoded signal by the remote device. 11. The system of claim 10 : further comprising a transmission module, stored in memory, that transmits a second encoded signal to the remote device; wherein the detection module: detects, within a time interval of sending the second encoded signal, a third signal, wherein the third signal is received at a frequency of the second encoded signal such that the third signal may interfere with reception of the second encoded signal by the remote device; detects a fourth signal, wherein a content of the fourth signal is identical to the content of the encoded signal. 12. The system of claim 11 , wherein: the encoded signal includes a value in a code sequence; the second encoded signal includes a subsequent value in the code sequence. 13. The system of claim 8 , wherein the security module calculates, based on the strength of the second signal, an estimated distance to a signal relay device. 14. The system of claim 8 , wherein the security action comprises at least one of: notifying an administrator of the relay attack; broadcasting an audible alarm; denying access to a function controlled by the system; activating a secondary security system. 15. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising one or more computer-readable instructions that, when executed by at least one processor of a computing device, cause the computing device to: buffer, in a memory buffer, an encoded signal that has been sent from a computing device to a remote device; detect, within a time interval of the encoded signal being sent, a second signal that corresponds to the encoded signal; determine that a strength of the second signal is above a predetermined signal strength threshold, which is calculated based on a strength of an echo of a test signal sent from the computing device; determine, based on the strength of the second signal being above the predetermined signal strength threshold, that the second signal represents a relay attack; initiate a security action to defeat the relay attack. 16. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15 , wherein the one or more computer-readable instructions cause the computing device to detect the second signal that corresponds to the encoded signal by: comparing content of the second signal to content of the encoded signal in the memory buffer; determining that the content of the second signal is identical to the content of the encoded signal. 17. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15 , wherein the second signal is received at a frequency of the encoded signal such that the second signal may interfere with reception of the encoded signal by the remote device. 18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 17 , wherein the one or more computer-readable instructions cause the computing device to: transmit a second encoded signal to the remote device; detect, within a time interval of sending the second encoded signal, a third signal, wherein the third signal is received at a frequency of the second encoded signal and may interfere with reception of the second encoded signal by the remote device; detect a fourth signal, wherein a content of the fourth signal is identical to the content of the encoded signal. 19. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 18 , wherein: the encoded signal includes a
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