Method for non-kinetic performance assessment

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9779191-B1
Application number	US-201414185029-A
Country	US
Kind code	B1
Filing date	Feb 20, 2014
Priority date	Feb 20, 2014
Publication date	Oct 3, 2017
Grant date	Oct 3, 2017

Abstract

Embodiments of an apparatus and method for assessing non-kinetic weapon performance for negating missile threats are generally described herein. In some embodiments, vulnerabilities of missile threats and techniques for negating the threats are identified. A probability of negation associated with an effectiveness of each of the techniques against the vulnerabilities is calculated. The calculated probability of negation of each technique against each vulnerability are conditioned at a plurality of times associated with a plurality of asymmetric missile defense (AMD) layer elements to produce temporal level probabilities of negation. Each temporal level probabilities of negation are conditioned based on a probability of validation of deployment and a probability of verification of mitigation to produce a battle damage assessment probability of negation. A terminal phase probability of impact failure without any intervention is calculated by combining the battle damage assessment probability of negation for each of plurality of AMD layers.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method for negating a missile threat, comprising:
identifying, using one or more hardware processors, vulnerabilities of missile threats and non-kinetic techniques for negating the missile threats prior to launch of the missile threats by exploiting the identified vulnerabilities;
calculating, using one or more of the hardware processors, a probability of negation associated with an effectiveness of each of the identified non-kinetic techniques against each vulnerability prior to launch of the missile threats;
conditioning the calculated probability of negation of each non-kinetic technique against each vulnerability at a plurality of times associated with a plurality of asymmetric missile defense (AMD) layer elements to produce temporal level probabilities of negation;
conditioning each of the temporal level probabilities of negation based on a probability of validation of deployment and a probability of verification of mitigation to produce a battle damage assessment probability of negation; calculating a terminal phase probability of impact failure without any kinetic intervention by combining the battle damage assessment probability of negation for each of the plurality of AMD layer elements; and
negating one or more of the missile threats using the identified non-kinetic techniques in response to determining the terminal phase probability of impact failure without any kinetic intervention is greater than a specified threshold, wherein one or more of the non-kinetic techniques includes using two or more cyber technologies, wherein the two or more cyber technologies include a first cyber technology during a production and test phase of the missile threats, and a second cyber technology during a boost, mid-course, or terminal phase of the missile threats, the first cyber technology including affecting a network associated with a launch of a first missile threat of the missile threats to induce a material defect in the first missile threat, and the second cyber technology including (a) at least one of airborne jamming to degrade a communication uplink, initiate self-destruct, or disrupt a guidance system of a second missile threat of the missile threats and (b) deploying a decoy payload to simulate a radar return from a target of the second missile threat.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the calculating the probability of negation associated with the effectiveness of each technique against each vulnerability comprises calculating a probability of negation that specific kinetic and non-kinetic techniques will overcome identified vulnerabilities.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the calculating the probability of negation associated with the effectiveness of each of the techniques against each vulnerability comprises combining data from subject matter experts via a rule-based value derivation process.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the calculating the probability of negation associated with the effectiveness of each of the techniques against each vulnerability comprises performing failure modes effective analysis including analysis of components for each vulnerability, functions, operational modes, failure modes and causes, failure effects, severities and detection methods.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the producing temporal level probabilities of negation comprises deriving a probability distribution function from the probability of negation associated with an effectiveness of each of the techniques against each vulnerability and deriving a confidence level for each probability distribution function.

6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the producing temporal level probabilities of negation further comprises generating a matrix of temporal level probabilities of negation for the vulnerabilities and techniques.

7. The method of claim 6 , wherein the generating the matrix further comprises generating a matrix having an x-axis and a y-axis, wherein the x-axis of the matrix is associated with the vulnerabilities with values related to operations, equipment, and facilities of a threat and the y-axis of the matrix is associated with techniques for exploiting the vulnerabilities to cause a failure of the threat to prevent a successful attack.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the producing the temporal level probabilities of negation comprises calculating temporal level probabilities of negation for time sub-elements for each of the plurality of AMD layer elements.

9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the calculating a terminal phase probability of impact failure without any intervention by combining the battle damage assessment probability of negation for each of plurality of AMD layer elements comprises using a Bayesian conditional calculation.

10. The method of claim 1 , wherein the producing the battle damage assessment probability of negation comprises multiplying the probability of negation of a specific technique used against a specific vulnerability at a certain time given the probability of validation of deployment validated based on data obtained from intelligence sources by a probability that the technique has been mitigated and is no longer available for use.

11. The method of claim 10 , wherein the probability of validation of deployment is validated based on data obtained from intelligence sources comprises a product of the probability that a threat action will occur, the probability that an intelligence source is available when the threat action occurs, the probability that the intelligence source detects the threat action, the probability that data from the intelligence source is timely enough to enable a tactical response to the threat action.

12. The method of claim 1 , wherein the calculating the terminal phase probability of impact failure without any intervention by combining the battle damage assessment probability of negation for each of plurality of AMD layer elements further comprises combining the battle damage assessment probability of negation for the production and test phase, a fielding and deployment phase, the boost phase and the mid-course phase, and the terminal phase.

13. The method of claim 12 , wherein the calculating the terminal phase probability of impact failure without any intervention comprises calculating the terminal phase probability of impact failure without any intervention using a Bayesian conditional calculation to modify estimates based on conditions from the production and test phase, the fielding and deployment phase, the boost phase and the mid-course phase.

14. An apparatus for negating a missile threat, the apparatus comprising:
memory for storing data; and
one or more processors, coupled to the memory, the one or more processors arranged to:
calculate a probability of negation of one or more missile threats using one or more non-kinetic techniques, the probability based on an effectiveness of each of the non-kinetic techniques against identified vulnerabilities of the one or more missile threats prior to launch by exploiting one or more of the identified vulnerabilities,
condition the calculated probability of negation of each non-kinetic technique against each vulnerability of the vulnerabilities at a plurality of times associated with a plurality of asymmetric missile defense (AMD) layer elements to produce temporal level probabilities of negation,
condition each of the temporal level probabilities of negation based on a probability of validation of deployment and a probability of verification of mitigation to produce a battle damage assessment probability of negation and calculate a terminal phase probability of impact failure without any intervention by combi

Assignees

• Raytheon Co

Inventors

• Hershey Paul C
• Dehnert Jr Robert E
• Williams John J
• Carbone John N
• Robinson Jeanne M
• Wisniewski David J

Classifications

• G06N7/01

  Probabilistic graphical models, e.g. probabilistic networks · CPC title

• G06F30/367 Primary

  Design verification, e.g. using simulation, simulation program with integrated circuit emphasis [SPICE], direct methods or relaxation methods · CPC title

• F41H11/02 Primary

  Anti-aircraft or anti-guided missile {or anti-torpedo} defence installations or systems (cartridges or missiles for producing smoke or for dispensing radar chaff or infrared material F42B5/15, F42B12/48, F42B12/70; {informative reference: details of radar or sonar systems G01S7/00; jamming or electronic countermeasures G01S7/38, G01S7/495, H04K3/00}) · CPC title

• G06N99/00

  Subject matter not provided for in other groups of this subclass · CPC title

• G06F17/5036 Primary

  Physics · mapped topic