Secure boot of virtualized computing instances

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-2018373879-A1
Application number	US-201815934621-A
Country	US
Kind code	A1
Filing date	Mar 23, 2018
Priority date	Jun 26, 2017
Publication date	Dec 27, 2018
Grant date	—

Abstract

In an embodiment, a secure boot method comprises writing a wrapped data encryption key (DEK) and a wrapped key encryption key (KEK) onto a label of a wrapped operating system image prior to uploading the wrapped operating system image to a virtual data center using one or more computing devices.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1 . A method, comprising:
writing a wrapped data encryption key (DEK) and a wrapped key encryption key (KEK) onto a label of a wrapped operating system image prior to uploading the wrapped operating system image to a virtual data center; and wherein the method is performed by one or more computing devices.

2 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
encrypting a system image under a data encryption key (DEK) to generate a wrapped system image; encrypting a data encryption key (DEK) under a key encryption key (KEK) to generate the wrapped DEK; and causing encrypting the KEK under an account root key to generate the wrapped KEK.

3 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
generating, by the virtual data center, an encrypted machine image by merging the wrapped operating system image with an intermediary guest manager machine image; and launching, by the virtual data center, an instance based on the encrypted machine image.

4 . The method of claim 3 , wherein the launching the instance based on the encrypted machine image is based on:
executing, by the virtual data center, an intermediary guest manager; sending, by the intermediary guest manager, a decryption request to a key management service that includes the wrapped KEK; receiving, by the intermediary guest manager, a response from the key management service that includes the KEK; unwrapping, by the intermediary guest manager, the wrapped DEK using the KEK to obtain the DEK; and booting up, by the intermediary guest manager, a guest operating system using the DEK.

5 . The method of claim 4 , wherein the intermediary guest manager does not store the KEK or the DEK in persistent storage of the virtual data center.

6 . The method of claim 4 , further comprising:
generating, by the intermediary guest manager, a different data encryption key (DEK) for new root volume data produced during execution of the instance; generating, by the intermediary guest manager, a different key encryption key (KEK); and wrapping, by the intermediary guest manager, the DEK and the different DEK using the different KEK.

7 . The method of claim 4 , wherein the instance is launched with one or more data volumes and wherein the method further comprises:
generating, by the intermediary guest manager, a data volume data encryption key (DEK) and a data volume key encryption key (KEK); wrapping, by the intermediary guest manager, the data volume DEK with the data volume KEK to produce a wrapped data volume data encryption key (DEK); sending, by the intermediary guest manager, an encryption request to the key management service to wrap the data volume KEK with an account root key; receiving, by the intermediary guest manager, a wrapped data volume key encryption key (KEK) that has been wrapped with the account root key from key management service; and writing, by the intermediary guest manager, the wrapped data volume DEK and the wrapped data volume KEK to the data volume.

8 . The method of claim 4 , wherein the generating the encrypted machine image is based on:
booting up, by the virtual data center, a temporary instance from the intermediary guest manager machine image; mounting, by the intermediary guest manager, the wrapped operating system image as a guest drive of the intermediary guest manager; and storing a snapshot of the temporary instance as the encrypted machine image.

9 . A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions which, when executed by one or more processors, cause:
encrypting a system image under a data encryption key (DEK) to generate a wrapped operating system image; encrypting the DEK under a key encryption key (KEK) to generate a wrapped data encryption key (DEK); causing encrypting the KEK under an account root key to generate a wrapped key encryption key (KEK); and writing the wrapped DEK and the wrapped KEK onto a label of a wrapped operating system image prior to uploading the wrapped operating system image to a virtual data center.

10 . The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 9 , storing instructions which, when executed by one or more processors, further cause:
generating, by the virtual data center, an encrypted machine image by merging the wrapped operating system image with an intermediary guest manager machine image; and launching, by the virtual data center, an instance based on the encrypted machine image.

11 . The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 10 , wherein the causing encrypting the KEK is based on:
establishing a secure connection to a key management service; sending a request to wrap the KEK with the account root key to the key management service; and receiving the wrapped KEK that has been wrapped with the account root key from the key management service.

12 . The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 11 , wherein the launching the instance based on the encrypted machine image is based on:
executing, by the virtual data center, an intermediary guest manager; sending, by the intermediary guest manager, a decryption request to a key management service that includes the wrapped KEK; receiving, by the intermediary guest manager, a response from the key management service that includes the KEK; unwrapping, by the intermediary guest manager, the wrapped DEK using the KEK to obtain the DEK; and booting up, by the intermediary guest manager, a guest operating system using the DEK.

13 . The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 12 , storing instructions which, when executed by one or more processors, cause:
generating, by the intermediary guest manager, a different data encryption key (DEK) for new root volume data produced during execution of the instance; generating, by the intermediary guest manager, a different key encryption key (KEK); wrapping, by the intermediary guest manager, the DEK and the new DEK using the new KEK.

14 . The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 12 , wherein the instance is launched with one or more data volumes and wherein the non-transitory computer-readable medium stores instructions which, when executed by one or more processors, further cause:
generating, by the intermediary guest manager, a data volume data encryption key (DEK) and a data volume key encryption key (KEK); wrapping, by the intermediary guest manager, the data volume DEK with the data volume KEK to produce a wrapped data volume data encryption key (DEK); sending, by the intermediary guest manager, an encryption request to the key management service to wrap the data volume KEK with the account root key; receiving, by the intermediary guest manager, a wrapped data volume key encryption key (KEK) that has been wrapped with the account root key from key management service; writing, by the intermediary guest manager, the wrapped data volume DEK and the wrapped data volume KEK to the data volume.

15 . The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 10 , wherein generating the encrypted machine image is based on:
booting up, by the virtual data center, a temporary instance from the intermediary guest manager machine image; mounting, by the intermediary guest manager, the wrapped system image as a guest drive of the intermediary guest manager; storing a snapshot of the temporary instance as the encrypted machine image.

16 . A computer system, comprising:
an on-premises device having one or more processors and storage media storing first instructions for execution by the one or more

Assignees

• Vmware Inc

Inventors

• Lango Jason A
• Cain Adam
• Bahadur Nitin
• Edwards John K
• George Kevin
• Mcgovern William
• Tucker Andrew G

Classifications

• H04L9/3268

  using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL] · CPC title

• H04L63/166

  at the transport layer · CPC title

• G06F21/575 Primary

  Secure boot · CPC title

• H04L9/0631

  Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms · CPC title

• H04L9/0822

  using key encryption key · CPC title