Wireless device and method for rekeying with reduced packet loss for high-throughput wireless communications
US-9231760-B2 · Jan 5, 2016 · US
US9866380B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-9866380-B2 |
| Application number | US-201614987011-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Jan 4, 2016 |
| Priority date | Dec 21, 2009 |
| Publication date | Jan 9, 2018 |
| Grant date | Jan 9, 2018 |
A practical reading order for non-experts. Skip the full description unless you need deep technical detail.
What the patent document calls the invention.
A short plain-language summary of the technical disclosure.
Who owns or filed the patent and who is credited as inventor.
Filing, priority, publication, and grant dates set the timeline.
The legal scope of protection — read this for what is actually claimed.
Technology tags used to group this patent with similar filings.
Prior art links and similar publications in this corpus.
Official abstract text for this publication.
Embodiments of a wireless device and methods for rekeying with reduced packet loss in a wireless network are generally described herein. In some embodiments, during rekeying operations a new key for reception may be installed early (i.e., prior to receipt of a rekeying confirmation message). The use of the new key for transmission may be delayed until after receipt of the rekeying confirmation message. The early installation of the new key for reception may allow both the new key and old key to be active at the same time for use decrypting received packets to reduce packet loss during rekeying operations. The rekeying confirmation message may be the fourth message of a four-way handshake for rekeying. In some embodiments, two key identifiers may be alternated between four-way handshakes to prevent deletion of the old key.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium that stores instructions for execution by one or more processors of a wireless device to perform operations comprising: transmitting, in a rekeying initiation response message of a four-way handshake, a robust security network (RSN) information element (IE) with an extended key ID field containing a 0 or a 1 to indicate whether the device supports use of a proposed extended key ID in unicast communication; receiving, in a response validation message of the four-way handshake, a key ID key data encapsulation (KBE); and transmitting, in a rekeying confirmation message of the four-way handshake, the key ID KDE to indicate agreement to use the proposed extended key ID. 2. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the memory is configured to store a plurality of unicast keys for use in encrypting and decrypting packets comprising unicast traffic. 3. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 2 , wherein the plurality of unicast keys includes a key derived from a previous four-way handshake. 4. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the four-way handshake comprises an Extensible Authentication Protocol over Local area network (EAPOL) key frame. 5. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium that stores instructions for execution by one or more processors of a first wireless device to perform operations comprising: receiving from a second wireless communications device, in a rekeying initiation response message of a four-way handshake, a robust security network (RSN) information element (IE) with an extended key ID field containing a 0 or a 1 to indicate whether the second device supports use of a proposed extended key ID in unicast communication; transmitting to the second wireless communications device, in a response validation message of the four-way handshake, a key ID key data encapsulation (KDE); and receiving from the second wireless communications device, in a rekeying confirmation message of the four-way handshake, the key ID KDE to indicate agreement to use the proposed extended key ID. 6. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 5 , wherein the memory is configured to store a plurality of unicast keys for use in encrypting and decrypting packets comprising unicast traffic. 7. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 6 , wherein the plurality of unicast keys includes a key derived from a previous four-way handshake. 8. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 5 , wherein the four-way handshake comprises an Extensible Authentication Protocol over Local area network (EAPOL) key frame.
Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying · CPC title
Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use · CPC title
Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] · CPC title
applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key · CPC title
using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for controlling usage of secret information H04L9/088) · CPC title
Related publications grouped by family.
Answers are generated from the same data shown on this page.