System and method for vehicle messaging using a public key infrastructure

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9602290-B2
Application number	US-201414516385-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Oct 16, 2014
Priority date	Oct 16, 2014
Publication date	Mar 21, 2017
Grant date	Mar 21, 2017

Abstract

An embodiment method for vehicle messaging includes obtaining initial trust information that includes a root public key (RPK), and obtaining a first pool of group certificate (GC) sets and a first vehicle authentication certificate that includes a first encrypted serial number. The method also includes: selecting from the first pool a first GC and a first group private key (Gpk); determining a first signature in accordance with a first message and a digest function; sending a first datagram that includes the first message and the first signature; receiving a second datagram that includes a second GC and a second signature, the second GC duplicating a GC in the first pool; receiving a third datagram that includes a third GC and a third signature, the third GC not duplicating any GC in the first pool; and verifying the second and third datagrams in accordance with the digest function and RPK.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method for vehicle messaging comprising:
obtaining, by a first vehicle, initial trust information comprising a root public key (RPK);
obtaining, by the first vehicle, a message authentication set comprising a first pool of group certificate (GC) sets and a first vehicle authentication certificate (VAC), wherein the first VAC comprises a first encrypted serial number (ESN) of the first vehicle;
selecting, by the first vehicle, a first GC set from the first pool, wherein the first GC set comprises a first GC and a first group private key (Gpk);
determining, by the first vehicle, a first signature in accordance with a first message and a digest function, wherein the first message comprises the first GC;
sending, by the first vehicle, a first datagram comprising the first message and the first signature;
receiving, by the first vehicle, a second datagram comprising a second GC and a second signature, wherein the second GC is a duplicate of a GC comprised in the first pool;
receiving, by the first vehicle, a third datagram comprising a third GC and a third signature, wherein the third GC is not a duplicate of any GC comprised in the first pool;
verifying the second datagram in accordance with the digest function and a second GPK of the second GC determined according to at least the RPK, wherein the verifying the second datagram comprises:
determining, by the first vehicle, the second GPK in accordance with a second GPK reconstruction value and the RPK; and
verifying, by the first vehicle, the second datagram in accordance with the digest function and the second GPK; and

verifying the third datagram in accordance with the digest function and a third GPK of the third GC determined according to at least the RPK, wherein the verifying the third datagram comprises:
determining, by the first vehicle, a third GPK in accordance with a third GPK reconstruction value and the RPK; and
verifying, by the first vehicle, the third datagram in accordance with the digest function and the third GPK.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein
the first GC comprises a first group public key (GPK) reconstruction value for a first GPK; and
wherein the first GPK is a matching public key of the first Gpk.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein
the determining the first signature is further in accordance with the first Gpk;
the second GC comprises the second GPK reconstruction value; and
the third GC comprises the third GPK reconstruction value.

4. The method of claim 2 , further comprising:
determining, by the first vehicle in accordance with the first Gpk, a first vehicle dynamic private key (VDpk); and
determining, by the first vehicle, a first vehicle dynamic public key (VDPK) reconstruction value for a first VDPK that is a matching public key of the first VDpk;
wherein the first message further comprises the first VDPK reconstruction value;
wherein the determining the first signature is further in accordance with the first VDpk;
wherein the second datagram further comprises a second GPK reconstruction value and a second VDPK reconstruction value;
wherein the verifying the second datagram comprises:
determining, by the first vehicle, a second GPK in accordance with the second GPK reconstruction value and the RPK;
determining, by the first vehicle, a second VDPK in accordance with the second VDPK reconstruction value and the second GPK; and
verifying, by the first vehicle, the second datagram in accordance with the digest function and the second VDPK;

wherein the third datagram further comprises a third GPK reconstruction value and a third VDPK reconstruction value; and
wherein the verifying the third datagram comprises:
determining, by the first vehicle, a third GPK in accordance with the third GPK reconstruction value and the RPK
determining, by the first vehicle, a third VDPK in accordance with the third VDPK reconstruction value and the third GPK; and
verifying, by the first vehicle, the third datagram in accordance with the digest function and the third VDPK.

5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising
concatenating the first ESN in accordance with a nonce to produce a concatenated ESN; and
encrypting the concatenated ESN in accordance with the RPK and the first Gpk to produce a first double-encrypted serial number (DESN) of the first vehicle;
wherein the first message further comprises the first DESN;
wherein the second datagram further comprises a second DESN of a second vehicle; and
wherein the third datagram further comprises sender data comprising one of a third DESN of a third vehicle and the second DESN.

6. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
determining, by the first vehicle, a vehicle authentication public key (VAPK) that is a matching public key of a vehicle authentication private key (VApk);
encrypting, by the first vehicle, the VAPK in accordance with the RPK to produce an RPK-encrypted VAPK; and
sending, by the first vehicle, a registration request comprising the RPK-encrypted VAPK and a first vehicle serial number (SN) of the first vehicle;
wherein the initial trust information further comprises the VApk and the first SN; and
wherein the obtaining the message authentication set comprises:
receiving, by the first vehicle, a registration package; and
decrypting, by the first vehicle, the registration package in accordance with the VApk to obtain the message authentication set.

7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
receiving, by the first vehicle, a certificate revocation list (CRL);
determining, by the first vehicle in accordance with the CRL, that a received GC is revoked, wherein the received GC comprises at least one of the second GC and the third GC; and
sending, by the first vehicle, a warning message indicating that the received GC is revoked.

8. A vehicle messaging system comprising:
an on-board equipment (OBE) configured to reside in a first vehicle, the OBE comprising:
a processor; and
a non-transitory computer readable medium;

wherein initial trust information is stored in the non-transitory computer readable medium, the initial trust information comprising a root public key (RPK), and
wherein programming for execution by the processor is stored in the non-transitory computer readable medium, the programming comprising instructions to:
obtain a message authentication set comprising a first pool of group certificate (GC) sets and a first vehicle authentication certificate (VAC), wherein the first VAC comprises a first encrypted serial number (ESN) of the first vehicle;
select a first GC set from the first pool, wherein the first GC set comprises a first GC and a first group private key (Gpk);
determine a first signature in accordance with a first message and a digest function, wherein the first message comprises the first GC;
send a first datagram comprising the first message and the first signature;
receive a second datagram comprising a second GC and a second signature, wherein the second GC is a duplicate of a GC comprised in the first pool;
receive a third datagram comprising a third GC and a third signature, wherein the third GC is not a duplicate of any GC comprised in the first pool;
verify the second datagram in accordance with the digest function and a second GPK of the second GC determined according to at least the RPK, wherein the instructions to verify the second datagram comprise instructions to:
determine the second GPK in accordance with a second GPK reconstruction value and the RPK; and
verify the second datagram in accordance with the digest function and the second GPK; and

verify the third datagram in accordance with the digest function and a third GPK of the third GC determined according to at least the RP

Assignees

• Infineon Technologies Ag

Inventors

• Cizas Jurijus
• Stafford Mark

Classifications

• H04L9/3252

  using DSA or related signature schemes, e.g. elliptic based signatures, ElGamal or Schnorr schemes · CPC title

• H04L63/0823

  using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263) · CPC title

• H04L63/123

  received data contents, e.g. message integrity · CPC title

• H04L2209/84

  Vehicles · CPC title

• H04L67/02

  based on web technology, e.g. hypertext transfer protocol [HTTP] · CPC title