System and method for authenticating identity of discovered component in an infiniband (IB) network

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-9240981-B2
Application number	US-201213488040-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Jun 4, 2012
Priority date	Jun 3, 2011
Publication date	Jan 19, 2016
Grant date	Jan 19, 2016

Abstract

A system and method can verify trustfulness of a fabric component in an InfiniBand (IB) fabric. A subnet manager that is responsible for authenticating the fabric component using private/public key pairs. The subnet manager can first send a first encrypted message to a fabric component in the IB fabric, wherein the first encrypted message contains a token and is encrypted using a public key associated with the fabric component. Then, the fabric component is allowed to decode the first encrypted message using a private key associated with the fabric component, and to send a second encrypted message back to the subnet manager. Finally, the subnet manager can authenticate the fabric component if the second encrypted message contains correct information.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method for verifying trustfulness of a fabric component in an InfiniBand (IB) fabric, comprising:
discovering, via a subnet manager executing on one or more microprocessors, a fabric component of a plurality of fabric components on a node in an IB fabric, wherein each of the plurality of fabric components is associated with a public key stored in a central repository connected to the subnet manager;
retrieving, based on an identity of the fabric component, a public key associated with the fabric component from the central repository to the subnet manager,
wherein the public key is distributed to the central repository when the fabric component is released, installed or deployed, and
wherein the identity of the fabric component includes version information for the fabric component;
sending a first encrypted message from the subnet manager to the fabric component, wherein the first encrypted message contains a first token and is encrypted using the public key associated with the fabric component, and wherein the fabric component decodes the first encrypted message using a private key associated with the fabric component;
receiving from the fabric component to the subnet manager a second encrypted message that contains a second token;
decoding the second encrypted message using a private key associated with the subnet manager to retrieve the second token; and
authenticating, via the subnet manager, the fabric component if the second token is the same as the first token or is recognized by the subnet manager.

2. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the fabric component is a host channel adapter (HCA) firmware or a hypervisor/OS assigned to a tenant.

3. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the first token contained in the first encrypted message is a random byte string.

4. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the fabric component hides the private key associated with the fabric component in an embedded firmware.

5. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the fabric component stores the private key associated with the fabric component in a tamper proof non-volatile key storage.

6. The method according to claim 1 , further comprising:
sending a public key associated with the subnet manager along with the first encrypted message to the fabric component.

7. The method according to claim 6 , wherein the fabric component encrypts the second encrypted message using the public key associated with the subnet manager.

8. A system for verifying trustfulness of a fabric component in an InfiniBand (IB) fabric, comprising:
a computer with memory and one or more microprocessors;
a subnet manager, executing on the computer, that is responsible for authenticating a fabric component in the IB fabric,
wherein the subnet manager is configured to
discover the fabric component from a plurality of fabric components in on a node in an IB fabric, wherein each of the plurality of fabric components is associated with a public key stored in a central repository connected to the subnet manager,
retrieve, based on an identity of the fabric component, a public key associated with the fabric component from the central repository to the subnet manager,
wherein the public key is distributed to the central repository when the fabric component is released, installed or deployed, and
wherein the identity of the fabric component includes version information for the fabric component,
send a first encrypted message from the subnet manager to the fabric component in the IB fabric, wherein the first encrypted message contains a first token and is encrypted using the public key associated with the fabric component, and wherein the fabric component decodes the first encrypted message using a private key associated with the fabric component,
receive from the fabric component to the subnet manager a second encrypted message that contains a second token,
decode the second encrypted message using a private key associated with the subnet manager to retrieve the second token, and
authenticate the fabric component if the second token is the same as the first token or is recognized by the subnet manager.

9. The system according to claim 8 , wherein the fabric component is a host channel adapter (HCA) firmware or a hypervisor/OS assigned to a tenant.

10. The system according to claim 8 , wherein the first token contained in the first encrypted message is a random byte string.

11. The system according to claim 8 , wherein the fabric component hides the private key associated with the fabric component in an embedded firmware.

12. The system according to claim 8 , wherein the fabric component stores the private key associated with the fabric component in a tamper proof non-volatile key storage.

13. The system according to claim 8 , wherein a public key associated with the subnet manager is sent along with the first encrypted message to the fabric component.

14. The system according to claim 13 , wherein the fabric component operates to encrypt the second encrypted message using the public key associated with the subnet manager.

15. A non-transitory machine readable storage medium having instructions stored thereon that when executed cause a system to perform the steps comprising:
discovering, via a subnet manager executing on one or more microprocessors, a fabric component of a plurality of fabric components on a node in an IB fabric, wherein each of the plurality of fabric components is associated with a public key stored in a central repository connected to the subnet manager;
retrieving, based on an identity of the fabric component, a public key associated with the fabric component from the central repository to the subnet manager,
wherein the public key is distributed to the central repository when the fabric component is released, installed or deployed, and
wherein the identity of the fabric component includes version information for the fabric component;
sending a first encrypted message from the subnet manager to the fabric component, wherein the first encrypted message contains a first token and is encrypted using the public key associated with the fabric component, and wherein the fabric component decodes the first encrypted message using a private key associated with the fabric component;
receiving from the fabric component to the subnet manager a second encrypted message that contains a second token;
decoding the second encrypted message using a private key associated with the subnet manager to retrieve the second token; and
authenticating, via the subnet manager, the fabric component if the second token is the same as the first token or is recognized by the subnet manager.

16. The non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 15 , wherein the first token contained in the first encrypted message is a random byte string.

17. The non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 15 , wherein the fabric component hides the private key associated with the fabric component in an embedded firmware.

18. The non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 15 , wherein the fabric component stores the private key associated with the fabric component in a tamper proof non-volatile key storage.

19. The non-transitory machine readable storage medium of claim 15 , wherein a public key associated with the subnet manager is sent along with the first encrypted message to the fabric component.

Assignees

• Johnsen Bjørn-Dag
• Hodoba Predrag
• Tørudbakken Ola
• Oracle Int Corp

Inventors

• Johnsen Bjørn-Dag
• Hodoba Predrag
• Tørudbakken Ola

Classifications

• H04L49/20

  Support for services · CPC title

• H04L63/0442 Primary

  wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30) · CPC title

• H04L63/083

  using passwords (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using a predetermined code H04L9/3226) · CPC title

• H04L9/3271

  using challenge-response · CPC title

• H04L9/3234

  involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853) · CPC title