Collaborative defense of energy distribution protection and control devices

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9755896-B2
Application number	US-47253209-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	May 27, 2009
Priority date	May 28, 2008
Publication date	Sep 5, 2017
Grant date	Sep 5, 2017

Abstract

A method is disclosed for preventing malicious settings changes to IEDs in a power transmission and distribution network. Attempted changes to the protection settings of an IED is detected and transmitted to one or more neighboring IEDs. The neighboring IEDs check for consistency of the new settings and return conformance or nonconformance signals. If a nonconformance signal is received, the attempted setting change is not allowed.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method of preventing malicious settings changes to one of a plurality of IEDs in a power network, the method comprising,
detecting an attempted change to protection settings of a first IED in the power network;
transmitting the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED to a second IED in the power network, wherein the second IED has protection settings different from the protection settings of the first IED and includes at least one predefined protection rule for the protection settings of the first IED;
the second IED checking whether the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED will result in the protection settings of the first IED not satisfying the at least one predefined protection rule, such that the first IED and the second IED would be miscoordinated with respect to their respective protection settings;
the second IED transmitting a nonconformance signal to the first IED in response to the checking by the second IED determining the attempted change will result in the protection settings of the first IED not satisfying the at least one predefined protection rule for the protection settings of the first IED; and
the first IED denying the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED upon receipt of the nonconformance signal from the second IED.

2. The method of claim 1 wherein the attempted change to the protection settings includes a change to a time dial setting or a current pick-up setting.

3. The method of claim 1 further comprising transmitting the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED to a third IED in the power network that stores at least one predefined protection rule for the protection settings of the first IED, and the third IED transmitting a nonconformance signal to the first IED in response to determining the attempted change will result in protection settings of the first IED not satisfying at least one predefined protection rule for the protection settings of the first IED.

4. The method of claim 3 wherein the second IED is immediately downstream of the first IED and the third IED is immediately upstream of the first IED.

5. The method of claim 1 wherein checking whether the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED will result in the protection settings of the first IED not satisfying the at least one predefined protection rule for the protection settings of the first IED comprises checking whether the protection settings of the first IED will be miscoordinated in time with the protection settings of the second IED.

6. The method of claim 1 further comprising sending an alert from the first IED or the second IED to an operator of the power network if the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED will result in the protection settings of the first IED not satisfying the at least one predefined protection rule for the protection settings of the first IED.

7. The method of claim 1 wherein transmitting the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED to the second IED in the power network comprises the first IED transmitting the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED to the second IED.

8. A non-transitory computer readable medium carried in first and second IEDs in a power network, the computer readable medium containing computer executable instructions which, when executed by at least one processor in the first and second IEDs, cause the at least one processor to perform a method of preventing malicious settings changes to one of a plurality of IEDs in a power network, the method comprising,
detecting an attempted change to protection settings of the first IED in the power network;
transmitting the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED to the second IED in the power network, wherein the second IED has protection settings different from the protection settings of the first IED and includes at least one predefined protection rule for the protection settings of the first IED;
the second IED checking whether the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED will result in the protection settings of the first IED not satisfying the at least one predefined protection rule, such that the first IED and the second IED would be miscoordinated with respect to their respective protection settings;
the second IED transmitting a nonconformance signal to the first IED from the second IED in response to the checking by the second IED determining the attempted change will result in the protection settings of the first IED not satisfying the at least one predefined protection rule for the protection settings of the first IED; and
the first IED denying the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED upon receipt of the nonconformance signal.

9. The computer readable medium of claim 8 wherein the attempted change to the protection settings includes a change to a time dial setting or a current pick-up setting.

10. The computer readable medium of claim 8 wherein the method further comprises transmitting the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED to a third IED in the power network.

11. The computer readable medium of claim 10 wherein the second IED is immediately downstream of the first IED and the third IED is immediately upstream of the first IED.

12. The computer readable medium of claim 8 wherein checking whether the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED will result in the protection settings of the first IED not satisfying the at least one predefined protection rule for the protection settings of the first IED comprises checking whether the protection settings of the first IED will be miscoordinated in time with the protection settings of the second IED.

13. The computer readable medium of claim 8 wherein the method further comprises sending an alert from the first IED or the second IED to an operator of the power network if the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED will result in the protection settings of the first IED not satisfying the at least one predefined protection rule for the protection settings of the first IED.

14. The computer readable medium of claim 8 wherein transmitting the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED to the second IED in the power network comprises the first IED transmitting the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED to the second IED.

15. A method of preventing malicious settings changes to one of a plurality of IEDs in a power network, the method comprising,
detecting an attempted change to protection settings of a first IED in the power network;
transmitting the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED to a second IED in the power network, wherein the second IED has protection settings different from the protection settings of the first IED and includes at least one predefined protection rule for the protection settings of the first IED;
the second IED checking whether the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED will result in the protection settings of the first IED satisfying the at least one predefined protection rule such that the first IED and the second IED would be coordinated with respect to their respective protection settings;
the second IED transmitting a conformance signal to the first IED if the attempted change to the protection settings of the first IED will result in the protection settings of the first IED satisfying the at least one predefined protection rule for the protecti

Assignees

• Nuqui Reynaldo
• Tang Le
• Abb Research Ltd

Inventors

• Nuqui Reynaldo
• Tang Le

Classifications

• Y04S40/18

  Network protocols supporting networked applications, e.g. including control of end-device applications over a network · CPC title

• H02H3/006

  Calibration or setting of parameters · CPC title

• G06Q50/06

  Energy or water supply · CPC title

• H04L67/12

  specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks · CPC title

• H04L63/1441

  Countermeasures against malicious traffic (countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002) · CPC title