Method and device for protecting products against counterfeiting

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9317981-B2
Application number	US-1802308-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Jan 22, 2008
Priority date	Jan 19, 2007
Publication date	Apr 19, 2016
Grant date	Apr 19, 2016

Abstract

A method for protecting a product against counterfeiting is provided that has a transponder associated with the product, upon which at least one unique identifier is stored, wherein a flag in a set or cleared state is associated with the identifier, and when the flag is set, read access to the identifier by a reader is only permitted after authentication. The invention further relates to a transponder for protecting a product against counterfeiting.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method comprising:
receiving a request to access a first unique identifier stored in a shadow memory area of a transponder, read access to the first identifier being based on a state of a flag and on knowledge of secret shadow memory access information, the transponder having a second unique identifier stored in a second memory area;
requiring authentication prior to permitting read access to the first identifier in response to the state of the flag having a first value; and
permitting read access to the first identifier when the request includes the secret shadow memory access information.

2. The method of claim 1 further comprising preventing overwriting the state of the flag by writing the flag in a non-reprogrammable memory area.

3. The method of claim 1 further comprising analyzing a bit of the first identifier used to emulate the state of the flag.

4. The method of claim 3 , wherein analyzing at least one bit of the first identifier comprises combining the bit of the at least one unique identifier with a clock signal.

5. The method of claim 1 further comprising detecting manipulation of the first identifier through a state of a check digit associated with the identifier.

6. The method of claim 1 wherein the first identifier stored in the shadow memory area is encrypted.

7. The method of claim 1 further comprising constructing a portion of the second identifier using the first identifier.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the secret shadow memory access information comprises one or more of:
a secret memory address; and
a secret access command.

9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
receiving a request to access the second unique identifier stored in the second memory area of the transponder, read access to the second identifier being based on the state of the flag; and
requiring authentication prior to permitting read access to the second identifier in response to the state of the flag having a first value.

10. A transponder comprising:
a shadow memory area storing a first unique identifier, read access to the first identifier being based on a state of a flag and on knowledge of secret shadow memory access information;
a second memory area storing a second unique identifier; and

one or more computer-readable non-transitory storage media coupled to the memory areas that embody logic that is operable when executed to:
receive a request to access the first identifier stored in the shadow memory area;
require authentication prior to permitting read access to the first identifier in response to the state of the flag having a first value; and
permit read access to the first identifier when the request includes the secret shadow memory access information.

11. The transponder of claim 10 , wherein the logic is further operable to prevent overwriting of the state of the flag by writing the flag in a non-reprogrammable memory area.

12. The transponder of claim 10 , wherein the logic is further operable to analyze a bit of the first identifier used to emulate the state of the flag.

13. The transponder of claim 12 , wherein the logic to analyze at least one bit of the first identifier is further operable to combine the bit of the at least one unique identifier with a clock signal.

14. The transponder of claim 10 , wherein the logic is further operable to detect manipulation of the first identifier-through a state of a check digit associated with the at least one unique identifier.

15. The transponder of claim 10 , wherein the first identifier stored in the shadow memory area is encrypted.

16. The transponder of claim 10 , wherein a portion of the second identifier is constructed using the first identifier.

17. The transponder of claim 10 , wherein the secret shadow memory access information comprises one or more of:
a secret memory address; and
a secret access command.

18. The transponder of claim 10 , wherein the logic is further operable to:
receive a request to access the second unique identifier stored in the second memory area of the transponder, read access to the second identifier being based on the state of the flag; and
require authentication prior to permitting read access to the second identifier in response to the state of the flag having a first value.

19. One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media that embody logic that is operable when executed to:
receive a request to access a first unique identifier stored in a shadow memory area of a transponder, read access to the at least one unique identifier being based on a state of a flag and on knowledge of secret shadow memory access information, the transponder having a second unique identifier stored in a second memory area;
require authentication prior to permitting read access to the first identifier in response to the state of the flag having a first value; and
permit read access to the first identifier when the request includes the secret shadow memory access information.

20. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 19 wherein the logic when executed is further operable to prevent overwriting the state of the flag by writing the flag in a non-reprogrammable memory area.

21. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 19 , wherein the logic when executed is further operable to analyze a bit of the first identifier used to emulate the state of the flag.

22. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 21 , wherein analyzing at least one bit of the first identifier further comprises combining the at least one bit of the first identifier with a clock signal.

23. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 19 , wherein the logic when executed is further operable to detect manipulation of the first identifier through a state of a check digit associated with the first identifier.

24. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 19 , wherein the first identifier stored in the shadow memory area is encrypted.

25. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 19 , wherein a portion of the second identifier is constructed using the first identifier.

26. The one or more non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 19 , wherein the secret shadow memory access information comprises one or more of:
a secret memory address; and
a secret access command.

27. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 19 , wherein the logic when executed is further operable to:
receive a request to access the second unique identifier stored in the second memory area of the transponder, read access to the second identifier being based on the state of the flag; and
require authentication prior to permitting read access to the second identifier in response to the state of the flag having a first value.

Assignees

• Friedrich Ulrich
• Atmel Corp

Inventors

• Friedrich Ulrich

Classifications

• G07C9/28 Primary

  the pass enabling tracking or indicating presence · CPC title

• G07G1/009 Primary

  the reader being an RFID reader · CPC title

• G07C9/00111 Primary

  Physics · mapped topic