Secure Management of Operations on Protected Virtual Machines
US-2015319160-A1 · Nov 5, 2015 · US
US9768966B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-9768966-B2 |
| Application number | US-201514821616-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Aug 7, 2015 |
| Priority date | Aug 7, 2015 |
| Publication date | Sep 19, 2017 |
| Grant date | Sep 19, 2017 |
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Techniques for peer to peer attestation are provided. An example method includes receiving, at a first device, a discovery message from a second device, based on the discovery message, establishing a communication channel between the first device and the second device, receiving, at the first device, identity information from the second device, the identity information including one or more of: a trusted platform module (TPM) endorsement key certificate, a public portion of an identity key, one or more platform control register (PCR) values or a quote of the PCR values with the identity key, verifying, at the first device, one or more of the PCR values, the quote or the endorsement key certificate and authenticating one or more of the communication channel or the identity information of the second device based on the verification of a signature received from the second device.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A computer implemented method comprising: receiving, at a first device, a discovery message from a second device; based on the discovery message, establishing a communication channel between the first device and the second device; receiving, at the first device, identity information from the second device, the identity information including a public portion of an identity key and one or more of: a trusted platform module (TPM) endorsement key certificate, one or more platform control register (PCR) values or a quote of the PCR values with the identity key; verifying, at the first device, one or more of the PCR values, the quote or the endorsement key certificate; and based on the verification, sending, from the first device to the second device, a message including a signing key, wherein the signing key includes a random value generated by the first device; encrypting, at the first device with an endorsement public key, a combination of identity key information and the signing key; providing the encrypted combination from the first device to the second device; when a response is received from the second device at the first device after the providing, verifying a signature included in the response; and authenticating one or more of the communication channel or the identity information from the second device based on the verification of the signature, thereby allowing peer to peer attestation between the first and second devices. 2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the TPM endorsement key certificate is provided by a manufacturer of the second device. 3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the endorsement key certificate is verified against a list of valid endorsement root authorities stored at the first device. 4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the combination is a data structure readable by a TPM at the first device or the second device. 5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the signing key is recovered from the encrypted combination by the second device when a TPM of the second device includes private keys for the endorsement public key and the identity key. 6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the response is received from the second device when the second device is able to recover the signing key from the encrypted combination. 7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the response from the second device includes the signature of the encrypted combination using the signing key, the signing key recovered by the second device. 8. A non-transitory machine-readable medium comprising instructions stored therein, which when executed by a processor, causes the processor to perform operations comprising: receiving, at a first device, a discovery message from a second device; based on the discovery message, establishing a communication channel between the first device and the second device; receiving, at the first device, identity information from the second device, the identity information including a public portion of an identity key and one or more of: a trusted platform module (TPM) endorsement key certificate, one or more platform control register (PCR) values or a quote of the PCR values with the identity key; verifying, at the first device, one or more of the PCR values, the quote or the endorsement key certificate; and based on the verification, sending, from the first device to the second device, a message including connectivity information associated with the established communication channel, wherein the connectivity information includes a random value generated by the first device; encrypting, at the first device with an endorsement public key, a combination of the connectivity information and identity key information; providing the encrypted combination from the first device to the second device; when a response is received from the second device at the first device after the providing, verifying a signature included in the response; and authenticating one or more of the communication channel or the identity information from the second device based on the verification, thereby allowing peer to peer attestation between the first and second devices. 9. The machine-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the TPM endorsement key certificate is provided by a manufacturer of the second device. 10. The machine-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the endorsement key certificate is verified against a list of valid endorsement root authorities stored at the first device. 11. The machine-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the combination is a data structure readable by a TPM at the first device or the second device. 12. The machine-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the signing key is recovered from the encrypted combination by the second device when a TPM of the second device includes private keys for the endorsement public key and the identity key. 13. The machine-readable of claim 12 , wherein the response is received from the second device when the second device is able to recover the connectivity information from the encrypted combination. 14. The machine-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the response from the second device includes the signature of the encrypted combination using the connectivity information, the connectivity information recovered by the second device. 15. A system comprising: a memory comprising instructions; and a processor configured to execute the instructions to: receive, at a first device, a discovery message from a second device; based on the discovery message, establish a communication channel between the first device and the second device; receive, at the first device, identity information from the second device, the identity information including a public portion of an identity key and one or more of: a trusted platform module (TPM) endorsement key certificate, one or more platform control register (PCR) values, a public portion of an asymmetric signing key, a signature of the public portion of the asymmetric signing key by the identity key, or a quote of the PCR values with the identity key; verify, at the first device, one or more of the PCR values, the quote, the endorsement key certificate or certification of the asymmetric signing key; and based on the verification, send, from the first device to the second device, a message including a signing key, wherein the signing key includes a random value generated by the first device; encrypt, at the first device with an endorsement public key, a combination of identity key information and the signing key; provide the encrypted combination from the first device to the second device; when a response is received from the second device at the first device after the providing, verify a signature included in the response; and authenticate one or more of the communication channel or the identity information from the second device based on the verification of the signature, thereby allowing peer to peer attestation between the first and second devices. 16. The system of claim 15 , wherein the first device retains the asymmetric signing key along with other metadata for the second device to authenticate future connections to the second device. 17. The system of claim 15 , wherein the endorsement key certificate is verified against a list of valid endorsement root authorities stored at the first device. 18. The system of claim 15 , wherein the combination is a data structure readable by a TPM at the first device or the second device. 19. The system of claim 15 , wherein the signing key is recovered from the encrypted combinati
involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853) · CPC title
wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload · CPC title
Key distribution {or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting key management in a packet data network H04L63/06)} · CPC title
using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates · CPC title
using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM] · CPC title
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