Global positioning system (GPS) receivers for munitions
US-10564291-B1 · Feb 18, 2020 · US
US12442932B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-12442932-B2 |
| Application number | US-202318122531-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Mar 16, 2023 |
| Priority date | Jul 12, 2022 |
| Publication date | Oct 14, 2025 |
| Grant date | Oct 14, 2025 |
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A local area detection and alerting system (LDAS) for detecting potential GNSS spoofing within a protected airspace includes a ground-based control station and several RF interference (RFI) control stations spaced to define the protected airspace. Each RFI control station includes two or more reference GNSS signal receivers in communication with two or more reception (Rx) antennas, each antenna having a surveyed true location and distinct height. The reference receivers continually determine GNSS-derived absolute positions of each antenna, which are compared to their true locations to determine if GNSS spoofing is responsible for measurement anomalies. Any detection of potential spoofing is forwarded to the control station, which broadcasts regular LDAS updates indicating the presence or absence of potential spoofing to all aircraft operating within a transmission range surrounding the protected airspace.
Opening claim text (preview).
We claim: 1. A system for local area detection and alerting of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing (LDAS), the LDAS system comprising: at least one ground-based control station comprising: one or more control processors; a memory in communication with the one or more control processors; and at least one transmitter in communication with the one or more control processors, the transmitter configured for one or more VHF data broadcast (VDB) transmissions via a transmit (Tx) antenna disposed at a first target height above ground; and two or more receiver stations in communication with the ground-based control station and collectively defining a coverage volume of the LDAS system, each receiver station comprising: at least two signal receivers operatively coupled to at least two reception (Rx) antennas, each Rx antenna corresponding to a distinct height and to a true location; each signal receiver configured to: receive, via each Rx antenna, a plurality of positioning signals from a plurality of navigational satellites; determine, based on the plurality of positioning signals, an absolute position of each Rx antenna; determine a probability of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofer presence by comparing the determined absolute position of each Rx antenna to the corresponding true location; and if the determined probability of GNSS spoofer presence is nonzero, notify the control station of the nonzero probability; wherein the control station is configured to transmit at a regular time interval, via the one or more VDB transmissions, either the nonzero probability or a zero probability of GNSS spoofer presence. 2. The LDAS system of claim 1 , wherein: the control station is configured to transmit at the regular time interval, via the one or more VDB transmissions, the zero probability of GNSS spoofer presence if none of the two or more reference receiver stations have indicated a nonzero probability within the most recent time interval. 3. The LDAS system of claim 1 , wherein: each receiver station is configured to indicate a nonzero probability of GNSS spoofer presence when: 1) At least one determined absolute position of an Rx antenna of the receiver station deviates from the corresponding true location of the Rx antenna; and 2) The deviation of the at least one absolute position from the true location is attributable to GNSS spoofing beyond a confidence bound. 4. The LDAS system of claim 3 , wherein the one or more VDB transmissions include the confidence bound. 5. The LDAS system of claim 1 , wherein at least one signal receiver is configured to: detect a spoofer transmission associated with the nonzero probability; determine an angle of arrival of the spoofer transmission relative to at least one Rx antenna; determine directional information relative to the receiver station and to the spoofer transmission based on the at least one angle of arrival; and forward the directional information to the ground-based control station. 6. The LDAS system of claim 5 , wherein the one or more VDB transmissions include the directional information. 7. The LDAS system of claim 1 , wherein the regular time interval is a first time interval, the two or more receiver stations are active receiver stations, and: the control station is configured to select the two or more active receiver stations from a group of three or more receiver stations for a second time interval, the non-selected receiver stations being inactive receiver stations; and wherein the control station is configured to select two or more new active receiver stations from the group when the second time interval expires. 8. The LDAS system of claim 1 , wherein the two or more receiver stations include: at least one Rx antenna fixed to a tethered aerial vehicle configured for operation at a target altitude. 9. The LDAS system of claim 1 , wherein the LDAS system and the coverage volume are associated with an airport. 10. The LDAS system of claim 9 , wherein the ground-based control station is physically disposed within the airport. 11. A control station for local area detection and alerting of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing (LDAS), the LDAS control station comprising: at least one receiver/transmitter associated with a surveyed true location, a target altitude, and a coverage volume, each receiver/transmitter configured to: receive a plurality of GNSS positioning signals from a plurality of navigational satellites; determine, based on the plurality of GNSS positioning signals, an absolute position of the receiver/transmitter; compare the determined absolute position to the surveyed true location of the receiver/transmitter; if a deviation of the determined absolute position from the surveyed true location is attributable to GNSS spoofing beyond a confidence bound, indicate a nonzero probability of GNSS spoofer presence within the coverage volume; and transmit at a regular time interval at least one LDAS update, each LDAS update indicative of: a zero probability of GNSS spoofer presence within the coverage volume; or if the nonzero probability has been indicated since the last LDAS update, the nonzero probability. 12. The LDAS control station of claim 11 , wherein the at least one receiver/transmitter is attached to an antenna extending above ground level. 13. The LDAS control station of claim 11 , wherein the at least one receiver/transmitter is attached to an unmanned aerial vehicle configured for operations at a target altitude. 14. The LDAS control station of claim 11 , wherein the LDAS control station is a first control station of a network of two or more LDAS control stations, the LDAS update is a first LDAS update, and wherein the at least one receiver/transmitter is configured to: transmit the at least one first LDAS update to at least one second LDAS control station of the network; and receive at least one second LDAS update from the at least one second LDAS control station. 15. A method for local area detection and alerting of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing (LDAS), the method comprising: receiving, via at least two signal receivers associated with an LDAS receiver station, each signal receiver communicatively coupled to at least two receiver (Rx) antennas, each Rx antenna corresponding to a surveyed true location and to a distinct height, a plurality of GNSS positioning signals transmitted by a plurality of navigational satellites; determining, via each signal receiver and based on the one or more received positioning signals, an absolute position of each Rx antenna; determining, via each signal receiver, a probability of GNSS spoofer presence by comparing the determined absolute position of each Rx antenna to the corresponding surveyed true location; if the probability determined by at least one signal receiver is nonzero, notifying, via the receiver station, the control station of the nonzero probability; and transmitting, via the control station, at least one VHF data broadcast (VDB) transmission at a regular time interval, the at least one VDB transmission comprising one of: a zero probability of GNSS spoofer presence; or if at least one receiver station of the plurality of receiver stations has notified the control station of the nonzero probability within the most recent time interval, the nonzero probability of GNSS spoofer presence. 16. The method of claim 15 , wherein determining, via each signal receiver, a probability of GNSS spoofer presence by comparing the determined absolute position
Aircraft, e.g. drones · CPC title
Control of altitude or depth · CPC title
specially adapted for aircraft · CPC title
using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal · CPC title
based on redundancy of transmitted data, transmission path or transmitting source · CPC title
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