Detection of click-fraud

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-2016321689-A1
Application number	US-201615210221-A
Country	US
Kind code	A1
Filing date	Jul 14, 2016
Priority date	Nov 29, 2010
Publication date	Nov 3, 2016
Grant date	—

Abstract

Devices, systems, and methods of detecting user identity, differentiating between users of a computerized service, detecting a cyber-attacker, and detecting click-fraud. An end-user device (a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a smartphone, a tablet, or the like) interacts and communicates with a server of a computerized server (a banking website, an electronic commerce website, or the like). The interactions are monitored, tracked and logged. User Interface (UI) interferences or irregularities are intentionally introduced to the communication session; and the server tracks the response or the reaction of the end-user to such communication interferences. The system determines whether the user is a legitimate human user, or a cyber-attacker or automated script posing as the legitimate human user. The system further detects click-fraud, and prevents or mitigates Application Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1 . A method comprising:
detecting fraudulent clicks performed towards an on-screen advertisement; wherein the detecting comprises:
(a) presenting to a user of an electronic device, a screen comprising content and said on-screen advertisement;
(b) injecting a temporary input/output interference that causes an on-screen pointer, that is on route to click within said on-screen advertisement, to exhibit irregular behavior from its regular route;
(c) tracking user interactions with said input unit in response to said temporary input/output interference;
(d) determining that said user did not perform sufficient manual correction operations that fix said temporary input/output interference;
(e) based on step (d), determining that a click performed within said on-screen advertisement, was performed by a click-fraud mechanism.

2 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
injecting a temporary input/output interference that causes an on-screen pointer, that is on route to click within said on-screen advertisement, to deviate from its expected on-screen route.

3 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
injecting a temporary input/output interference that causes an on-screen pointer, that is on route to click within said on-screen advertisement, to temporarily disappear.

4 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
injecting a temporary input/output interference that causes an on-screen pointer, that is on route to click within said on-screen advertisement, to disappear from a first on-screen location and to re-appear at a second, different, on-screen location.

5 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
injecting a temporary input/output interference that causes an on-screen pointer, that is on route to click within said on-screen advertisement, to appear at a pseudo-random offset relative to a regular non-interfered location of said on-screen pointer.

6 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
injecting a temporary input/output interference that causes an on-screen pointer to operate irregularly relative to pointer-controlling gestures that are inputted by said user while said user is attempting to move said on-screen pointer towards said advertisement.

7 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
injecting a temporary input/output interference that causes an on-screen pointer to operate irregularly relative to pointer-controlling gestures that are inputted by said user while said user is attempting to move said on-screen pointer towards said advertisement; wherein said temporary input/output interference is exhibited as anomaly between (i) user gestures via the input unit, and (ii) on-screen behavior of the on-screen pointer.

8 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
injecting a temporary input/output interference that causes an on-screen pointer to operate irregularly relative to pointer-controlling gestures that are inputted by said user while said user is attempting to move said on-screen pointer towards said advertisement; wherein said temporary input/output interference is exhibited as anomaly between (i) user gestures via the input unit, and (ii) on-screen behavior of the on-screen pointer; wherein the temporary input/output interference causes the on-screen pointer to reach an on-screen location that is external to said advertisement unless manual correction operations are performed via the input unit in response to said temporary input/output interference.

9 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (a) comprises:
presenting to said user of said electronic device, a web-page comprising said content and said on-screen advertisement.

10 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (a) comprises:
presenting to said user of said electronic device, a native mobile application comprising said content and said on-screen advertisement.

11 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
injecting a temporary input/output interference that replaces the on-screen pointer with both: (I) a real on-screen pointer that is visible to human users and is detectable by computerized scripts, and (II) a fake on-screen pointer that is invisible to human users and is detectable by computerized scripts.

12 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
injecting a temporary input/output interference that replaces the on-screen pointer with both: (I) a real on-screen pointer that is visible to human users and is detectable by computerized scripts, and (II) a fake on-screen pointer that is invisible to human users and is detectable by computerized scripts, wherein the real on-screen pointer is located at a constant on-screen offset distance relative to the fake on-screen pointer.

13 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
injecting a temporary input/output interference that replaces the on-screen pointer with both: (I) a real on-screen pointer that is visible to human users and is detectable by computerized scripts, and (II) a fake on-screen pointer that is invisible to human users and is detectable by computerized scripts, wherein the real on-screen pointer is located at a dynamically-changing on-screen offset distance relative to the fake on-screen pointer.

14 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
injecting a temporary input/output interference that replaces the on-screen pointer with both: (I) a real on-screen pointer that is visible to human users and is detectable by computerized scripts, and (II) a fake on-screen pointer that is invisible to human users and is detectable by computerized scripts, wherein said temporary input/output interference causes human users to click within said online advertisement, and causes computerized scripts to click outside of said online advertisement.

15 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
injecting a temporary input/output interference that replaces the on-screen pointer with both: (I) a real on-screen pointer that is visible to human users and is detectable by computerized scripts, and (II) a fake on-screen pointer that is invisible to human users and is detectable by computerized scripts, wherein said temporary input/output interference causes computerized scripts to click within said online advertisement, and causes human users to click outside of said online advertisement.

16 . The method of claim 1 , wherein step (b) of injecting the temporary input/output interference comprises:
dynamically and pseudo-randomly modifying one or more parameters of said temporary input/output interference.

17 . The method of claim 1 , wherein at least one of: step (a), step (b), step (c), step (d), and step (e), is performed by a hardware processor.

18 . A system comprising:
a click-fraud detector to detect fraudulent clicks in on-screen advertisements, wherein the click-fr

Assignees

• Biocatch Ltd

Inventors

• Turgeman Avi

Classifications

• H04L63/1408

  by monitoring network traffic (monitoring network traffic per se H04L43/00) · CPC title

• H04L2463/144

  Detection or countermeasures against botnets · CPC title

• G06F3/041

  Digitisers, e.g. for touch screens or touch pads, characterised by the transducing means · CPC title

• H04L63/1458 Primary

  Denial of Service · CPC title

• G06F21/31

  User authentication · CPC title