Staged control release in boot process

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9679142-B2
Application number	US-201414507205-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Oct 6, 2014
Priority date	Apr 12, 2010
Publication date	Jun 13, 2017
Grant date	Jun 13, 2017

Abstract

Integrity validation of a network device may be performed. A network device comprising a secure hardware module, may receive a root key. The secure hardware module may also receive a first code measurement. The secure hardware module may provide a first key based on the root key and the first code measurement. The secure hardware module may receive a second code measurement and provide a second key based on the first key and the second code measurement. The release of keys based on code measurements may provide authentication in stages.

First claim

What is claimed:

1. A network device comprising:
a processor and a memory configured to perform at least one essential function of the device, wherein the at least one essential function comprises one of device authentication to a network, communication stack execution, or transmission or reception of communication signals; and
a secure processing environment comprising a trusted environment (TrE) configured to:
perform device integrity validation comprising an integrity check of one or more components of the device;
gate the performance of the at least one essential function of the device based on a result of the device integrity validation; and
in response to a failure of the integrity check of the one or more components of the device, release a first key that enables the device to authenticate with an external network entity and to initiate a request to the external network entity for remediation of the one or more components that failed the integrity check.

2. The network device of claim 1 , wherein the secure processing environment is protected by a hardware-based root of trust.

3. The network device recited in claim 1 , wherein the at least one essential function comprises device authentication to a network, and wherein the secure processing environment gates the performance of that essential function by gating access to one of (a) a secure processing capability within the secure processing environment needed to perform the device authentication to the network or (b) data protected by the secure processing environment that may be needed to perform the secure processing capability.

4. The network device recited in claim 3 , wherein the secure processing capability comprises one or more of cryptographic encryption or decryption, signature generation or verification, random number generation, message authentication, cryptographic key generation, derivation, or management, certificate verification, and computation of secret materials that are needed for authentication of the secure processing environment, the user of the device, or authentication of the device to the network.

5. The network device recited in claim 3 , wherein the secure processing environment gates the performance of the device authentication function by preventing the device authentication function from accessing a second key, the second key being a pre-shared key required for device authentication to the network.

6. The network device recited in claim 3 , wherein the secure processing environment gates the performance of the device authentication function by preventing the device authentication function from accessing a second key, the second key being a private key associated with a device certificate required for device authentication to the network.

7. The network device recited in claim 1 , wherein the external network entity is an operations, administration, and maintenance (OAM) server.

8. The network device recited in claim 1 , wherein the secure processing environment is further configured to execute a cryptographic function using a second key, the second key being released upon a successful integrity check of the one or more components of the device and representing one of a plurality of trustworthy states of the device.

9. A method of binding integrity validation of a network device to other functions of the device, comprising:
performing, by a secure processing environment comprising a trusted environment (TrE) within the device, device integrity validation comprising an integrity check of one or more components of the device;
gating the performance of at least one essential function of the device based on a result of the device integrity validation, wherein the at least one essential function comprises one of device authentication to a network, communication stack execution, or transmission or reception of communication signals; and
in response to a failure of the integrity check of the one or more components of the device, releasing a key that enables the device to authenticate with an external network entity and to initiate a request to the external network entity for remediation of the one or more components that failed the integrity check.

10. The method of claim 9 , wherein the secure processing environment is protected by a hardware-based root of trust.

11. The method recited in claim 9 , wherein the at least one essential function comprises device authentication to a network, and wherein gating the performance of that essential function comprises gating access to one of (a) a secure processing capability within the secure processing environment needed to perform the device authentication to the network or (b) data protected by the secure processing environment that may be needed to perform the secure processing capability.

12. The method recited in claim 11 , wherein the secure processing capability comprises one or more of cryptographic encryption or decryption, signature generation or verification, random number generation, message authentication, cryptographic key generation, derivation, or management, certificate verification, and computation of secret materials that are needed for authentication of the secure processing environment, the user of the device, or authentication of the device to the network.

13. The method recited in claim 11 , wherein gating the performance of the device authentication function comprises preventing the device authentication function from accessing a second key second key being a pre-shared key required for device authentication to the network.

14. The method recited in claim 11 , wherein gating the performance of the device authentication function comprises preventing the device authentication function from accessing a second key, the second key being a private key associated with a device certificate required for device authentication to the network.

15. The method recited in claim 9 , wherein the external network entity is an operations, administration, and maintenance (OAM) server.

16. The method recited in claim 9 , wherein the secure processing environment is further configured to execute a cryptographic function using a second key, the second key being released upon a successful integrity check of the one or more components of the device and representing one of a plurality of trustworthy states of the device.

Assignees

• Interdigital Patent Holdings Inc

Inventors

• Cha Inhyok
• Shah Yogendra C
• Case Lawrence

Classifications

• G06F21/57 Primary

  Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities · CPC title

• H04L63/08

  for authentication of entities (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32) · CPC title

• H04W12/10

  Integrity · CPC title

• H04W84/045

  using private Base Stations, e.g. femto Base Stations, home Node B · CPC title

• G06F21/86

  Secure or tamper-resistant housings · CPC title