Mobile station with bond between end device and security element

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9338647-B2
Application number	US-201314407284-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Jun 3, 2013
Priority date	Jun 13, 2012
Publication date	May 10, 2016
Grant date	May 10, 2016

Abstract

The invention relates to a mobile station comprising a terminal (ME) and a security element ((U)(SIM)) which can be operated, removed or securely implemented in the terminal (ME), a link being provided between the terminal (ME) and the security element ((U)(SIM)) and being verifiable by means of a secret key (PrK; KST) and by means of the verification key (Puk; KSA). The terminal (ME) comprises a secured runtime environment (TEE), and the verification key (PuK; KST) is stored in the secured runtime environment (TEE).

First claim

The invention claimed is:

1. A mobile station comprising an end device (ME) and comprising a removable or fixedly implemented security element ((U)SIM) operable in the end device (ME), a bond being established between the end device (ME) and the security element ((U)SIM), such that the end device (ME) and the security element ((U)SIM) are only operable together in accordance with the bond, a secret key (PrK; KST) being stored in the security element ((U)SIM) and a verification key (PuK; KSA) corresponding to the secret key being stored in the end device (ME), such that the bond between the end device (ME) and the security element ((U)SIM) can be verified by means of the secret key (PrK; KST) and the verification key (PuK; KSA;
wherein the end device (ME) comprises a secured runtime environment (TEE) and the verification key (PuK; KST) is stored in the secured runtime environment (TEE).

2. The mobile station according to claim 1 , wherein a bond application (SIM lock trustlet) operable exclusively under control of the secured runtime environment (TEE) is implemented in the secured runtime environment (TEE) and is implemented to verify the bond between the end device (ME) and the security element ((U)SIM), wherein the verification key (PuK; KST) is stored such that it can be called exclusively by the bond application (SIM lock trustlet).

3. The mobile station according to claim 1 , wherein a bond applet (SIM lock applet) is implemented in the security element (SIM) and is implemented to verify the bond between the end device (ME) and the security element ((U)SIM), wherein the secret key (PrK; KSA) is stored such that it can be called exclusively by the bond applet (SIM Lock Applet).

4. The mobile station according to claim 1 , wherein further a security operating system is implemented in the secured runtime environment (TEE), and wherein at least part of an RIL driver is implemented in the secured runtime environment (TEE) and is set up for communication at hardware level between said security operating system and the security element (SIM), and wherein the bond application (SIM lock trustlet) is set up to communicate with the at least part of the RIL driver within the secured runtime environment (TEE).

5. The mobile station according to claim 1 , wherein the end device (ME) further has a normal execution environment (normal zone), wherein the verification key (PuK; KST) is inaccessible from the normal execution environment (normal zone).

6. A method, in a mobile station according to claim 1 , comprising the steps of:
verifying the bond between the end device (ME) and the security element ((U)SIM); wherein a verification request (challenge; RND) is sent by the end device (ME) to the security element (SIM);
wherein a verification response is sent by the security element (SIM) to the end device (ME), said verification response containing verification information (SIG) generated by means of the secret key (PrK; KSA); and
wherein the verification response is checked by the end device (ME) by means of the verification key (PuK; KST) and the bond between the end device (ME) and the security element ((U)SIM) is verified as existent or non-existent depending on the result of the check.

7. A method for setting-up of a mobile station, wherein a bond of the mobile station is verified by a method according to claim 6 ;
wherein if the bond between the end device (ME) and the security element (SIM) is verified as existent, the setting-up of the mobile station is granted; and
wherein if the bond between the end device (ME) and the security element (SIM) is verified as non-existent, the setting-up of the mobile station is prevented or terminated or is only granted to a limited extent.

8. The method according to claim 7 , wherein the mobile station is further designed wherein a bond application (SIM lock trustlet) operable exclusively under control of the secured runtime environment (TEE) is implemented in the secured runtime environment (TEE) and is implemented to verify the bond between the end device (ME) and the security element ((U)SIM), wherein the verification key (PuK; KST) is stored such that it can be called exclusively by the bond application (SIM lock trustlet).

9. The method according to claim 7 , wherein the mobile station is further designed, wherein a bond applet (SIM lock applet) is implemented in the security element (SIM) and is implemented to verify the bond between the end device (ME) and the security element ((U)SIM), wherein the secret key (PrK; KSA) is stored such that it can be called exclusively by the bond applet (SIM Lock Applet).

10. The method according to claim 7 , wherein the mobile station is further designed wherein further a security operating system is implemented in the secured runtime environment (TEE), and wherein at least part of an RIL driver is implemented in the secured runtime environment (TEE) and is set up for communication at hardware level between said security operating system and the security element (SIM), and wherein the bond application (SIM lock trustlet) is set up to communicate with the at least part of the RIL driver within the secured runtime environment (TEE).

11. The method according to claim 7 , wherein the mobile station is further designed, wherein the end device (ME) further has a normal execution environment (normal zone), wherein the verification key (PuK; KST) is inaccessible from the normal execution environment (normal zone).

12. The method according to claim 7 , wherein the mobile station wherein further a security operating system is implemented in the secured runtime environment (TEE), and wherein at least part of an RIL driver is implemented in the secured runtime environment (TEE) and is set up for communication at hardware level between said security operating system and the security element (SIM), and wherein the bond application (SIM lock trustlet) is set up to communicate with the at least part of the RIL driver within the secured runtime environment (TEE); and
wherein if the bond between the end device (ME) and the security element (SIM) is verified as existent, the setting-up of the mobile station is granted at hardware level by the at least part of the RIL driver, and,
if the bond between the end device (ME) and the security element (SIM) is verified as non-existent, the setting-up of the mobile station is prevented or terminated at hardware level by the at least part of the RIL driver.

13. The method according to claim 9 , wherein the end device (ME) further has a normal execution environment (normal zone), wherein the verification key (PuK; KST) is inaccessible from the normal execution environment (normal zone), and wherein the secured runtime environment (TEE) is started up first when setting-up the mobile station, and the normal execution environment (normal zone) is started up afterwards, such that the bond is verified before setting-up of the normal execution environment (normal zone).

Assignees

• Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh

Inventors

• Spitz Stephan
• Kohler Markus

Classifications

• H04W4/001

  Electricity · mapped topic

• H04M1/675 Primary

  the user being required to insert a coded card, e.g. a smart card carrying an integrated circuit chip · CPC title

• H04W12/04 Primary

  Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] · CPC title

• H04W12/08

  Access security · CPC title

• H04W88/02

  Terminal devices · CPC title