Phishing campaign ranker

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9729573-B2
Application number	US-201514805649-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Jul 22, 2015
Priority date	Jul 22, 2015
Publication date	Aug 8, 2017
Grant date	Aug 8, 2017

Abstract

According to one embodiment, an apparatus is configured to store a plurality of phishing scores, each phishing score of the plurality of phishing scores indicating a likelihood that a user will respond to a phishing email The apparatus is communicatively coupled to the memory and is configured to determine that a plurality of phishing campaigns are occurring. For each phishing campaign of the plurality of phishing campaigns, the apparatus is configured to determine that a plurality of users responded to the phishing campaign and to determine a priority score for the phishing campaign based on the phishing score of each user of the plurality of users. The apparatus is further configured to rank the plurality of phishing campaigns based on the priority score of each phishing campaign, wherein the phishing campaign of the plurality of phishing campaigns with the highest rank is reviewed first.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. An apparatus comprising:
a memory configured to store a plurality of phishing scores, each phishing score of the plurality of phishing scores indicating a likelihood that a user will respond to a phishing email; and
a processor communicatively coupled to the memory, the processor configured to:
determine that a first phishing campaign and a second phishing campaign are occurring based on a plurality of emails reported as phishing emails;
determine that a first user deleted an email of the first phishing campaign;
determine a priority score for the first phishing campaign based on a phishing score of the first user, the determination that that the first user deleted the email of the first phishing campaign, and a number of phishing emails sent as part of the first phishing campaign;
determine that a second user fell victim to an email of the second phishing campaign;
determine a priority score for the second phishing campaign based on a phishing score of the second user, the determination that the second user fell victim to the email of the second phishing campaign, and a number of phishing emails sent as part of the second phishing campaign;
determine that the priority score of the second phishing campaign is higher than the priority score of the first phishing campaign; and
in response to the determination that the priority score of the second phishing campaign is higher than the priority score of the first phishing campaign, rank the second phishing campaign higher than the first phishing campaign so that the second phishing campaign is reviewed before the first phishing campaign.

2. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the priority score for each phishing campaign is inversely proportional to the phishing score of a user of the plurality of users.

3. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of phishing scores are determined by analyzing a response rate of a plurality of users to a plurality of phishing emails.

4. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the phishing campaign of the plurality of phishing campaigns with the lowest ranking is ignored.

5. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of users responded to the phishing campaign by clicking a link within a phishing email sent as part of the phishing campaign.

6. A method comprising:
storing, by a memory, a plurality of phishing scores, each phishing score of the plurality of phishing scores indicating a likelihood that a user will respond to a phishing email;
determining, by a processor communicatively coupled to the memory, that a first phishing campaign and a second phishing campaign are occurring based on a plurality of emails reported as phishing emails;
determining that a first user deleted an email of the first phishing campaign;
determining a priority score for the first phishing campaign based on a phishing score of the first user, the determination that that the first user deleted the email of the first phishing campaign, and a number of phishing emails sent as part of the first phishing campaign;
determining that a second user fell victim to an email of the second phishing campaign;
determining a priority score for the second phishing campaign based on a phishing score of the second user, the determination that the second user fell victim to the email of the second phishing campaign, and a number of phishing emails sent as part of the second phishing campaign;
determining that the priority score of the second phishing campaign is higher than the priority score of the first phishing campaign; and
in response to the determination that the priority score of the second phishing campaign is higher than the priority score of the first phishing campaign, ranking the second phishing campaign higher than the first phishing campaign so that the second phishing campaign is reviewed before the first phishing campaign.

7. The method of claim 6 , wherein the priority score for each phishing campaign is inversely proportional to the phishing score of a user of the plurality of users.

8. The method of claim 6 , wherein the plurality of phishing scores are determined by analyzing a response rate of a plurality of users to a plurality of phishing emails.

9. The method of claim 6 , wherein the phishing campaign of the plurality of phishing campaigns with the lowest ranking is ignored.

10. The method of claim 6 , wherein the plurality of users responded to the phishing campaign by clicking a link within a phishing email sent as part of the phishing campaign.

11. A system comprising:
a plurality of users; and
a phishing management device comprising:
a memory configured to store a plurality of phishing scores, each phishing score of the plurality of phishing scores indicating a likelihood that a user will respond to a phishing email; and
a processor communicatively coupled to the memory and configured to:
determine that a first phishing campaign and a second phishing campaign are occurring based on a plurality of emails reported as phishing emails;
determine that a first user deleted an email of the first phishing campaign;
determine a priority score for the first phishing campaign based on a phishing score of the first user, the determination that that the first user deleted the email of the first phishing campaign, and a number of phishing emails sent as part of the first phishing campaign;
determine that a second user fell victim to an email of the second phishing campaign;
determine a priority score for the second phishing campaign based on a phishing score of the second user, the determination that the second user fell victim to the email of the second phishing campaign, and a number of phishing emails sent as part of the second phishing campaign;
determine that the priority score of the second phishing campaign is higher than the priority score of the first phishing campaign; and
in response to the determination that the priority score of the second phishing campaign is higher than the priority score of the first phishing campaign, rank the second phishing campaign higher than the first phishing campaign so that the second phishing campaign is reviewed before the first phishing campaign.

12. The system of claim 11 , wherein the priority score for each phishing campaign is inversely proportional to the phishing score of a user of the plurality of users.

13. The system of claim 11 , wherein the plurality of phishing scores are determined by analyzing a response rate of a plurality of users to a plurality of phishing emails.

14. The system of claim 11 , wherein the phishing campaign of the plurality of phishing campaigns with the lowest ranking is ignored.

15. The system of claim 11 , wherein the plurality of users responded to the phishing campaign by clicking a link within a phishing email sent as part of the phishing campaign.

Assignees

• Bank Of America

Inventors

• Gatti Benjamin L

Classifications

• H04L63/1483 Primary

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