Mobile de-whitening

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-10437745-B2
Application number	US-201816211330-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Dec 6, 2018
Priority date	Jan 5, 2018
Publication date	Oct 8, 2019
Grant date	Oct 8, 2019

Abstract

Systems and methods are disclosed and include a processor configured to execute instructions stored in a nontransitory computer-readable medium. The instructions include generating first message authentication code (MAC) bytes based on a shared secret key. The instructions include generating first nonce bytes and an authenticated packet based on the first MAC bytes, the first nonce bytes, and a message byte. The instructions include generating a de-whitened tone byte based on the shared secret key. The instructions include generating a message packet that includes the authenticated packet and the de-whitened tone byte. Generating the message packet includes pseudo-randomly identifying a first location of the authenticated packet and inserting the de-whitened tone byte at the first location. The instructions include transmitting the message packet to the peripheral device and establishing the communication link between a portable device and a peripheral device in response to the peripheral device validating the message packet.

First claim

The invention claimed is:

1. A method for establishing a communication link between (i) a portable device that includes a processor that is configured to execute instructions stored in a nontransitory computer-readable medium and (ii) a peripheral device, the method comprising:
generating, using the processor of the portable device:
first message authentication code (MAC) bytes based on a shared secret key;
first nonce bytes;
an authenticated packet based on the first MAC bytes, the first nonce bytes, and a message byte;
a de-whitened tone byte based on the shared secret key; and
a message packet that includes the authenticated packet and the de-whitened tone byte, wherein generating the message packet includes:
pseudo-randomly identifying a first location of the authenticated packet; and
inserting the de-whitened tone byte at the first location;

transmitting, using the processor of the portable device, the message packet to the peripheral device; and
establishing, using the processor of the portable device, the communication link between the portable device and the peripheral device in response to the peripheral device validating the message packet.

2. The method of claim 1 further comprising:
generating, using a processor of the peripheral device, second MAC bytes based on the shared secret key, wherein the processor of the peripheral device is configured to execute instructions stored in a nontransitory computer-readable medium; and
generating, using the processor of the peripheral device, second nonce bytes.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein validating the message packet comprises:
removing, using the processor of the peripheral device, the de-whitened tone byte from the message packet; and
determining, using the processor of the peripheral device, that the message packet is authorized in response to the processor of the peripheral device determining that the first MAC bytes match the second MAC bytes.

4. The method of claim 3 , wherein validating the message packet comprises determining, using the processor of the peripheral device, that the message packet is authorized in response to the processor of the peripheral device determining that the first nonce bytes match the second nonce bytes.

5. The method of claim 2 , further comprising determining the message packet is invalid in response to one of:
determining, using the processor of the peripheral device, that the first MAC bytes do not match the second MAC bytes; and
determining, using the processor of the peripheral device, that the first nonce bytes do not match the second nonce bytes.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first nonce bytes are generated using a random number generator.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first location is between a first MAC bit of the first MAC bytes and a second MAC bit of the first MAC bytes.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first location is between a first nonce bit of the first nonce bytes and a second nonce bit of the first nonce bytes.

9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first location precedes a location of one of the first nonce bytes and the first MAC bytes.

10. The method of claim 1 , wherein a location of the first nonce bytes and a location of the first MAC bytes precede the first location.

11. A system comprising:
a portable device that includes a processor configured to execute instructions stored in a nontransitory computer-readable medium, wherein the instructions include:
generating first message authentication code (MAC) bytes based on a shared secret key;
generating first nonce bytes;
generating an authenticated packet based on the first MAC bytes, the first nonce bytes, and a message byte;
generating a de-whitened tone byte based on the shared secret key; and
generating a message packet that includes the authenticated packet and the de-whitened tone byte, wherein generating the message packet includes:
pseudo-randomly identifying a first location of the authenticated packet; and
inserting the de-whitened tone byte at the first location;

transmitting, using the processor of the portable device, the message packet to a peripheral device; and
establishing, using the processor of the portable device, a communication link between the portable device and a peripheral device in response to the peripheral device validating the message packet.

12. The system of claim 11 , wherein:
the peripheral device includes a processor configured to execute second instructions stored in a second nontransitory computer-readable medium, and wherein the second instructions include:
generating, using the processor of the peripheral device, second MAC bytes based on the shared secret key; and
generating, using the processor of the peripheral device, second nonce bytes.

13. The system of claim 12 , wherein validating the message packet comprises:
removing, using the processor of the peripheral device, the de-whitened tone byte from the message packet; and
determining, using the processor of the peripheral device, that the message packet is authorized in response to the processor of the peripheral device determining that the first MAC bytes match the second MAC bytes.

14. The system of claim 13 , wherein validating the message packet comprises determining, using the processor of the peripheral device, that the message packet is authorized in response to the processor of the peripheral device determining that the first nonce bytes match the second nonce bytes.

15. The system of claim 12 , wherein the instructions include determining the message packet is invalid in response to one of:
determining, using the processor of the peripheral device, that the first MAC bytes do not match the second MAC bytes; and
determining, using the processor of the peripheral device, that the first nonce bytes do not match the second nonce bytes.

16. The system of claim 11 , wherein the first nonce bytes are generated using a random number generator.

17. The system of claim 11 , wherein the first location is between a first MAC bit of the first MAC bytes and a second MAC bit of the first MAC bytes.

18. The system of claim 11 , wherein the first location is between a first nonce bit of the first nonce bytes and a second nonce bit of the first nonce bytes.

19. The system of claim 11 , wherein the first location precedes a location of one of the first nonce bytes and the first MAC bytes.

20. The system of claim 11 , wherein a location of the first nonce bytes and a location of the first MAC bytes precede the first location.

Assignees

• Denso Int America Inc
• Denso Corp

Inventors

• STITT Raymond
• Peterson Thomas
• Jager Karl
• Golsch Kyle

Classifications

• H04L2209/84

  Vehicles · CPC title

• G07C2009/00555

  comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks · CPC title

• G07C9/00309

  operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks · CPC title

• H04L9/3242

  involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC · CPC title

• H04L9/085

  Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes · CPC title