Computer implemented system and method for lightweight authentication on datagram transport for internet of things
US-2015222439-A1 · Aug 6, 2015 · US
US9602476B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-9602476-B2 |
| Application number | US-201514794963-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Jul 9, 2015 |
| Priority date | Mar 13, 2015 |
| Publication date | Mar 21, 2017 |
| Grant date | Mar 21, 2017 |
A practical reading order for non-experts. Skip the full description unless you need deep technical detail.
What the patent document calls the invention.
A short plain-language summary of the technical disclosure.
Who owns or filed the patent and who is credited as inventor.
Filing, priority, publication, and grant dates set the timeline.
The legal scope of protection — read this for what is actually claimed.
Technology tags used to group this patent with similar filings.
Prior art links and similar publications in this corpus.
Official abstract text for this publication.
In a method of selectively applying a data encryption function, a CoAP client and a CoAP server perform a DTLS handshake process. The CoAP client generates a CoAP message when the DTLS handshake process has been completed, and then indicates that encryption does not need to be applied to the CoAP message. The CoAP client generates only the authentication value of the CoAP message via a DTLS record layer protocol. The CoAP client sets the value of the specific field of a DTLS record layer protocol header to a specific value via the DTLS record layer protocol. The CoAP client sends the CoAP message and the authentication value to the CoAP server.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A method of selectively applying a data encryption function, comprising: performing, by a Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) client and a CoAP server, a datagram transport layer security (DTLS) handshake process; generating, by the CoAP client, a CoAP message when the DTLS handshake process has been completed, and then indicating, by the CoAP client, that encryption does not need to be applied to the CoAP message; generating, by the CoAP client, only an authentication value of the CoAP message via a DTLS record layer protocol; setting, by the CoAP client, a value of a specific field of a DTLS record layer protocol header to a specific value via the DTLS record layer protocol; and sending, by the CoAP client, the CoAP message and the authentication value to the CoAP server, wherein the specific field of the DTLS record layer protocol header comprises an epoch field, and wherein the setting the value of the specific field of the DTLS record layer protocol header to the specific value comprises setting a left highest 1 bit of the epoch field to 0. 2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the performing the DTLS handshake process comprises performing the DTLS handshake process in accordance with an encryption algorithm standard that provides both data integrity and confidentiality. 3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the indicating that the encryption does not need to be applied to the CoAP message comprises setting a value of a lowest 1 bit of a CoAP option field to 0. 4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the indicating that the encryption does not need to be applied to the CoAP message comprises: newly defining an Encryption Option in a CoAP; and setting a right lowest 1 bit of an option value region of a CoAP format to 0. 5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising, after sending the CoAP message and the authentication value to the CoAP server, checking, by the CoAP server, the value of the specific field of the DTLS record layer protocol header; and verifying, by the CoAP server, only the authentication value of the CoAP message if, as a result of the checking, the value of the specific field is found to be the specific value. 6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the checking the value of the specific field of the DTLS record layer protocol header comprises checking a value of a left highest 1 bit of an epoch field of the DTLS record layer protocol header. 7. The method of claim 6 , wherein the verifying only the authentication value of the CoAP message if, as a result of the checking, the value of the specific field is found to be the specific value comprises verifying only the authentication value of the CoAP message if the value of the left highest 1 bit of the epoch field of the DTLS record layer protocol header is 0. 8. A method of selectively applying a data encryption function, comprising: performing, by a Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) client and a CoAP server, a datagram transport layer security (DTLS) handshake process; generating, by the CoAP client, a CoAP message when the DTLS handshake process has been completed, and then indicating, by the CoAP client, that encryption needs to be applied to the CoAP message; generating, by the CoAP client, an authentication value of the CoAP message, and performing, by the CoAP client, encryption via a DTLS record layer protocol; setting, by the CoAP client, a value of a specific field of a DTLS record layer protocol header to a specific value via the DTLS record layer protocol; and sending, by the CoAP client, the encrypted CoAP message and the authentication value to the CoAP server, wherein the specific field of the DTLS record layer protocol header comprises an epoch field, and wherein the setting the value of the specific field of the DTLS record layer protocol header to the specific value comprises setting a left highest 1 bit of the epoch field to 1. 9. The method of claim 8 , wherein the performing the DTLS handshake process comprises performing the DTLS handshake process in accordance with an encryption algorithm standard that provides both data integrity and confidentiality. 10. The method of claim 8 , wherein the indicating that the encryption needs to be applied to the CoAP message comprises setting a value of a lowest 1 bit of a CoAP option field to 1. 11. The method of claim 8 , wherein the indicating that the encryption needs to be applied to the CoAP message comprises: newly defining an Encryption Option in a CoAP; and setting a right lowest 1 bit of an option value region of a CoAP format to 1. 12. The method of claim 8 , further comprising, after sending the encrypted CoAP message and the authentication value to the CoAP server: checking, by the CoAP server, the value of the specific field of the DTLS record layer protocol header; and decoding, by the CoAP server, the encrypted CoAP message, and then verifying, by the CoAP server, the authentication value if, as a result of the checking, the value of the specific field is found to be the specific value. 13. The method of claim 12 , wherein the checking the value of the specific field of the DTLS record layer protocol header comprises checking a left value of a highest 1 bit of an epoch field of the DTLS record layer protocol header. 14. The method of claim 13 , wherein the decoding the encrypted CoAP message and the verifying the authentication value if, as a result of the checking, the value of the specific field is found to be the specific value comprises decoding the encrypted CoAP message and also verifying the authentication value if the value of the left highest 1 bit of the epoch field of the DTLS record layer protocol header is 1.
for authentication of entities (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32) · CPC title
at the transport layer · CPC title
above the transport layer · CPC title
wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload · CPC title
received data contents, e.g. message integrity · CPC title
Related publications grouped by family.
Answers are generated from the same data shown on this page.