Method and Apparatus For Enabling Machine To Machine Communication
US-2016044440-A1 · Feb 11, 2016 · US
US9826335B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-9826335-B2 |
| Application number | US-86300909-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Jan 21, 2009 |
| Priority date | Jan 18, 2008 |
| Publication date | Nov 21, 2017 |
| Grant date | Nov 21, 2017 |
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Official abstract text for this publication.
A method and apparatus for performing secure Machine-to-Machine (M2M) provisioning and communication is disclosed. In particular a temporary private identifier, or provisional connectivity identification (PCID), for uniquely identifying machine-to-machine equipment (M2ME) is also disclosed. Additionally, methods and apparatus for use in validating, authenticating and provisioning a M2ME is also disclosed. The validation procedures disclosed include an autonomous, semi-autonomous, and remote validation are disclosed. The provisioning procedures include methods for re-provisioning the M2ME. Procedures for updating software, and detecting tampering with the M2ME are also disclosed.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. In a system comprising a visited network operator (VNO), a registration operator (RO), and a machine-to-machine equipment (M2ME) having a trusted environment (TRE), wherein the VNO, RO, and M2ME communicate via a network, a method performed by the M2ME, the method comprising: transmitting, to the VNO, a network attach request message comprising a temporary private identifier; authenticating with the VNO using the temporary private identifier, the temporary private identifier being a provisional connectivity identification (PCID) valid for a validity period; generating, by the TRE, security-critical executable code and sending the security-critical executable code to a platform verification authority; receiving authentication vectors if the platform verification authority validates an integrity, using the security-critical executable code, of the TRE that is within the M2ME; after the M2ME is authenticated with the VNO and after the TRE is validated by the platform verification authority, establishing IP connectivity with the RO via the VNO; receiving a manageable identity (MID) from the RO; provisioning the MID on the M2ME and reporting a success message to the RO; and when the validity period expires, removing the PCID such that another M2ME can use the PCID. 2. The method of claim 1 , the method further comprising: validating the M2ME; and based on the validation of the M2ME, sending a validation success message or a validation failure message to the platform verification authority via the VNO. 3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the validation of the M2ME is at least partially determined based on a validation procedure performed by the trusted environment (TRE) within the M2ME. 4. The method of claim 3 , wherein the validation procedure is performed autonomously within the M2ME. 5. The method of claim 3 , where in the validation procedure is performed semi-autonomously by the M2ME. 6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the MID comprises at least one of a universal mobile telecommunications (UMTS) subscriber identity module (USIM) function, credentials, or configuration information which enable the M2ME to authenticate with a selected home operator (SHO). 7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the RO comprises an initial connectivity function (ICF), a discovery and registration function (DRF), and a download and provisioning function (DPF). 8. The method of claim 7 , wherein the initial connectivity function (ICF), the discovery and registration function (DRF), and the download and provisioning function (DPF) are separate entities in the network. 9. A machine-to-machine equipment (M2ME) configured to communicate, via a network, with a visited network operator (VNO) and a registration operator (RO), the M2ME having a trusted environment (TRE), the M2ME comprising: a memory comprising executable instructions; and a processor in communication with the memory, the instructions, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to effectuate operations comprising: transmitting, to the VNO, a network attach request message comprising a temporary private identifier; authenticating with the VNO using the temporary private identifier, the temporary private identifier being a provisional connectivity identification (PCID) valid for a validity period; generating, by TRE, security-critical executable code and sending the security-critical executable code to a platform verification authority; receiving authentication vectors if the platform verification authority validates an integrity, using the security-critical executable code, of the TRE that is within the M2ME; after the M2ME is authenticated with the VNO and after the TRE is validated by the platform verification authority, establishing IP connectivity with the RO via the VNO; receiving a manageable identity (MID) from the RO; provisioning the MID on the M2ME and reporting a success message to the RO; and when the validity period expires, removing the PCID such that another M2ME can use the PCID. 10. The M2ME of claim 9 , wherein the processor is further configured to execute the instructions to perform operations comprising: validating the M2ME; and based on the validation of the M2ME, sending a validation success message or a validation failure message to platform verification authority via the VNO. 11. The M2ME of claim 10 , wherein the validation of the M2ME is at least partially determined based on a validation procedure performed by the trusted environment (TRE) within the M2ME. 12. The M2ME of claim 11 , wherein the validation procedure is performed autonomously within the M2ME. 13. The M2ME of claim 11 , where in the validation procedure is performed semi-autonomously by the M2ME. 14. The M2ME of claim 9 , wherein the MID comprises at least one of a universal mobile telecommunications (UMTS) subscriber identity module (USIM) function, credentials, or configuration information which enable the M2ME to authenticate with a selected home operator (SHO). 15. The M2ME of claim 9 , wherein the RO comprises an initial connectivity function (ICF), a discovery and registration function (DRF), and a download and provisioning function (DPF). 16. The M2ME of claim 15 , wherein the initial connectivity function (ICF), the discovery and registration function (DRF), and the download and provisioning function (DPF) are separate entities in the network.
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