Preventing pattern recognition in electronic code book encryption

US9531916B2 · US · B2

Patent metadata
FieldValue
Publication numberUS-9531916-B2
Application numberUS-201113996890-A
CountryUS
Kind codeB2
Filing dateDec 30, 2011
Priority dateDec 30, 2011
Publication dateDec 27, 2016
Grant dateDec 27, 2016

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  1. Title

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  2. Abstract

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  3. Assignees and inventors

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  4. Key dates

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  5. First independent claim

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  6. CPC / IPC classifications

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  7. Citations and related patents

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Abstract

Official abstract text for this publication.

In general, in one aspect, noise is injected into a bitmap associated with content to be presented on a display to create a noisy bitmap. The noisy bitmap is encrypted using electronic code book (ECB) encryption. The resulting ciphertext does not include recognizable patterns from the content as is typical with ECB encryption. The injection of noise may include modifying pixel values for at least a subset of pixels in the bitmap. The pixel values may be modified by using a counter, a known modification pattern, or a random number generator. The bitmap may be analyzed to determine how the bitmap can be modified to maximize the randomness of the bitmap while ensuring that the noisy bitmap is visually perceptually similar when presented. The noise may be injected into a block of pixels prior to the block being encrypted.

First claim

Opening claim text (preview).

What is claimed: 1. A method to encrypt an image using electronic code book (ECB) encryption that results in an encrypted image with visually unrecognizable patterns from the image, wherein typical ECB encryption results in a typical encrypted image having visually recognizable patterns from the image, the method comprising: modifying pixel values for at least a subset of pixels within a bitmap of the image to create a noisy bitmap of the image, wherein the noisy bitmap of the image provides randomness in pixels but is visually perceptually similar to the bitmap of the image; and encrypting the noisy bitmap using ECB encryption, wherein the encrypted image produced therefrom does not include visually recognizable patterns from the image. 2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the modifying pixel values includes using a counter to modify the pixel values. 3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the modifying pixel values includes applying a known modification pattern to the bitmap. 4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the modifying pixel values includes using a random number generator to modify the pixel values. 5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising analyzing the bitmap to determine how the bitmap can be modified to maximize the randomness of the bitmap while ensuring that the noisy bitmap is visually perceptually similar to the bitmap, wherein the modifying includes modifying the pixel values based on the analyzing. 6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the modifying pixel values includes modifying pixel values for a block of pixels prior to the block being encrypted. 7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising: storing the encrypted image in graphics memory in preparation for presentation on the display; decrypting the encrypted image to recreate the noisy bitmap; and displaying the noisy bitmap on the display. 8. The method of claim 7 , wherein a hacker accessing the graphics memory will not be able to ascertain any visually recognizable patterns from the encrypted image stored therein. 9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the encrypting is performed by a block cipher that is part of a graphics processor. 10. The method of claim 1 , wherein the modifying pixel values is performed by a noise injector that is external to a graphics processor. 11. The method of claim 1 , wherein the modifying pixel values is performed by a noise injector that is part of a graphics processor. 12. A system comprising: a server to provide a user secure access to their confidential information, wherein the server includes: a digital signature system (DSS) to generate a digital signature for a document capturing the confidential information that is to be transmitted to a user for presentation, wherein the digital signature is used to authenticate the document; a graphics processor to modify pixel values for at least a subset of pixels in a bitmap of the document to create a noisy bitmap of the document and to encrypt the noisy bitmap using electronic code book (ECB) encryption to create an encrypted image thereof, wherein the noisy bitmap of the document provides randomness in pixels but is visually perceptually similar to the bitmap of the document, and wherein the encrypted image does not include visually recognizable patterns from the document as would be the case if the bitmap was encrypted using ECB; and a communications interface; a communications network; and a consumer electronic device to receive and present the users confidential information, wherein the consumer electronics device includes: a communications interface; a display; graphics memory to store information to be presented on the display including the encrypted image received from the server; and a graphics processor to decrypt the encrypted image using electronic code book (ECB) decryption prior to presenting on the display. 13. The system of claim 12 , wherein the server graphics processor utilizes a counter to modify the pixel values. 14. The system of claim 12 , wherein the server graphics processor utilizes a random number generator to modify the pixel values. 15. The system of claim 12 , wherein when the graphics memory is randomly accessed by a hacker attempting to obtain confidential information being presented on the display, the encrypted image stored in the graphics memory will not include visually recognizable patterns from which the hacker can ascertain the confidential information. 16. The system of claim 12 , wherein the server graphics processor is to analyze the bitmap to determine how the bitmap can be modified to maximize the randomness of the bitmap while ensuring that the noisy bitmap is visually perceptually similar to the bitmap; and modify the pixel values based on the analysis. 17. A system comprising a digital signature system (DSS) to generate a digital signature for a document capturing confidential information that is to be transmitted to a user for presentation, wherein the digital signature is used to authenticate the document; and a graphics processor to modify pixel values for at least a subset of pixels in a bitmap of the document to create a noisy bitmap of the document and to encrypt the noisy bitmap using electronic code book (ECB) encryption to create an encrypted image thereof, wherein the noisy bitmap of the document provides randomness in pixels but is visually perceptually similar to the bitmap of the document, and wherein the encrypted image does not include visually recognizable patterns from the document as would be the case if the bitmap was encrypted using ECB. 18. The system of claim 17 , wherein the graphics processor includes a counter that is to modify the pixel values by adding a counter value to current pixel values in the bitmap. 19. The system of claim 17 , wherein the graphics processor is to modify the pixel values by adding a predefined noise pattern into the bitmap. 20. The system of claim 17 , wherein the graphics processor includes a random number generator that is used to modify the pixel values by adding a random number to current pixel values in the bitmap. 21. The system of claim 17 , wherein the graphics processor includes a bitmap analyzer to determine how the bitmap can be modified to maximize the randomness of the bitmap while ensuring that the noisy bitmap is visually perceptually similar to the bitmap.

Assignees

Inventors

Classifications

  • H04L9/0637Primary

    Modes of operation, e.g. cipher block chaining [CBC], electronic codebook [ECB] or Galois/counter mode [GCM] · CPC title

  • H04N1/4486Primary

    using digital data encryption · CPC title

  • Processor architectures; Processor configuration, e.g. pipelining · CPC title

  • Randomization, e.g. dummy operations or using noise · CPC title

  • to a single file or object, e.g. in a secure envelope, encrypted and accessed using a key, or with access control rules appended to the object itself · CPC title

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What does patent US9531916B2 cover?
In general, in one aspect, noise is injected into a bitmap associated with content to be presented on a display to create a noisy bitmap. The noisy bitmap is encrypted using electronic code book (ECB) encryption. The resulting ciphertext does not include recognizable patterns from the content as is typical with ECB encryption. The injection of noise may include modifying pixel values for at lea…
Who is the assignee on this patent?
Janus Scott, Martin Jason, Savagaonkar Uday, and 1 more
What technology area does this patent fall under?
Primary CPC classification H04L9/0637. Mapped technology areas include Electricity.
When was this patent published?
Publication date Tue Dec 27 2016 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) (B2). Legal status and post-grant events are not shown on this page.
What related patents are in patentsdb?
We list 8 related publications on this page (citations in our corpus or others sharing the same primary CPC).