Method and arrangement for detecting digital content tampering
US-2020372184-A1 · Nov 26, 2020 · US
US12580735B1 · US · B1
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-12580735-B1 |
| Application number | US-201916445687-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B1 |
| Filing date | Jun 19, 2019 |
| Priority date | Jun 19, 2019 |
| Publication date | Mar 17, 2026 |
| Grant date | Mar 17, 2026 |
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Apparatuses, systems, and techniques to enable verification of content, such as media content. Hashes of content can be digitally signed and stored to a distributed ledger, such that a source of content can be verified and any modification determined.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1 . A method, comprising: receiving a frame of video data comprising at least an associated hash value appended to the frame of the video data; decoding the associated hash value of the received frame of video data using a public key; generating another hash value based on the received frame of video data; and digitally signing the other generated hash value that was generated based on the received frame of video data using a private key responsive to determining that the decoded associated hash value of the received frame of video data matches the other generated hash value that was generated based on the received frame of video data. 2 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising: providing a computing device with access to another public key, the computing device is enabled to compare an additional hash value for the frame of video data against the digitally signed hash value in order to verify that the frame of video data is unmodified, wherein the computing device decodes the digitally signed hash value using the other public key to verify that the frame of video data is unmodified. 3 . The method of claim 2 , wherein the frame of video data comprises a plurality of hash values appended to the frame of video data, at least one of the plurality of hash values associated with another frame of video data associated with the frame of video data. 4 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising: receiving the frame of video data from an identified source; and verifying a digital signature of the identified source, wherein a computing device having access to the frame of video data uses the public key to verify the identified source. 5 . The method of claim 4 , further comprising: comparing the other hash value against the associated hash value, the associated hash value appended to the frame of video data by a source device that generated the frame of video data, the associated hash value appended to the frame of video data when the source device generates the frame of video data; and determining that the hash value matches the associated hash value before digitally signing the other hash value using the private key. 6 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising: causing a computing device, displaying the frame of video data, to display an indication that the frame of video data has been verified as authentic and unmodified. 7 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising: digitally signing hash values for a subset of frames of the video data; and periodically adding the signed hash values as blocks to a distributed ledger, the blocks depending in part upon previous blocks added to the distributed ledger for the video data. 8 . A system, comprising: one or more processors; and memory containing instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the system to: receive a frame of video data comprising at least an associated hash value appended to the frame of video data; decode the associated hash value of the received frame of video data using a public key; generate another hash value based on the received frame of video data; and digitally sign the other generated hash value that was generated based on the received frame of video data using a private key responsive to determining that the decoded associated hash value of the received frame of video data matches the other generated hash value that was generated based on the received frame of video data. 9 . The system of claim 8 , wherein the instructions when executed further cause the system to: provide a computing device with access to another public key, the computing device is enabled to compare an additional hash value for the frame of video data against the digitally signed hash value in order to verify that the frame of video data is unmodified, wherein the computing device decodes the digitally signed hash value using the other public key in order to verify that the frame of video data is unmodified. 10 . The system of claim 9 , wherein the frame of video data comprises a plurality of hash values appended to the frame of video data, at least one of the plurality of hash values associated with another frame of video data associated with the frame of video data. 11 . The system of claim 8 , wherein the instructions when executed further cause the system to: receive the video data from an identified source; and verify a digital signature of the identified source, wherein a computing device having access to the frame of video data uses the public key to verify the identified source. 12 . The system of claim 11 , wherein the instructions when executed further cause the system to: comparing the other hash value against the associated hash value, the associated hash value appended to the frame of video data by a source device that generated the frame of video data; and determining that the hash value matches original hash value before digitally signing the other hash value using the private key. 13 . The system of claim 8 , wherein the instructions when executed further cause the system to: causing a computing device, displaying the frame of video data, to display an indication that the frame of video data has been verified as authentic and unmodified. 14 . The system of claim 8 , wherein the instructions when executed further cause the system to: digitally signing hash values for a subset of frames of the video data; and periodically adding the signed hash values as blocks to a distributed ledger, the blocks depending in part upon previous blocks added to the distributed ledger for the video data. 15 . A computing device, comprising: one or more processors; and memory containing instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the system to: receive a frame of video data captured using a camera, the frame of video data comprising an associated hash value appended to the frame of video data; decode the associated hash value of the received frame of video data using a public key; generate another hash value based on the received frame of video data; and digitally sign the other generated hash value that was generated based on the received frame of video data using a private key responsive to determining that the decoded associated hash value of the received frame of video data matches the other generated hash value that was generated based on the received frame of video data. 16 . The computing device of claim 15 , wherein the instructions when executed further cause the computing device to: compare the other hash value for the frame of video data against the associated hash value to determine that the frame of video data is unmodified. 17 . The computing device of claim 16 , wherein the frame of video data comprises a plurality of hash values appended to the frame of video data, at least one of the plurality of hash values associated with another frame of video data associated with the frame of video data. 18 . The computing device of claim 17 , wherein the instructions when executed further cause the computing device to: enable a consumer device, to receive the frame of video data, to verify a source of the frame of video data using a distributed ledger. 19 . The computing device of claim 17 , wherein the instructions when executed further cause the computing device to: enable a consumer device, to receive the video data, to verify inclusion of all frames of the video data using signed hash values stored to a distributed ledger.
involving digital signatures · CPC title
using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees · CPC title
Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC · CPC title
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