Protection against passive sniffing

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9847879-B2
Application number	US-201113883933-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Nov 8, 2011
Priority date	Nov 8, 2010
Publication date	Dec 19, 2017
Grant date	Dec 19, 2017

Abstract

The invention relates in particular to a method for securing the execution of a cryptographic algorithm (ALG) against passive sniffing, the method implementing masking (MSK) of data processed by the cryptographic algorithm. The masking (MSK) of said data includes a linear encoding step such as x′=x·L+c, in which x is the data to be masked, x′ is the corresponding masked data, c is a code word included in a linear code C, and L is a matrix made up of linearly independent vectors not included in the linear code C. The invention also relates to a device (SC) implementing such a method.

First claim

The invention claimed is:

1. A method for securing an electronic device executing a cryptographic algorithm against passive sniffing via a side channel based on analyzing a measurable physical parameter of the electronic device during operation, the method comprising:
masking data processed by the cryptographic algorithm, including applying a transformation step x′=x·L+c, where x is data to be masked, x′ is the corresponding masked data, c is a codeword included in a linear code C, and L is a matrix consisting of linearly independent vectors not included in the linear code C; and
generating the measurable physical parameter of the electronic device by applying the cryptographic algorithm, wherein the measurable physical parameter is communicated via the side channel of the electronic device, and a third-party attacker is unable to correlate the measurable physical parameter with the data processed by the cryptographic algorithm.

2. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the codeword c is chosen randomly during each execution of the cryptographic algorithm.

3. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the matrix L is randomly chosen one time only for all executions of the cryptographic algorithm (ALG).

4. The method according to claim 1 , comprising carrying out an unmasking operation after executing the cryptographic algorithm.

5. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the cryptographic algorithm is an algorithm executing a nonlinear operation S, said nonlinear operation S being replaced with a nonlinear operation S′ such that S′(x·L+c)=S(x)·L+c′, where c′ is a codeword of the linear code C.

6. The method according to claim 5 , wherein the cryptographic algorithm comprises several rounds, each round comprising the same nonlinear operation S, and the nonlinear operation S is replaced with the same nonlinear operation S′ during each round.

7. The method according to claim 5 , wherein c′=c.

8. The method of claim 1 , comprising transmitting the data processed by the cryptographic algorithm via a communication channel.

9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the measurable physical parameter is one of emitted vibration, electromagnetic radiation, or temperature.

10. An electronic device comprising:
a processing unit; and
a memory storing instructions for securing execution of a cryptographic algorithm against passive sniffing via a side channel based on analyzing a measurable physical parameter of the electronic device during operation, wherein the instructions, when executed on the processing unit, cause the electronic device to:
mask data processed by the cryptographic algorithm, including apply a transformation x′=x·L+c, where x is data to be masked, x′ is the corresponding masked data, c is a codeword included in a linear code C, and L is a matrix consisting of linearly independent vectors not included in the linear code C; and
generate the measurable physical parameter of the electronic device by applying the cryptographic algorithm, wherein the measurable physical parameter is communicated via the side channel of the electronic device, and a third-party attacker is unable to correlate the measurable physical parameter with the data processed by the cryptographic algorithm.

11. The electronic device according to claim 10 , the instructions further causing the electronic device to choose the codeword c randomly during each execution of the cryptographic algorithm.

12. The electronic device according to claim 10 , the instructions further causing the electronic device to choose the matrix L randomly one time only for all executions of the cryptographic algorithm.

13. The electronic device according to claim 10 , the instructions further causing the electronic device to perform the masking before executing the cryptographic algorithm, to execute the cryptographic algorithm, and to perform an unmasking operation after executing the cryptographic algorithm.

14. The electronic device according to claim 10 , wherein the cryptographic algorithm is an algorithm including a nonlinear operation S, the instructions further causing the electronic device to replace the nonlinear operation S with a nonlinear operation S′ such that S′(x·L+c)=S(x)·L+c′, where c′ is a codeword of the linear code C.

15. The electronic device according to claim 14 , wherein the cryptographic algorithm comprises several rounds, each round comprising the same nonlinear operation S, the instructions further causing the electronic device to replace the nonlinear operation S with the same nonlinear operation S′ during each round.

16. The electronic device according to claim 14 , wherein c′=c.

17. The electronic device of claim 10 , wherein the electronic device includes a smart card.

18. The electronic device of claim 10 , wherein the electronic device includes a personal computer.

19. The electronic device of claim 10 , wherein the electronic device includes one of an electronic driver's license, an electronic passport, a secure Universal Serial Bus (USB) key, a secure multimedia (MMC) card, or a secure token.

20. The electronic device of claim 10 , wherein the measurable physical parameter is one of emitted vibration, electromagnetic radiation, or temperature.

Assignees

• CHABANNE Hervé
• Bringer Julien
• Le Thanh Ha
• Morpho

Inventors

• CHABANNE Hervé
• Bringer Julien
• Le Thanh Ha

Classifications

• H04L2209/04

  Masking or blinding · CPC title

• H04L9/28 Primary

  Electricity · mapped topic

• H04L9/003 Primary

  for power analysis, e.g. differential power analysis [DPA] or simple power analysis [SPA] · CPC title

• H04L2209/56

  Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash · CPC title

• H04L9/30 Primary

  Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy · CPC title