Unauthorized device resource drain prevention

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-11979742-B2
Application number	US-202117237298-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Apr 22, 2021
Priority date	Apr 22, 2021
Publication date	May 7, 2024
Grant date	May 7, 2024

Abstract

Detection and prevention of resource drain from unauthorized wireless device connections is provided. Responsive to receiving of a connection request from a connecting device, a pre-authentication message is sent to the connecting device, the pre-authentication message including a challenge value. A vehicle hash result is computed using a hash function taking the challenge value and the unique identifier of the vehicle as inputs. A device hash result is received from the connecting device. Responsive to a match of the vehicle hash result and the device hash result, additional hardware of the vehicle is activated to perform a secondary authentication of the connecting device. Responsive to a mismatch, authentication of the connecting device is rejected without activation of the additional hardware, thereby avoiding key-off load from the additional hardware in instances where pre-authentication of the connecting device fails.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A system for detection and prevention of resource drain from unauthorized wireless device connections comprising:
a memory configured to store a unique vehicle identifier; and
a controller of a vehicle, programmed to:
responsive to receipt of a connection request from a connecting device, send a pre-authentication message to the connecting device, the pre-authentication message including a challenge value;
compute a vehicle hash result using a hash function taking the challenge value and a unique identifier of the vehicle as inputs;
receive a device hash result from the connecting device;
responsive to a match of the vehicle hash result and the device hash result being determined by the controller without activating additional cryptographic hardware, activate the additional cryptographic hardware to perform a secondary authentication of the connecting device; and
responsive to a mismatch of the vehicle hash result and the device hash result, reject authentication of the connecting device without activation of the additional cryptographic hardware, thereby avoiding key-off load from the additional cryptographic hardware in instances where pre-authentication of the connecting device fails.

2. The system of claim 1 , wherein the challenge value is a random number that is different for each connection request.

3. The system of claim 1 , wherein the challenge value is a counter value that is incremented for each connection request.

4. The system of claim 1 , wherein, prior to the connection request, the unique vehicle identifier is provided on a human machine interface of the vehicle for capture by the connecting device.

5. The system of claim 4 , wherein the unique vehicle identifier is provided on the human machine interface as a barcode for scanning by a camera of the connecting device.

6. The system of claim 4 , wherein the unique vehicle identifier is provided on the human machine interface as a numeric value.

7. The system of claim 1 , wherein the hash function is a one-way cryptographic function.

8. The system of claim 1 , wherein the controller is further programmed to:
generate the unique vehicle identifier; and
send the unique vehicle identifier to a remote server for distribution to the connecting device.

9. The system of claim 1 , wherein the controller is further programmed to receive the unique vehicle identifier from a remote server.

10. A method for detection and prevention of resource drain from unauthorized wireless device connections comprising:
responsive to receiving a connection request to a vehicle from a connecting device, sending a pre-authentication message to the connecting device, the pre-authentication message including a challenge value;
computing a vehicle hash result using a hash function taking the challenge value and a unique identifier of the vehicle as inputs;
receiving a device hash result from the connecting device;
responsive to a match of the vehicle hash result and the device hash result being determined without activating additional cryptographic hardware, activating the additional cryptographic hardware to perform a secondary authentication of the connecting device; and
responsive to a mismatch of the vehicle hash result and the device hash result, rejecting authentication of the connecting device without activation of the additional cryptographic hardware, thereby avoiding key-off load from the additional cryptographic hardware in instances where pre-authentication of the connecting device fails.

11. The method of claim 10 , further comprising computing the device hash result by the connecting device, further using the hash function taking the challenge value and the unique identifier of the vehicle as inputs.

12. The method of claim 10 , wherein the challenge value is a random number that is different for each connection request.

13. The method of claim 10 , wherein the challenge value is a counter value that is incremented for each connection request.

14. The method of claim 10 , further comprising, prior to the connection request, providing the unique identifier on a human machine interface of the vehicle for capture by the connecting device.

15. The method of claim 14 , wherein the unique identifier is provided on the human machine interface as a barcode for scanning by a camera of the connecting device.

16. The method of claim 14 , wherein the unique identifier is provided on the human machine interface as a numeric value.

17. The method of claim 10 , wherein the hash function is a one-way cryptographic function.

18. The method of claim 10 , further comprising:
generating the unique identifier by the vehicle; and
sending the unique identifier from the vehicle to a remote server for distribution by the remote server to the connecting device.

19. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising instructions for detection and prevention of resource drain from unauthorized wireless device connections that, when executed by a processor of a controller of a vehicle, cause the vehicle to perform operations including to:
obtain or pre-generate a unique vehicle identifier;
store the unique vehicle identifier to a memory of the vehicle;
prior to a connection request, providing the unique vehicle identifier for capture by a connecting device;
responsive to receipt of the connection request from the connecting device, send a pre-authentication message to the connecting device, the pre-authentication message including a challenge value, the challenge value being different for each connection request;
compute a vehicle hash result using a hash function taking the challenge value and a unique identifier of the vehicle as inputs;
receive a device hash result from the connecting device, the device hash result being computed by the connecting device also using the hash function taking the challenge value and the unique identifier of the vehicle as inputs;
responsive to a match of the vehicle hash result and the device hash result being determined without activating additional cryptographic hardware, activate the additional cryptographic hardware to perform a secondary authentication of the connecting device; and
responsive to a mismatch of the vehicle hash result and the device hash result, reject authentication of the connecting device without activation of the additional cryptographic hardware, thereby avoiding key-off load from the additional cryptographic hardware in instances where pre-authentication of the connecting device fails.

Assignees

• Ford Global Tech Llc

Inventors

• Schubert Jochen
• Bounefissa Fouad
• Simons Michael Andrew
• Nelson Thomas
• Thivierge Jr Timothy

Classifications

• H04W12/062 Primary

  Pre-authentication · CPC title

• G06K7/10722

  Photodetector array or CCD scanning · CPC title

• G06K7/1413

  1D bar codes · CPC title

• G06K19/06028

  using bar codes · CPC title

• H04L9/3239

  involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD · CPC title