MAC address cloning attack detection for V2X devices

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-12445489-B2
Application number	US-202318316025-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	May 11, 2023
Priority date	May 11, 2023
Publication date	Oct 14, 2025
Grant date	Oct 14, 2025

Abstract

A method of wireless communication at a first V2X device is described herein. The method includes obtaining a message including a MAC header, an L1 source ID, and an L1 destination ID. The method includes decoding the MAC header to produce an L2 source ID associated with the message based on at least one of (1) the L1 destination ID of the message matching a first number of bits of an L2 source ID of the first V2X device or (2) the L1 source ID of the message matching a second number of bits of the L2 source ID of the first V2X device. The method includes outputting an indication of a MAC cloning attack based on the L2 source ID of the message matching the L2 source ID of the first V2X device.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. An apparatus for wireless communication at a first vehicle-to- everything (V2X) device, comprising:
a memory; and
a processor coupled to the memory and, based on information stored in the memory, the processor is configured to:
obtain a message comprising a medium access control (MAC) header, a layer 1 (L1) source identifier (ID), and an L1 destination ID;
decode the MAC header to produce a layer 2 (L2) source ID associated with the message based on at least one of (1) the L1 destination ID of the message matching a first number of bits of an L2 source ID of the first V2X device or (2) the L1 source ID of the message matching a second number of bits of the L2 source ID of the first V2X device, wherein to decode the MAC header, the processor is configured to decode the MAC header further based on the L1 destination ID of the message matching a third number of bits of a provider service ID (PSID) associated with the first V2X device.; and
output an indication of a MAC cloning attack based on the L2 source ID of the message matching the L2 source ID of the first V2X device.

2. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the first V 2 X device is at least one of a vehicle, an ego vehicle, a user equipment (UE), a roadside unit (RSU), an on-board unit (OBU), or a network node.

3. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein to output the indication of the MAC cloning attack, the processor is configured to output the indication of the MAC cloning attack during a unicast session between the first V2X device and a second V2X device.

4. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processor is further configured to:
perform a temperature measurement of at least one of hardware of the first V2X device or an ambient environment around the first V2X device, wherein to decode the MAC header, the processor is configured to decode the MAC header based on the temperature measurement and a threshold temperature.

5. The apparatus of claim 4 , wherein to decode the MAC header, the processor is configured to decode the MAC header if the temperature measurement is less than or equal to the threshold temperature.

6. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processor is further configured to:
receive a second message from a second V 2 X device, wherein to decode the MAC header, the processor is configured to decode the MAC header based on the reception of the second message.

7. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the Ll destination ID of the message comprises sixteen bits, and wherein the first number of bits comprises sixteen least significant bits (LSBs) of the L2 source ID of the first V2X device.

8. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the L1 source ID of the message comprises eight bits, and wherein the second number of bits comprises eight least significant bits (LSBs) of the L2 source ID of the first V2X device.

9. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein to output the indication of the MAC cloning attack, the processor is configured to transmit a second message to a second V2X device.

10. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the apparatus is a wireless communication device comprising at least one of a transceiver or an antenna coupled to the processor, and wherein to obtain the message, the processor is configured to obtain the message via at least one of the transceiver or the antenna.

11. An apparatus for wireless communication at a first vehicle-to- everything (V2X) device, comprising:
a memory; and
a processor coupled to the memory and, based on information stored in the memory, the processor is configured to:
detect that a medium access control (MAC) cloning attack has occurred based on a layer 1 (L1) destination identifier (ID) of a second V2X device, an L1 source ID of the first V2X device, and a layer 2 (L2) source ID of a first message; and

transmit, for the second V2X device based on the detection, a second message that indicates a MAC cloning attack and that includes the L1 destination ID of the second V2X device, the L1 source ID of the first V2X device, and the L2 source ID of the first message, wherein the second message is associated with a plurality of messages from a plurality of V2X devices including the second V2X device, and wherein the plurality of messages is associated with a majority voting algorithm associated with an indication of the MAC cloning attack.

12. The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the second message includes an inter-user equipment (inter-UE) coordination message.

13. The apparatus of claim 12 , wherein the L1 destination ID of the second V2X device, the L1 source ID of the first V2X device, and the L2 source ID of the first message are included in a MAC control element (MAC-CE) of the inter-UE coordination message.

14. The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the second message includes an application layer message.

15. The apparatus of claim 14 , wherein the application layer message comprises at least one of a cooperative perception message (CPM) or a sensor data sharing message (SDSM).

16. The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein to transmit the second message, the processor is configured to transmit the second message during at least one of a unicast session between the first V2X device and the second V2X device, a groupcast session between the first V2X device and the second V2X device, or a broadcast session associated with the first V2X device.

17. The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the first V2X device is at least one of a first vehicle, a first ego vehicle, a first user equipment (UE), a first roadside unit (RSU), a first on-board unit (OBU), or a first network node, and wherein the second V2X device is at least one of a second vehicle, a second ego vehicle, a second UE, a second RSU, a second OBU, or a second network node.

18. The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the apparatus is a wireless communication device comprising at least one of a transceiver or an antenna coupled to the processor, and wherein to transmit the second message, the processor is configured to transmit the second message via at least one of the transceiver or the antenna.

19. A method of wireless communication at a first vehicle-to-everything (V2X) device, comprising:
obtaining a message comprising a medium access control (MAC) header, a layer 1 (L1) source identifier (ID), and an L1 destination ID;
decoding the MAC header to produce a layer 2 (L2) source ID associated with the message based on at least one of (1) the L1 destination ID of the message matching a first number of bits of an L2 source ID of the first V2X device or (2) the L1 source ID of the message matching a second number of bits of the L2 source ID of the first V2X device, wherein decoding the MAC header comprises decoding the MAC header further based on the L1 destination ID of the message matching a third number of bits of a provider service ID (PSID) associated with the first V2X device; and
outputting an indication of a MAC cloning attack based on the L2 source ID of the message matching the L2 source ID of the first V2X device.

20. The method of claim 19 , wherein the first V2X device is at least one of a vehicle, an ego vehicle, a user equipment (UE), a roadside unit (RSU), an on-board unit (OBU), or a network node.

21. The method of claim 19 , wherein outputting the indication of the MAC cloning attack occurs during a unicast session between the first V2X device and a second V2X device.

22. The method of claim 19 , further comprising:
performing a temperature measurement of at least one of hardware of the first V2X

Assignees

• Qualcomm Inc

Inventors

• Das Soumya
• Sarkis Gabi
• Nekoui Mohammad
• Petit Jonathan

Classifications

• G06F1/206

  comprising thermal management · CPC title

• H04W12/009

  specially adapted for networks, e.g. wireless sensor networks, ad-hoc networks, RFID networks or cloud networks · CPC title

• H04W12/122

  Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices · CPC title

• H04L63/1483 Primary

  service impersonation, e.g. phishing, pharming or web spoofing (detection of rogue wireless access points H04W12/12) · CPC title

• H04L63/1466 Primary

  Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks · CPC title