Trust establishment between a trusted execution environment and peripheral devices

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9621547-B2
Application number	US-201414580204-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Dec 22, 2014
Priority date	Dec 22, 2014
Publication date	Apr 11, 2017
Grant date	Apr 11, 2017

Abstract

Technologies are provided in embodiments to establish trust between a trusted execution environment (TEE) and a peripheral device. Embodiments are configured to communicate with an attestation server to generate an encryption key, and to establish, using the encryption key, a secure connection with an authentication server to enable communication between the authentication server and the peripheral device. Embodiments are also configured to receive a pairwise master key if the peripheral device is authenticated and to receive a trusted communication from the peripheral device based, at least in part, on the pairwise master key. Embodiments may also be configured to identify a connection to the peripheral device before the peripheral device is authenticated to the authentication server, receive an identifier from the peripheral device, and establish a connection to an attestation server based on at least a portion of the identifier.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. At least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium comprising instructions stored thereon for establishing a trusted relationship between a trusted execution environment (TEE) and a peripheral device, wherein the instructions, when executed by at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to:
communicate with an attestation server to cause an encryption key to be dynamically generated;
establish, based on the encryption key, a secure connection between the TEE and an authentication server to enable communication between the authentication server and the peripheral device to authenticate the peripheral device;
receive one or more messages at the TEE from the peripheral device, the one or more messages indicating one or more credentials of the peripheral device;
provide the one or more messages from the TEE to the authentication server via the secure connection;
receive a pairwise master key if the peripheral device is authenticated; and
receive a trusted communication from the peripheral device based, at least in part, on the pairwise master key.

2. The at least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to:
identify a connection to the peripheral device before the peripheral device is authenticated to the authentication server;
receive an identifier from the peripheral device; and
establish a connection to the attestation server based on at least a portion of the identifier.

3. The at least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the TEE is to communicate with the peripheral device via a body area network (BAN).

4. The at least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to:
communicate with the peripheral device to verify the pairwise master key.

5. The at least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the trusted communication is encrypted based on a transport key derived from the pairwise master key.

6. The at least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the one or more messages include
an identifier of the peripheral device.

7. The at least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to:
send a command to the peripheral device to indicate whether to send a stream of a network communication in a trusted mode or a non-trusted mode.

8. The at least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to:
send a command to the peripheral device to identify a subset of multiple streams of a network communication to be sent in a trusted mode.

9. The at least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to:
store the pairwise master key with a lifetime parameter that indicates an amount of time during which the pairwise master key is to remain valid.

10. The at least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the encryption key is to be used as a secret in a Radius protocol or a Diameter protocol to establish the secure connection between the TEE and the authentication server.

11. The at least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the communication between the authentication server and the peripheral device is to be based on an extensible authentication protocol method.

12. The at least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the pairwise master key is to remain valid to enable the secure connection between the TEE and the peripheral device until the TEE moves outside of a connection range of the peripheral device.

13. The at least one non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the peripheral device is to be authenticated if one or more credentials in the peripheral device correspond to one or more credentials associated with the authentication server.

14. An apparatus for establishing a trusted relationship with a peripheral device, the apparatus comprising a trusted execution environment (TEE) to:
communicate with an attestation server to cause an encryption key to be dynamically generated;
establish, based on the encryption key, a secure connection between the TEE and an authentication server to enable communication between the authentication server and the peripheral device to authenticate the peripheral device;
receive one or more messages at the TEE from the peripheral device, the one or more messages indicating one or more credentials of the peripheral device;
provide the one or more messages from the TEE to the authentication server via the secure connection;
receive a pairwise master key if the peripheral device is authenticated; and
receive a trusted communication from the peripheral device based, at least in part, on the pairwise master key.

15. The apparatus of claim 14 , wherein the TEE is to:
identify a connection to the peripheral device before the peripheral device is authenticated to the authentication server;
receive an identifier from the peripheral device; and
establish a connection to the attestation server based on at least a portion of the identifier.

16. The apparatus of claim 14 , wherein the TEE is to:
communicate with the peripheral device to verify the pairwise master key.

17. The apparatus of claim 14 , wherein the trusted communication is encrypted based on a transport key derived from the pairwise master key.

18. The apparatus of claim 14 , wherein the one or more messages include
an identifier of the peripheral device.

19. The apparatus of claim 14 , wherein the encryption key is to be used as a secret in a Radius protocol or a Diameter protocol to establish the secure connection between the TEE and the authentication server.

20. A method for establishing a trusted relationship between a trusted execution environment (TEE) and a peripheral device, the method comprising:
communicating with an attestation server to cause an encryption key to be dynamically generated;
establishing, based on the encryption key, a secure connection between the TEE and an authentication server to enable communication between the authentication server and the peripheral device to authenticate the peripheral device;
receiving one or more messages at the TEE from the peripheral device, the one or more messages indicating one or more credentials of the peripheral device;
providing the one or more messages from the TEE to the authentication server via the secure connection;
receiving a pairwise master key if the peripheral device is authenticated; and
receiving a trusted communication from the peripheral device based, at least in part, on the pairwise master key.

21. The method of claim 20 , further comprising:
identifying a connection to the peripheral device before the peripheral device is authenticated to the authentication server;
receiving an identifier from the peripheral device; and
establishing a connection to the attestation server based on at least a portion of the identifier.

Assignees

• Mcafee Inc

Inventors

• Sharaga Avishay
• Nayshtut Alex
• Pogorelik Oleg
• Muttik Igor
• Smith Ned M

Classifications

• H04L63/061

  for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838) · CPC title

• H04L63/0823

  using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263) · CPC title

• G06F21/606

  by securing the transmission between two devices or processes · CPC title

• G06F21/82

  Protecting input, output or interconnection devices · CPC title

• H04L63/0876

  based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint · CPC title