Trusted entity based anti-cheating mechanism

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9805196-B2
Application number	US-39443009-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Feb 27, 2009
Priority date	Feb 27, 2009
Publication date	Oct 31, 2017
Grant date	Oct 31, 2017

Abstract

An anti-cheating system may comprise a combination of a modified environment, such as a modified operating system, in conjunction with a trusted external entity to verify that the modified environment is running on a particular device. The modified environment may be may be modified in a particular manner to create a restricted environment as compared with an original environment which is replaced by the modified environment. The modifications to the modified environment may comprise alternations to the original environment to, for example, detect and/or prevent changes to the hardware and/or software intended to allow cheating or undesirable user behavior.

First claim

What is claimed:

1. A method for preventing cheating comprising:
monitoring, by a trusted component, a device and a modified operating system executing on the device;
performing a proxy execution operation that includes execution of code on a tamper resistant security processor, wherein the proxy execution operation utilizes a licensed channel between the tamper resistant security processor and a central processing unit of the device, the trusted component usable to check the licensed channel's attestation, and an associated static root of trust measurement usable to validate that the modified operating system is running in an untampered form, and wherein the tamper resistant security processor is associated with a particular static root of trust measurement usable to cause a recovery check when the licensed channel expires; and
restricting access to resources based on results of the monitoring and the performing of the proxy execution operation.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the resources are necessary secrets.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the resources are network services.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the resources are additional hardware.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the trusted component is a trusted platform module.

6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the trusted platform module combined with software running on the device generate a static root of trust measurement.

7. The method of claim 6 , further comprising performing a code integrity operation.

8. The method of claim 7 , further comprising performing a disk integrity operation.

9. The method of claim 1 , wherein a first operating system executing on the device is modified to provide the modified operating system.

10. The method of claim 7 , further comprising performing an individualization mechanism.

11. The method of claim 1 , further comprising performing a watchdog operation.

12. A computer readable storage device comprising instructions for preventing cheating, the instructions for performing operations comprising:
monitoring, by a trusted component, a device and a modified operating system executing on the device;
performing a proxy execution operation that includes execution of code on a tamper resistant security processor, wherein the proxy execution operation utilizes a licensed channel between the tamper resistant security processor and a central processing unit of the device, the trusted component usable to check the licensed channel's attestation, and an associated static root of trust measurement usable to validate that the modified operating system is running in an untampered form, and wherein the tamper resistant security processor is associated with a particular static root of trust measurement usable to cause a recovery check when the licensed channel expires; and
restricting access to resources based on results of the monitoring and the performing of the proxy execution operation.

13. The computer readable storage device of claim 12 , wherein the resources are necessary secrets.

14. The computer readable storage device of claim 12 , wherein the resources are network services.

15. The computer readable storage device of claim 12 , wherein the resources are additional hardware.

16. The computer readable storage device of claim 12 , wherein a first operating system executing on the device is modified to provide the modified operating system.

17. A system for preventing cheating comprising:
a device;
a modified operating system executing on the device,
a tamper resistant security processor;
a memory storing computer-executable instructions that, when executed, cause the system to perform operations comprising:
instantiate a licensed channel operable to perform a proxy execution operation that includes execution of code on the tamper resistant security processor, wherein the licensed channel is between the tamper resistant security processor and a central processing unit of the device, and including a trusted component usable to check the licensed channel's attestation and an associated static root of trust measurement usable to validate that the modified operating system is running in an untampered form, and wherein the tamper resistant security processor is associated with a particular static root of trust measurement usable to perform a recovery check when the licensed channel expires;
monitor the device and the modified operating system; and
restrict access to resources based on results of the monitoring and performing of the proxy execution operation.

18. The system of claim 17 , wherein the resources are necessary secrets.

19. The system of claim 17 , wherein the resources are network services.

20. The system of claim 17 , wherein the resources are additional hardware.

21. The system of claim 17 , wherein a first operating system executing on the device is modified to provide the modified operating system.

Assignees

• Ray Kenneth D
• Alkove James M
• Mcmichael Lonny Dean
• Lewis Nathan T
• Schnell Patrik
• Microsoft Technology Licensing Llc

Inventors

• Ray Kenneth D
• Alkove James M
• Mcmichael Lonny Dean
• Lewis Nathan T
• Schnell Patrik

Classifications

• A63F13/75

  Enforcing rules, e.g. detecting foul play or generating lists of cheating players · CPC title

• G06F2221/2149

  Restricted operating environment · CPC title

• G06F21/51

  at application loading time, e.g. accepting, rejecting, starting or inhibiting executable software based on integrity or source reliability · CPC title

• A63F13/73

  Authorising game programs or game devices, e.g. checking authenticity · CPC title

• H04L9/3234

  involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853) · CPC title