Data Aggregation/Analysis System and Method Therefor
US-2017308580-A1 · Oct 26, 2017 · US
US12475237B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-12475237-B2 |
| Application number | US-202118566678-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Jun 8, 2021 |
| Priority date | Jun 8, 2021 |
| Publication date | Nov 18, 2025 |
| Grant date | Nov 18, 2025 |
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By using [x 0,0 ], . . . , [x 0,r(0)-1 ], . . . , [x L-1,0 ], . . . , [x L-1,r(L-1)-1 ] obtained by concealing L sets X 0 ={x 0,0 , . . . , x 0,r(0)-1 }, . . . , X L-1 ={x L-1,0 , . . . , x L-1,r(L-1)-1 }, [c 0 ], . . . , [c m-1 ] obtained by concealing the number c p of elements representing k p among x 0,0 , . . . , x 0,r(0)-1 , . . . , x L-1,0 , . . . , x L-1,r(L-1)-1 for p=0, . . . , m−1 are obtained, [eq 0 ], . . . , [eq m-1 ] obtained by concealing eq p =T when c p is L and eq p =F when c p is not L for p=0, . . . , m−1 are obtained, and a data structure including [k p ] and [eq p ] associated with each other is output as a concealed operation result of a product set of X 0 , . . . , X L-1 .
Opening claim text (preview).
The invention claimed is: 1 . A secure computation device that obtains a concealed operation result representing concealed information of a product set of L sets X 0 , . . . , X L-1 while concealing sets X 0 ={x 0,0 , . . . , X 0,r(0)-1 }, . . . , X L-1 ={X L-1,0 , . . . , X L-1,r (L-1)-1 }, L being an integer of 2 or greater, i=0, . . . , L−1, r(i) being an integer of 1 or greater, j(i)=0, . . . , r(i)-1, m being an integer of 1 or greater, k 0 , . . . , k m-1 being pieces of key information different from each other, p=0, . . . , m−1, and [α] being concealed information of α, the secure computation device comprising processing circuitry configured to: (A) obtain count results [c 0 ], . . . , [c m-1 ] through secure computation by using concealed elements [x 0,0 ], . . . , [X 0,r(0)-1 ], . . . , [X L-1,0 ], . . . , [X L-1,r(L-1)-1 ] where each element x i,j(i) represents any one of the key information k 0 , . . . , k m-1 , and a number of elements representing key information k p among elements X 0,0 , . . . , X 0,r(0)-1 , . . . , X L-1,0 , . . . , X L-1,r(L-1)-1 iS C p ; (B) obtain equality check results [eq 0 ], . . . , [eq m-1 ] through the secure computation by using count results [c 0 ], . . . , [C m-1 ], where eq p =T when c p is L, eq p =F when c p is not L, and T and F are different from each other; and (C) output the concealed operation result including concealed key information [k p ] and a equality check result [eq p ] associated with each other, wherein the processing circuitry is configured to further obtain concealed key information [k 0 ], . . . , [k m-1 ] through the secure computation by using the concealed elements [x 0,0 ], . . . , [X 0,r(0)-1 ], . . . , [X L-1,0 ], . . . , [X L-1,r(L-1)-1 ]. 2 . The secure computation device according to claim 1 , wherein n is an integer greater than m, (A) the processing circuitry is configured to obtain sequences ([f], [k], [c]), where a sequence [f] is a sequence including m valid flags [f 0 ], . . . , [f m-1 ] and n-m dummy flags [f m ], . . . , [f n-1 ], where f 0 , . . . , f m-1 are B 1 , f m , . . . , f n-1 are B 0 , and B 1 and B 0 are different from each other, a sequence [k] is a sequence including m pieces of concealed key information [k 0 ], . . . , [k m-1 ] and n-m pieces of dummy information [k m ], . . . , [k n-1 ], a sequence [c] is a sequence including m count results [c 0 ], . . . , [c m-1 ] and n-m pieces of dummy information [c m ], . . . , [C n-1 ], for p=0, . . . , m−1, a valid flag [f p ], a concealed key information [k p ], and a count result [c p ] are associated with each other, and for q=m, . . . , n−1, a dummy flag [f q ], a dummy information [k q ], and a dummy information [c q ] are associated with each other, (B) the processing circuitry is configured to obtain equality check results [eq 0 ], . . . , [eq m-1 ] and dummy information [eq m ], . . . , [eq n-1 ] through the secure computation by using the sequences ([f], [k], [c]), and (C) the processing circuitry is configured to output the concealed operation result including the concealed key information [k p ] and the equality check result [eq p ] associated with each other for p=0, . . . , m−1, and the dummy information [k q ] and a dummy information [eq q ] associated with each other for q=m, . . . , n−1. 3 . The secure computation device according to claim 1 , wherein L is an integer of 3 or greater. 4 . A secure computation system comprising the secure computation device according to claim 1 . 5 . A secure computation method by a secure computation device that obtains a concealed operation result representing concealed information of a product set of L sets X 0 , . . . , X L-1 while concealing sets X 0 ={x 0,0 , . . . , X 0,r(0)-1 }, . . . , X L-1 ={X L-1,0 , . . . , X L-1,r(L-1)-1 }, L being an integer of 2 or greater, i=0, . . . , L−1, r(i) being an integer of 1 or greater, j(i)=0, . . . , r(i)-1, m being an integer of 1 or greater, k 0 , . . . , k m-1 are pieces of key information different from each other, p=0, . . . , m−1, and [α] being concealed information of a, the secure computation method comprising: (A) a counting step of obtaining count results [c 0 ], . . . , [c m-1 ] through secure computation by using concealed elements [x 0,0 ], . . . , [x 0,r(0)-1 ], . . . , [X L-1,0 ], . . . , [X L-1,r(L-1)-1 ] where each element X i,j(i) represents any one of the key information k 0 , . . . , k m-1 , and a number of elements representing key information k p among elements X 0,0 , . . . , X 0,r(0)-1 , . . . , X L-1,0 , . . . , X L-1,r(L-1)-1 iS C p ; (B) an equality check step of obtaining equality check results [eq 0 ], . . . , [eq m-1 ] through the secure computation by using count results [c 0 ], . . . , [C m-1 ], where eq p =T when c p is L, eq p =F when c p is not L, and T and Fare different from each other; and (C) an output flag adding step of outputting the concealed operation result including concealed key information [k p ] and a equality check result [eq p ] associated with each other, wherein the method further comprises obtaining concealed key information [k 0 ], . . . , [k m-1 ], through the secure computation by using the concealed elements [X 0,0 ], . . . , [X 0,r(0)-1 ], . . . , [X L-1,0 ], . . . , [X L-1,r (L-1)-1]. 6 . A non-transitory computer-readable recording medium storing a program for causing a computer to function as the secure computation device according to claim 1 .
of operations, operands or results of the operations · CPC title
Secure multiparty computation, e.g. millionaire problem · CPC title
involving homomorphic encryption · CPC title
Providing cryptographic facilities or services · CPC title
Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes · CPC title
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