DNS-based captive portal with integrated transparent proxy to protect against user device caching incorrect IP address
US-9756019-B2 · Sep 5, 2017 · US
US9832276B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-9832276-B2 |
| Application number | US-201514754669-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Jun 29, 2015 |
| Priority date | Jun 28, 2014 |
| Publication date | Nov 28, 2017 |
| Grant date | Nov 28, 2017 |
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An approach for selective dynamic disabling of transport layer handshake spoofing is provided. A local proxy node of a communications network receives request message from a respective local host for establishing a network connection with a remote host. A destination address for the network connection is determined. It is determined whether the destination address is included in a handshake spoofing bypass list. If it is determined that the destination address is included in the spoofing bypass list, a corresponding un-spoofed connection request message is transmitted to a remote proxy node associated with the remote host, in accordance with a respective handshaking protocol for the connection establishment. If it is determined that the destination address is not included in the spoofing bypass list, a corresponding spoofed connection request message is transmitted to the remote proxy node, in accordance with a respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A method comprising: receiving, by a local proxy node of a communications network, a request message from a respective local host for establishing a network connection with a remote host; determining a destination address for the network connection; determining whether the destination address is included in a handshake spoofing bypass list; and if it is determined that the destination address is included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, transmitting a corresponding un-spoofed connection request message to a remote proxy node associated with the remote host, in accordance with a respective handshaking protocol for the connection establishment; and if it is determined that the destination address is not included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, transmitting a corresponding spoofed connection request message to the remote proxy node associated with the remote host, in accordance with a respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment. 2. The method according to claim 1 , further comprising: when it is determined that the destination address is not included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, in addition to the transmission of the corresponding spoofed connection request message to the remote proxy node, transmitting a corresponding acknowledgment message to the local host, in accordance with the respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment. 3. The method according to claim 1 , when it is determined that the destination address is not included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, the method further comprises: determining whether an error message has been received from the remote proxy node; and if it is determined that the error message has been received from the remote proxy node, adding the destination address to the handshake spoofing bypass list; and if it is determined that the error message has not been received from the remote proxy node, continuing with the connection establishment in accordance with the respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment. 4. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the connection comprises a transmission control protocol (TCP) connection, and the handshake spoofing protocol comprises eliminating multi-step handshake messaging over a network path between the local proxy node and the remote proxy node by generating local acknowledgments to spoof handshake messages to respective client applications. 5. An apparatus, comprising: at least one processor; and at least one memory including computer program code for one or more programs, the at least one memory and the computer program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus to perform at least the following, receive a request message from a respective local host for establishing a network connection with a remote host; determine a destination address for the network connection; determine whether the destination address is included in a handshake spoofing bypass list; and if it is determined that the destination address is included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, transmit a corresponding un-spoofed connection request message to a remote proxy node associated with the remote host, in accordance with a respective handshaking protocol for the connection establishment; and if it is determined that the destination address is not included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, transmit a corresponding spoofed connection request message to the remote proxy node associated with the remote host, in accordance with a respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment. 6. The apparatus according to claim 5 , wherein the apparatus is further caused to: when it is determined that the destination address is not included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, in addition to the transmission of the corresponding spoofed connection request message to the remote proxy node, transmit a corresponding acknowledgment message to the local host, in accordance with the respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment. 7. The apparatus according to claim 5 , wherein, when it is determined that the destination address is not included in the handshake spoofing bypass list, the apparatus is further caused to: determine whether an error message has been received from the remote proxy node; and if it is determined that the error message has been received from the remote proxy node, add the destination address to the handshake spoofing bypass list; and if it is determined that the error message has not been received from the remote proxy node, continue with the connection establishment in accordance with the respective handshake spoofing protocol for the connection establishment. 8. The apparatus according to claim 5 , wherein the connection comprises a transmission control protocol (TCP) connection, and the handshake spoofing protocol comprises eliminating multi-step handshake messaging over a network path between the local proxy node and the remote proxy node by generating local acknowledgments to spoof handshake messages to respective client applications.
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in the transport layer [OSI layer 4] (H04L69/16 takes precedence) · CPC title
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