Computing devices and methods for constructing trusted chain of computing device

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-12561441-B2
Application number	US-202318523689-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Nov 29, 2023
Priority date	Dec 20, 2022
Publication date	Feb 24, 2026
Grant date	Feb 24, 2026

Abstract

Embodiments of this specification disclose computing devices and methods for constructing a trusted chain of a computing device, and relate to the field of information security technologies. The method includes following: A trusted module located on the computing device is started; the trusted module measures a CRTM of a processor on the computing device, and stores a measurement result in the trusted module; and when the CRTM is executed by the processor, a next level of code of the CRTM is measured, and a measurement result is stored in the trusted module; and when the next level of code of the CRTM is executed by the processor, a next level of code is measured, and a measurement result is stored in the trusted module, where by analogy, next levels of code is measured layer by layer to complete trusted chain establishment for the computing device.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1 . A method for constructing a trusted chain of a computing device, wherein the method comprises:
starting a trusted module located on the computing device; measuring, by the trusted module, a core root of trust for measurement (CRTM) of a processor on the computing device, and storing a measurement result in the trusted module, the trusted module comprising a root of trust for measurement (RTM); detecting, by the RTM of the trusted module, whether a core root measurement policy exists in a non-volatile storage area in the trusted module, wherein the core root measurement policy comprises a storage address of the CRTM to be measured; in response to that the core root measurement policy exists, obtaining at least a part of the CRTM based on the storage address by using the RTM and measuring the part of the CRTM, and storing the measurement result in the non-volatile storage area; in response to that the CRTM is executed by the processor, measuring a first next level of code of the CRTM, and storing a measurement result of measuring the first next level of code in the trusted module; and in response to that the first next level of code of the CRTM is executed by the processor, measuring a second next level of code next to the first next level, and storing a measurement result of measuring the second next level of code in the trusted module, wherein by analogy, next levels of code is measured layer by layer to complete trusted chain establishment for the computing device.

2 . The method according to claim 1 , wherein the CRTM is a segment of code initially executed by the processor.

3 . The method according to claim 1 , wherein the trusted module is implemented based on a secure chip, and further comprises a root of trust for storage (RTS), and a root of trust for reporting (RTR).

4 . The method according to claim 1 , wherein the core root measurement policy further comprises one or more of the following: a measurement reference value of the CRTM, a processing method, and a signature value of a policy maker.

5 . The method according to claim 1 , wherein levels of code under the CRTM successively comprise BIOS, master boot code, an OS loader, and an OS kernel program.

6 . A computing device, comprising:
a trusted module, configured to:
measure a CRTM of a processor on the computing device, and store a measurement result, the trusted module comprising a root of trust for measurement (RTM);
detect, by the RTM of the trusted module, whether a core root measurement policy exists in a non-volatile storage area in the trusted module, wherein the core root measurement policy comprises a storage address of the CRTM to be measured; and
in response to that the core root measurement policy exists, obtain at least a part of the CRTM based on the storage address by using the RTM and measuring the part of the CRTM, and store the measurement result in the non-volatile storage area; and
the processor, configured to: when executing the CRTM, measure a first next level of code of the CRTM, and store a measurement result of measuring the first next level of code in the trusted module; and when executing the first next level of code of the CRTM, measure a second next level of code next to the first next level, and store a measurement result of measuring the second next level of code in the trusted module, wherein by analogy, next levels of code is measured layer by layer to complete trusted chain establishment for the computing device.

7 . The computing device to claim 6 , wherein the CRTM is a segment of code initially executed by the processor.

8 . The computing device to claim 6 , wherein the trusted module is implemented based on a secure chip, and further comprises a root of trust for storage (RTS), and a root of trust for reporting (RTR).

9 . The computing device to claim 6 , wherein the core root measurement policy further comprises one or more of the following: a measurement reference value of the CRTM, a processing method, and a signature value of a policy maker.

10 . The computing device to claim 6 , wherein levels of code under the CRTM successively comprise BIOS, master boot code, an OS loader, and an OS kernel program.

11 . A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions stored therein that, when executed by a processor of a computing device, cause the processor to:
start a trusted module located on the computing device; measure, by the trusted module, a core root of trust for measurement (CRTM) of a processor on the computing device, and store a measurement result in the trusted module, the trusted module comprising a root of trust for measurement (RTM); detect, by the RTM of the trusted module, whether a core root measurement policy exists in a non-volatile storage area in the trusted module, wherein the core root measurement policy comprises a storage address of the CRTM to be measured; in response to that the core root measurement policy exists, obtain at least a part of the CRTM based on the storage address by using the RTM and measuring the part of the CRTM, and store the measurement result in the non-volatile storage area; in response to that the CRTM is executed by the processor, measure a first next level of code of the CRTM, and store a measurement result of measuring the first next level of code in the trusted module; and in response to that the first next level of code of the CRTM is executed by the processor, measure a second next level of code next to the first next level, and store a measurement result of measuring the second next level of code in the trusted module, wherein by analogy, next levels of code is measured layer by layer to complete trusted chain establishment for the computing device.

12 . The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium to claim 11 , wherein the CRTM is a segment of code initially executed by the processor.

13 . The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium to claim 11 , wherein the trusted module is implemented based on a secure chip, and further comprises a root of trust for storage (RTS), and a root of trust for reporting (RTR).

14 . The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium to claim 11 , wherein the core root measurement policy further comprises one or more of the following: a measurement reference value of the CRTM, a processing method, and a signature value of a policy maker.

15 . The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium to claim 11 , wherein levels of code under the CRTM successively comprise BIOS, master boot code, an OS loader, and an OS kernel program.

Assignees

• Alipay Hangzhou Inf Tech Co Ltd

Inventors

• Hou Weixing
• Hu Lei
• Wu Peng
• Luo Hailin
• An Wei
• Li Chao
• Shuai Fengyun

Classifications

• G06F2221/034

  Test or assess a computer or a system · CPC title

• G06F21/57 Primary

  Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities · CPC title