Isolating guest code and data using multiple nested page tables

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9870324-B2
Application number	US-201514798483-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Jul 14, 2015
Priority date	Apr 9, 2015
Publication date	Jan 16, 2018
Grant date	Jan 16, 2018

Abstract

A hypervisor provides a guest operating system with a plurality of protection domains, including a root protection domain and one or more secure protection domains, and mechanisms for controlling the transitions between the protection domains. The guest physical memory region of a secure protection domain, which is mapped to host physical memory by secure nested page tables, stores secure guest code and data, and guest page tables for the secure guest code. When executing secure guest code, the guest page tables stored in the secure protection domain region are used for guest virtual to guest physical address translations, and the secure nested page tables are used for guest physical to host physical address translations.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method of isolating secure guest code to be executed in a guest that is configured in a host by a virtualization software, comprising:
creating first page tables, which are used for guest physical to host physical address translations, that provide mappings to a first protected region of host physical memory where the secure guest code has been loaded;
creating second page tables, which are used for guest physical to host physical address translations, that provide mappings to a second protected region of the host physical memory;
storing third page tables, which are used for guest virtual to guest physical address translations, in the first protected region;
storing fourth page tables, which are used for guest virtual to guest physical address translations, in the second protected region; and
when execution is switched from a non-secure guest code, which is loaded into the second protected region, to the secure guest code, changing a first pointer value from one that points to the fourth page tables to one that points to the third page tables so that the third page tables are accessed for guest virtual to guest physical address translations, and changing a second pointer value from one that points to the second page tables to one that points to the first page tables so that the first page tables are accessed for guest physical to host physical address translations.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first page tables include a mapping to a trampoline code that causes the execution switch from the non-secure guest code to the secure guest code when the trampoline code is called while the non-secure guest code is being executed, and the second page tables also include a mapping to the trampoline code.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the mapping to the trampoline code included in the second page tables has a control bit that prohibits writing to the host physical memory location into which the trampoline code has been loaded.

4. The method of claim 2 , further comprising:
detecting an interrupt while executing the secure guest code;
saving contents of guest registers and then clearing the contents of the guest registers;
switching to the fourth page tables for guest virtual to guest physical address translations, and to the second page tables for guest physical to host physical address translations;
delivering the interrupt to an interrupt handler in the guest; and
after the interrupt handler completes execution, calling into the trampoline code to cause the execution switch back to the secure guest code.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first page tables also include non-executable mappings to the second protected region.

6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the first page tables include a mapping to a helper function, and the helper function is invoked to access the host physical memory locations of the second protected region during execution of the secure guest code.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first page tables further include a mapping to confidential data.

8. The method of claim 7 , wherein the confidential data is used as a cryptographic key for decrypting and encrypting data transmitted between the secure guest code and a module within the virtualization software.

9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
performing signature verification on the secure guest code upon being notified that the secure guest code has been loaded into the host physical memory.

10. A non-transitory computer readable medium comprising instructions to be executed in a host including one or more processors and host physical memory to carry out a method of isolating secure guest code to be executed in a guest that is configured in the host by a virtualization software, said method comprising:
creating first page tables, which are used for guest physical to host physical address translations, that provide mappings to a first protected region of host physical memory where the secure guest code has been loaded;
creating second page tables, which are used for guest physical to host physical address translations, that provide mappings to a second protected region of the host physical memory that is distinct from the first protected region of the host physical memory;
storing third page tables, which are used for guest virtual to guest physical address translations, in the first protected region;
storing fourth page tables, which are used for guest virtual to guest physical address translations, in the second protected region; and
when execution is switched from a non-secure guest code, which is loaded into the second protected region, to the secure guest code, changing a first pointer value from one that points to the fourth page tables to one that points to the third page tables so that the third page tables are accessed for guest virtual to guest physical address translations, and changing a second pointer value from one that points to the second page tables to one that points to the first page tables so that the first page tables are accessed for guest physical to host physical address translations.

11. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 10 , wherein the first page tables include a mapping to a trampoline code that causes the execution switch from the non-secure guest code to the secure guest code when the trampoline code is called while the non-secure guest code is being executed, and the second page tables also include a mapping to the trampoline code.

12. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 11 , wherein the mapping to the trampoline code included in the second page tables has a control bit that prohibits writing to the host physical memory location into which the trampoline code has been loaded.

13. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 11 , wherein the method further comprises:
detecting an interrupt while executing the secure guest code;
saving contents of guest registers and then clearing the contents of the guest registers;
switching to the fourth page tables for guest virtual to guest physical address translations, and to the second page tables for guest physical to host physical address translations;
delivering the interrupt to an interrupt handler in the guest; and
after the interrupt handler completes execution, calling into the trampoline code to cause the execution switch back to the secure guest code.

14. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 10 , wherein the first page tables also include non-executable mappings to the second protected region.

15. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 14 , wherein the first page tables include a mapping to a helper function, and the helper function is invoked to access the host physical memory locations of the second protected region during execution of the secure guest code.

16. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 10 , wherein the first page tables further include a mapping to confidential data.

17. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 16 , wherein the confidential data is used as a cryptographic key for decrypting and encrypting data transmitted between the secure guest code and a module within the virtualization software.

18. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 10 , wherein the method further comprises:
performing signature verification on the secure guest code upon being notified that the secure guest code has been loaded into the host physical memory.

19. A host including one or more processors and host phy

Assignees

• Vmware Inc

Inventors

• Mattson Jr James S
• Agarwal Rakesh
• Kataria Alok Nemchand
• Xu Wei
• Jacobs Frederick Joseph

Classifications

• G06F2212/151

  Emulated environment, e.g. virtual machine · CPC title

• G06F9/45558

  Hypervisor-specific management and integration aspects · CPC title

• G06F2212/1052

  Security improvement · CPC title

• G06F12/1009 Primary

  using page tables, e.g. page table structures · CPC title

• G06F12/145 Primary

  the protection being virtual, e.g. for virtual blocks or segments before a translation mechanism · CPC title