Secure session communication between a mobile device and a base station

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-10412581-B2
Application number	US-201715432886-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Feb 14, 2017
Priority date	Feb 14, 2017
Publication date	Sep 10, 2019
Grant date	Sep 10, 2019

Abstract

A vehicle includes: (i) a main telematics module, (ii) a connectivity module including antenna(s) and processor(s). The connectivity module is configured to: (a) authenticate a mobile device via a vehicle-access-key (VAK); (b), if (a), issue an ephemeral-session-key (DSK) to the mobile device; (c), if (b), establish an active session with the mobile device; (d) encrypt all messages to the mobile device with the VAK during (a) and with the DSK during (c). The connectivity module is configured to automatically revoke the DSK upon expiration of a predetermined time interval.

First claim

We claim:

1. A computing system comprising:
a main telematics module,
a connectivity module comprising antenna(s), processor(s), the connectivity module configured to:
(a) authenticate a mobile device via a vehicle-access-key (VAK);
(b), if (a), issue an ephemeral-session-key (DSK) to the mobile device;
(c), if (b), establish an active session with the mobile device;
(d) encrypt messages to the mobile device with the VAK during (a) and with the DSK during (c); and
(e) maintain the active session with the mobile device only when a signed challenge message periodically transmitted by the connectivity module is satisfied with a signed response from the mobile device within a countdown, the countdown resetting each time the signed response is received from the mobile device.

2. The computing system of claim 1 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to automatically revoke the DSK.

3. The computing system of claim 2 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to automatically revoke the DSK upon expiration of a predetermined time interval.

4. The computing system of claim 3 , wherein the time interval begins during (b).

5. The computing system of claim 4 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to during (c), reject messages from the mobile device encrypted with the VAK but accept messages from another mobile device encrypted with a different VAK.

6. The computing system of claim 1 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to begin (a) upon receiving an unencrypted message comprising a valid VAK ID and a valid VAK hash.

7. The computing system of claim 1 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to include an unencrypted VAK authentication code in messages including VAK encrypted data.

8. The computing system of claim 7 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to include an unencrypted DSK hash in messages including DSK encrypted data.

9. The computing system of claim 1 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to break the DSK into a first block (DSK 1 ) and a second block (DSK 2 ).

10. The computing system of claim 9 , wherein both of DSK 1 and DSK 2 are necessary to compute DSK.

11. The computing system of claim 9 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to break the DSK by factoring the DSK such that DSK 1 is a first factor and DSK 2 is a second factor.

12. The computing system of claim 9 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to transmit DSK 1 in a first message and DSK 2 in a later second message.

13. The computing system of claim 12 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to transmit DSK 2 in reply to a valid response from the mobile device.

14. The computing system of claim 13 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to transmit an encrypted nonce to the mobile device.

15. The computing system of claim 14 , wherein to be valid, the response must include a value based on the nonce.

16. The computing system of claim 15 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to transmit DSK assembly instructions with DSK 1 or DSK 2 .

17. The computing system of claim 16 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to increment the nonce and transmit the incremented nonce to the mobile device prior to (c).

18. The computing system of claim 1 , wherein the VAK is a first VAK, the DSK is a first DSK and the connectivity module is configured to store multiple VAKs and multiple DSKs.

19. The computing system of claim 1 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to revoke the DSK upon receiving a message from the mobile device encrypted with the VAK during (c).

20. The computing system of claim 1 , wherein the connectivity module is configured to include unencrypted mobile device metadata in each message to the mobile device, the metadata enabling the mobile device to route the message.

Assignees

• Ford Global Tech Llc

Inventors

• Smyth Cameron
• Southern Robert James
• Van Wiemeersch John Robert
• Erkkila David Ray
• Westra Mike Raymond
• Caushi Aldi
• Turner John William
• Shahidehpour Bobak
• Elangovan Vivekanandh

Classifications

• H04W12/02

  Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII] · CPC title

• H04L63/068

  using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for controlling usage of secret information H04L9/088) · CPC title

• H04L9/088

  Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms (network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068) · CPC title

• H04L9/0643 Primary

  Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC · CPC title

• H04L67/141

  Setup of application sessions (admission control or resource allocation in data switching networks H04L47/70) · CPC title