Method and apparatus for secure communication and determining secret information

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9749133-B2
Application number	US-201313926245-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Jun 25, 2013
Priority date	Jun 26, 2012
Publication date	Aug 29, 2017
Grant date	Aug 29, 2017

Abstract

A method of secure communication in a transmitter, includes determining a method of generating a training sequence that is shared with a receiver. The method further includes generating the training sequence based on the method of generating the training sequence, and secret information. The method further includes communicating with the receiver based on channel information derived from the training sequence.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method of secure communication in a transmitter, the method comprising:
determining whether secure communication between the transmitter and a receiver is necessary;
generating a unique training sequence based on secret information and a public training sequence, and
communicating securely with the receiver using the unique training sequence, in response to determining that secure communication between the transmitter and the receiver is necessary; and
communicating with the receiver using the public training sequence shared between the transmitter and the receiver, in response to determining that secure communication is unnecessary.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the generating of the unique training sequence comprises:
changing an order of data of the public training sequence based on the secure communication.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the generating of the unique training sequence comprises:
extracting data from the public training sequence selectively based on the secure communication.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the generating of the unique training sequence comprises:
combining data of the secret information and data of the public training sequence.

5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
determining the secret information such that the secret information between the transmitter and the receiver is equal each other.

6. A non-transitory computer-readable medium embodying a program executable in a computer device with memory, wherein the executed program, when executed, causes the computer device with memory to perform the method of determining whether secure communication between the transmitter and a receiver is necessary;
generating a unique training sequence based on secret information and a public training sequence, and communicating securely with the receiver using the unique training sequence, in response to determining that secure communication between the transmitter and the receiver is necessary; and
communicating with the receiver using the public training sequence shared between the transmitter and the receiver, in response to determining that secure communication is unnecessary.

7. A method of determining secret information of a transmitter, the method comprising:
transmitting, to a receiver, a hash value generated based on channel information;
receiving, from the receiver, a first response corresponding to the hash value;
changing the channel information of the transmitter such that a hash value of the transmitter generated based on the changed channel information is equal to a hash value of the receiver, in response to the transmitted hash value differing from the hash value of the receiver; and
determining the secret information based on the changed channel information.

8. The method of claim 7 , further comprising:
transmitting, to the receiver, a hash value generated based on the changed channel information; and
receiving, from the receiver, a second response corresponding to the hash value generated based on the changed channel information.

9. The method of claim 8 , wherein the determining comprises determining the secret information based on the changed channel information in response to the second response indicating that the hash value generated based on the changed channel information is equal to a hash value of the receiver.

10. The method of claim 7 , wherein the changing comprises changing a predetermined length of data of the channel information.

11. The method of claim 7 , further comprising:
quantizing the channel information; and
generating the hash value based on the quantized channel information.

12. The method of claim 7 , further comprising:
generate a unique training sequence based on the secret information.

13. A method of determining secret information in a receiver, the method comprising:
receiving, from a transmitter, a hash value of the transmitter;
transmitting, to the transmitter, a first response corresponding to the hash value of the transmitter;
changing channel information of the receiver such that a hash value of the receiver generated based on the changed information is equal to a hash value of the transmitter in response to the received hash value differing from the hash value of the receiver; and
determining the secret information based on the changed channel information.

14. The method of claim 13 , wherein the determining comprises determining the secret information based on the changed channel information in response to the second response indicating that the hash value generated based on the changed channel information is equal to a hash value of the receiver.

15. The method of claim 13 , wherein the changing comprises changing a predetermined length of data of the channel information.

16. The method of claim 13 , further comprising:
transmitting, to the transmitter, a hash value generated based on the changed channel information
receiving, from the transmitter, a second response corresponding to the transmitted hash value.

17. A transmitter that performs secure communication, the transmitter comprising:
at least one hardware processor; and
a communicating unit configured to communicate with a receiver,
wherein the at least one processor determines whether secure communication between the transmitter and the receiver is necessary, and generates a unique training sequence based on secret information and a public training sequence, and communicating securely with the receiver using the unique training sequence, in response to determining that secure communication between the transmitter and the receiver is necessary; and
wherein the communicating unit communicates with the receiver using the public training sequence shared between the transmitter and the receiver, in response to determining that secure communication is unnecessary.

18. The transmitter of claim 17 , wherein the at least one processor changes an order of data of the public training sequence based on the secure communication to generate the unique training sequence.

19. The transmitter of claim 17 , wherein the at least one processor extracts data from the public training sequence selectively based on the secure communication to generate the unique training sequence.

20. The transmitter of claim 17 , wherein the at least one processor combines data of the secret information and data of the public training sequence to generate the unique training sequence.

21. The transmitter of claim 17 , wherein the at least one processor generate 2 X unique training sequences, and wherein x is a number of bits of data in the public training sequence.

22. The transmitter of claim 17 , wherein the at least one processor generates the unique training sequence based on index information of the public training sequence.

23. A transmitter comprising:
at least one hardware processor; and
a communicating unit configured to communicate with a receiver,
wherein the communicating unit transmits, to a receiver, a hash value generated based on channel information, and receives, from the receiver, a first response corresponding to the hash value of the transmitter,
wherein the at least one processor changes the channel information of the transmitter such that a hash value of the transmitter generated based on the changed channel information is equal to a hash value of the receiver, in response to the transmitted hash value differing from the hash value of the rece

Assignees

• Samsung Electronics Co Ltd

Inventors

• Huh Mi Suk
• Lim Jong Bu
• Jang Kyung Hun

Classifications

• H04L9/12 Primary

  Transmitting and receiving encryption devices synchronised or initially set up in a particular manner · CPC title

• H04L9/065 Primary

  Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3 · CPC title

• H04L9/0875 Primary

  based on channel impulse response [CIR] · CPC title

• H04K1/00

  Secret communication · CPC title