Elevated security execution mode for network-accessible devices
US-2024411878-A1 · Dec 12, 2024 · US
US9251347B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-9251347-B2 |
| Application number | US-201213993540-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Mar 30, 2012 |
| Priority date | Mar 30, 2012 |
| Publication date | Feb 2, 2016 |
| Grant date | Feb 2, 2016 |
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In one embodiment, a method includes initializing a portion of a computing system in a pre-boot environment using a basic input/output system (BIOS) stored in a non-volatile storage of the computing system, launching a boot manager to enable a launch of an operating system (OS) payload, and if the OS payload is not successfully launched, executing an OS payload portion and an antivirus stack stored in the non-volatile storage to restore an integrity of the mass storage. Other embodiments are described and claimed.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. An apparatus comprising: a processor to execute instructions; a chipset coupled to the processor; at least one user interface coupled to the chipset via a trusted path; and a non-volatile storage including a first volume to store a basic input/output system (BIOS) and a second volume to store an operating system (OS) payload portion including an antivirus software stack, wherein the OS payload portion is separate from and is a subset of an OS kernel stored in a different storage than the non-volatile storage and the antivirus software stack is to restore an integrity of the different storage subsequent to corruption of the different storage, wherein in a pre-boot environment, a user is to be authenticated based on user input via the at least one user interface, and if the user authentication is successful, the BIOS is to pass control to a boot manager of the OS kernel stored in the different storage, and if the OS kernel does not successfully launch in a predetermined period, the BIOS to cause execution of the antivirus software stack to restore the integrity of the different storage, wherein the different storage comprises a mass storage. 2. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein a virus definition of the antivirus stack stored in the non-voltage storage is to be updated in a secure management mode of a computing system. 3. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the OS payload portion comprises a lightweight kernel to validate an image of the OS kernel stored in the different storage. 4. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the BIOS is to prevent launch of the OS kernel if the antivirus stack is not identified to the BIOS within the predetermined period. 5. A system comprising: a processor to execute instructions; a chipset coupled to the processor; at least one user interface coupled to the chipset via a trusted path; a first non-volatile storage coupled to the processor to store an operating system (OS) kernel; and a second non-volatile storage to store a basic input/output system (BIOS) and an operating system (OS) payload portion including an antivirus software stack, wherein the OS payload portion is separate from and is a subset of the OS kernel and the antivirus software stack is to restore an integrity of the first non-volatile storage subsequent to corruption of the first non-volatile storage, the first non-volatile storage a different storage than the second non-volatile storage, wherein in a pre-boot environment, a user is to be authenticated based on user input via the at least one user interface, and if the user authentication is successful, the BIOS is to pass control to a boot manager of the OS kernel stored in the first non-volatile storage, and if the OS kernel does not successfully launch in a predetermined period, the BIOS to cause execution of the antivirus software stack to restore the integrity of the first non-volatile storage. 6. The system of claim 5 , wherein the BIOS is to launch the OS payload portion and the antivirus software stack if the OS kernel is not successfully launched. 7. The system of claim 5 , further comprising a virus definition database for the antivirus software stack stored in the second non-volatile storage. 8. The system of claim 5 , wherein the BIOS is to launch the antivirus software stack if a timer set for the predetermined period expires prior to successful launch of the OS payload. 9. The system of claim 5 , wherein the first non-volatile storage comprises a solid state drive for the system. 10. At least one non-transitory machine readable medium comprising a plurality of instructions that in response to being executed on a computing device, cause the computing device to: initialize a hardware portion of the computing device in a pre-boot environment using a basic input/output system (BIOS) stored in a non-volatile storage of the computing device; receive user input of a user from at least one user interface of the computing device, via a trusted path; authenticate the user based on the user input; responsive to not authenticating the user, execute an antivirus stack stored in the non-volatile storage; responsive to authenticating the user, launch a boot manager in the pre-boot environment to enable a launch of an operating system (OS) payload stored in a mass storage of the computing device, if the OS payload is not successfully launched in a predetermined period, execute an OS payload portion stored in the non-volatile storage and the antivirus stack to restore an integrity of the mass storage, and otherwise enter into a boot environment using the OS payload stored in the mass storage, the mass storage separate from the non-volatile storage. 11. The at least one non-transitory machine readable medium device of claim 10 , further comprising instructions that in response to being executed on the computing device, cause the computing device to, after restoring the integrity, perform a reset of the computing device to cause the hardware portion to be initialized in the pre-boot environment. 12. The at least one non-transitory machine readable medium device of claim 10 , further comprising instructions that in response to being executed on the computing device, cause the computing device to determine that the OS payload is not successfully launched if a timer set for the predetermined period expires prior to successful launch of the OS payload. 13. The at least one non-transitory machine readable medium device of claim 10 , further comprising instructions that in response to being executed on the computing device, cause the computing device to maintain the antivirus stack and the OS payload portion in a first volume of the non-volatile storage and maintain the BIOS in a second volume of the non-volatile storage. 14. A method comprising: initializing a portion of a computing system in a pre-boot environment using a basic input/output system (BIOS) stored in a non-volatile storage of the computing system; receiving user input of a user from at least one user interface of the computing system, via a trusted path; authenticating the user based on the user input; responsive to not authenticating the user, executing an antivirus stack stored in the non-volatile storage; responsive to authenticating the user, launching a boot manager in the pre-boot environment to enable a launch of an operating system (OS) payload stored in a mass storage of the computing system, the mass storage separate from the non-volatile storage; and if the OS payload is not successfully launched in a predetermined period, executing an OS payload portion and the antivirus stack stored in the non-volatile storage to restore an integrity of the mass storage, and otherwise entering into a boot environment using the OS payload stored in the mass storage. 15. The method of claim 14 , further comprising after restoring the integrity, performing a reset of the computing system to cause initializing the portion of the computer system in the pre-boot environment. 16. The method of claim 14 , further comprising determining that the OS payload is not successfully launched if a timer set for the predetermined period expires prior to successful launch of the OS payload. 17. The method of claim 14 , further comprising maintaining the antivirus stack in the non-volatile storage. 18. The method of claim 17 , further comprising maintaining the OS payload portion in the non-volatile storage, the OS payload corresponding to a shrink wrap OS instantiation. 19. The method of claim 17 , wherein the OS payload porti
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