Data dependent authentication keys for differential power analysis resistant authentication

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9876641-B2
Application number	US-201514878404-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Oct 8, 2015
Priority date	Oct 8, 2015
Publication date	Jan 23, 2018
Grant date	Jan 23, 2018

Abstract

A system and method for using mixing functions to generate and manipulate authentication keys based on the data being decrypted to mitigate the effect of side channel attacks based on differential power analysis (DPA). The mixing function may be based on a XOR tree, substitution-permutation networks, or double-mix Feistel networks. The mixing function uses some secret key material, which diversifies its behavior between different instantiations.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A system for improving security of a device comprising:
a mixing unit that:
generates a first authentication key for a first segment of data, the first authentication key being dependent on a first ciphertext corresponding with the first segment of data; wherein if the first segment of data has a bit length that is shorter than the bit length of the first authentication key, parts of the first segment of data are repeated to fill an input buffer of the mixing unit or remaining bits of the input buffer are set; and wherein if the first segment of data has a bit length that is longer than the bit length of the first authentication key, the mixing unit truncates the first authentication key by dropping unneeded bits or XORing the unneeded bits to at least one or more of the used bits; and
generates a second authentication key for a second segment of data, the second authentication key being dependent on a second ciphertext corresponding with the second segment of data;
wherein the first authentication key is different from the second authentication key.

2. The system of claim 1 further comprising a message authentication code (MAC) generator that generates a first MAC based on the first authentication key and a second MAC based on the second authentication key.

3. The system of claim 1 wherein the mixing unit maps the first segment of data's block size input with the first segment of data's block size output.

4. The system of claim 1 wherein the first segment of data is hashed to align with an input buffer of the mixing unit.

5. The system of claim 1 wherein the mixing unit is invertible.

6. The system of claim 1 wherein the mixing unit is non-linear.

7. The system of claim 1 wherein the mixing unit is selected from the group consisting of a XOR tree mixing unit, substitution-permutation mixing unit, and double-mix Feistel mixing unit.

8. The system of claim 1 further comprising a key rolling unit that cooperates with the mixing unit.

9. A method for improving security of a device comprising the steps of:
generating with a mixing unit a first authentication key for a first segment of data, the first authentication key being dependent on such first segment of data; wherein if the first segment of data has a bit length that is longer than a bit length of the first authentication key, repeating parts of the first segment of data to fill an input buffer of the mixing unit or setting remaining bits of the input buffer; and wherein if the first segment of data has a bit length that is longer than the bit length of the first authentication key, truncating the first authentication key by dropping unneeded bits or XORing the unneeded bits to at least one or more of the used bits; and
generating with the mixing unit a second authentication key for a second segment of data, the second authentication key being dependent on such second segment of data;
wherein the first authentication key is different from the second authentication key.

10. The method of claim 9 further comprising the step of generating with a message authentication code (MAC) a first MAC based on the first authentication key and a second MAC based on the second authentication key.

11. The method of claim 9 further comprising the step of mapping the first segment of data's block size input with the first segment of data's block size output.

12. The method of claim 9 further comprising the step of hashing the first segment of data to align with an input buffer of the mixing unit.

13. The method of claim 9 wherein the mixing unit is invertible.

14. The method of claim 9 wherein the mixing unit is non-linear.

15. The method of claim 9 wherein the mixing unit is selected from the group consisting of a XOR tree mixing unit, substitution-permutation mixing unit, and double-mix Feistel mixing unit.

16. The method of claim 9 further comprising the step of a key rolling unit cooperating with the mixing unit.

Assignees

• Boeing Co

Inventors

• Hars Laszlo
• Matthews Jr Donald P

Classifications

• H04L9/3242

  involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC · CPC title

• H04L9/003

  for power analysis, e.g. differential power analysis [DPA] or simple power analysis [SPA] · CPC title

• H04L9/0861 Primary

  Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords · CPC title

• H04L9/0625 Primary

  with splitting of the data block into left and right halves, e.g. Feistel based algorithms, DES, FEAL, IDEA or KASUMI · CPC title

• H04L2209/24

  Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption · CPC title