Systems and methods for protecting against relay attacks

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-11936684-B2
Application number	US-202318193438-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Mar 30, 2023
Priority date	Nov 28, 2017
Publication date	Mar 19, 2024
Grant date	Mar 19, 2024

Abstract

A user device may receive (e.g., when proximate to the first access device), from an intervening device, device identification data for a first access device. A message may be received from a second access device via the intervening device. The message may include a digital signature generated based at least in part on second access device identification data. The user device may validate the message utilizing the digital signature and a public key. If the message is invalid, the user device may discard the message. If the message is valid, (e.g., unaltered), the user device may determine that the user has not confirmed an intent to interact with the second access device and may terminate a[n] further interaction with the second access device accordingly.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method, comprising:
receiving, by a user device, a first message comprising first access device identification data associated with a first access device, the first access device identification data comprising a first public key;
receiving, by the user device, a second message comprising at least second access device identification data corresponding to a second access device and a digital signature;
performing a validation process for the second message using the digital signature and a second public key;
when the second message is invalid and the second public key is the first public key associated with the first access device:
identifying that the second access device identification data differs from the first access device identification data; and
presenting, by the user device, the second access device identification data indicating a difference between the second access device identification data and the first access device identification data; and

when the second message is valid and the second public key differs from the first public key:
terminating processing of the second access device based at least in part on determining that a confirmation indicating an intent to interact with the second access device has not been received.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the second message is transmitted from the second access device to the user device via a first intervening device and a second intervening device.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the second message further comprises an interaction value.

4. The method of claim 3 , wherein the second access device identification data received in the second message comprises the second public key.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the digital signature of the second message is created by a hash of the at least second access device identification data being digitally signed with a private key of a public/private key pair associated with the second access device.

6. The method of claim 5 , wherein performing the validation process comprises: obtaining the hash from the digital signature using the second public key; generating an additional hash based at least in part on message data of the second message; comparing, by the user device, the hash to the additional hash; and determining, by the user device, if the hash matches the additional hash.

7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
presenting, by the user device, the first access device identification data in a request to interact with the first access device; and
receiving, by the user device, user input confirming a corresponding intent to interact with the first access device.

8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
receiving, by the user device based at least in part on presenting the second access device identification data, user input confirming a corresponding intent to interact with the second access device.

9. The method of claim 8 , further comprising:
in response to receiving the user input confirming the corresponding intent to interact with the second access device, transmitting, by the user device to the second access device, a third message comprising the at least second access device identification data and the first public key.

10. The method of claim 9 , wherein transmitting the third message causes the second access device to discard the third message based at least in part on determining that data provided in the third message does not match data provided in the second message.

11. A user device, comprising:
a processor; and
a memory storing computer-executable instructions that, when executed by the processor, cause the user device to:
receive a first message comprising first access device identification data associated with a first access device, the first access device identification data comprising a first public key;
receive a second message comprising at least second access device identification data corresponding to a second access device and a digital signature;
perform a validation process for the second message based at least in part on the digital signature and a second public key;
when the second message is invalid and the second public key is the first public key associated with the first access device:
identify that the second access device identification data differs from the first access device identification data; and
present the second access device identification data indicating a difference between the second access device identification data and the first access device identification data; and

when the second message is valid and the second public key differs from the first public key:
terminate processing of the second message based at least in part on determining that a confirmation indicating an intent to interact with the second access device has not been received.

12. The user device of claim 11 , wherein the first access device and the second access device are automated fuel dispensers.

13. The user device of claim 11 , wherein the second message comprises a location of the second access device, and wherein executing the computer-executable instructions further causes the user device to determine, when the second message is valid, whether the location of the second access device is within a threshold distance of a second location associated with the user device.

14. The user device of claim 13 , wherein processing of the second message is terminated based on determining that the location of the second access device is outside the threshold distance of the second location associated with the user device.

15. The user device of claim 11 , wherein the first message and the second message are received using a Bluetooth Low Energy communications protocol.

16. The user device of claim 11 , wherein the first access device is configured to enable access to a resource or a location.

17. The user device of claim 11 , wherein the first message is a Bluetooth Low Energy advertisement message.

18. The user device of claim 11 , wherein executing the computer-executable instructions further causes the user device to:
present, at a user interface, the first access device identification data; and
receive user input provided via the user interface, wherein a connection is established between the user device and an intervening device based at least in part on receiving the user input, the intervening device being different from the first access device.

19. The user device of claim 11 , wherein executing the computer-executable instructions further causes the user device to determine, when the second public key is received in the second message, that the second public key received in the second message does not match the first public key received in the first message.

20. The user device of claim 11 , wherein the first message and the second message are received from an intervening device different from the first access device.

Assignees

• Visa Int Service Ass

Inventors

• Sullivan Brian
• Wang Quan
• Chen Yuexi
• Aabye Christian
• Flurscheim Christian
• Hapuarachchi Pasan

Classifications

• H04L63/1441 Primary

  Countermeasures against malicious traffic (countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002) · CPC title

• G07F15/001

  for gas · CPC title

• H04L9/0825

  using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates · CPC title

• H04L9/3236

  using cryptographic hash functions · CPC title

• H04L9/3247

  involving digital signatures · CPC title