Monitor based ambiguity verification for enhanced guidance quality
US-2016097859-A1 · Apr 7, 2016 · US
US12442929B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-12442929-B2 |
| Application number | US-202418665225-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | May 15, 2024 |
| Priority date | Sep 12, 2022 |
| Publication date | Oct 14, 2025 |
| Grant date | Oct 14, 2025 |
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A method can include and/or a system can be configured for determining satellite positioning corrections, generating a satellite positioning corrections message to transmit the satellite positioning corrections to an endpoint. The method can optionally include and/or the system can optionally be configured for establishing or determining a chain-of-trust, validating the satellite positioning corrections (e.g., at the endpoint), and/or determining a positioning solution.
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We claim: 1. A system comprising: a corrections generation computing system configured to: determine corrections data for satellite signals received from satellites associated with one or more satellite constellations; group the corrections data into corrections groups based on a source of error the corrections data accounts for; for each correction group, generate a signature message with a signature construction consistent with a signature algorithm, wherein the signature message comprises a broadcast counter that increments only when a corrections group is broadcast at a predetermined time; broadcast the corrections groups and the respective signature message with a predetermined timing, wherein each corrections group of the corrections groups is transmitted separately; and receive a request to transmit at least one corrections group from the corrections group and transmit the corrections group in response to the request; wherein each corrections group is configured to be received and verified by a GNSS receiver configured to determine a positioning solution of the GNSS received based on the corrections group. 2. The system of claim 1 , wherein each corrections group is verified based on the broadcast counter. 3. The system of claim 1 , wherein the signature message comprises a request counter that increments only for corrections groups transmitted in response to the request. 4. The system of claim 3 , wherein each corrections group is verified based on the request counter. 5. The system of claim 1 , wherein the source of errors comprises satellite errors and atmospheric delays. 6. The system of claim 5 , wherein the satellite errors comprise satellite antenna phase center, ephemeris data, satellite clock offsets, satellite orbit errors, satellite code bias errors, and satellite phase bias errors; and wherein the atmospheric delays comprise slant total electron count corrections and gridded atmospheric corrections. 7. The system of claim 5 , wherein the corrections data further comprises integrity messages comprising bounds on the atmospheric delays, bounds on the satellite orbit corrections, bounds on the satellite clock corrections, degradation of the bounds on the satellite orbit corrections, degradation of the bounds on the satellite clock corrections, bounds on the code bias corrections, bounds on the phase bias corrections, and satellite flags. 8. The system of claim 1 , wherein generating a signature message comprises processing the corrections data within a corrections group to form a hash and signing the hash using a private key to generate the signature message. 9. The system of claim 8 , wherein the corrections generation computing system is further configured to transmit a certificate message comprising a public key associated with the private key and a certificate fingerprint, wherein the certificate fingerprint is configured to verify a trust in the public key, and wherein a corrections group of the corrections groups is configured to be verified by decoding the signature message using the public key to determine a correction data fingerprint, independently processing the corrections data of the corrections group to form a second correction data fingerprint, and comparing the correction data fingerprint with the second correction data fingerprint. 10. The system of claim 8 , wherein the hash is signed with the private key using an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm. 11. A method comprising: at a gnss receiver, receiving a corrections message from a corrections generator, wherein the corrections message comprises a corrections signature and corrections data wherein the corrections data is grouped within a corrections message based on an error type; verifying the corrections data by: processing the corrections data to form a first corrections data fingerprint; decoding the corrections signature using a public key to form a second corrections data fingerprint, wherein the corrections signature is formed by signing a hash of the corrections data with a private key associated with the public key; and comparing the first corrections data fingerprint to the second corrections data fingerprint, wherein the corrections data is verified when the first corrections data fingerprint and the second corrections data fingerprint are the same; and when the corrections data is verified: correcting satellite observations tracked by the GNSS receiver using the verified corrections group; and determining a positioning solution of the GNSS receiver using the corrected satellite observations. 12. The method of claim 11 , wherein the error type comprises satellite errors and atmospheric delays. 13. The method of claim 12 , wherein the satellite errors comprise satellite antenna phase center, ephemeris data, satellite clock offsets, satellite orbit errors, satellite code bias errors, and satellite phase bias errors; and wherein the atmospheric delays comprise slant total electron count corrections and gridded atmospheric corrections. 14. The method of claim 12 , wherein the corrections data further comprises integrity messages comprising bounds on the atmospheric delays, bounds on the satellite orbit corrections, bounds on the satellite clock corrections, degradation of the bounds on the satellite orbit corrections, degradation of the bounds on the satellite clock corrections, bounds on the code bias corrections, bounds on the phase bias corrections, and satellite flags. 15. The method of claim 11 , wherein the corrections message further comprises a broadcast counter, wherein the broadcast counter increments for corrections message that is broadcast, wherein verifying the corrections data further comprises verifying a value of the broadcast counter. 16. The method of claim 11 , further comprising requesting specific corrections data wherein the request comprises a request for at least one of: a corrections certificate comprising the public key; an intermediate certificate used to sign the corrections certificate; low rate corrections; ephemeris data; satellite clock corrections; satellite orbit corrections; code bias corrections; phase bias corrections; atmospheric delays; or integrity messages. 17. The method of claim 16 , wherein the corrections message further comprises a request counter, wherein the request counter only increments for corrections message that are requested, wherein verifying the corrections data further comprises verifying a value of the request counter. 18. The method of claim 11 , further comprising receiving a certificate message comprising the public key associated with the private key and a certificate fingerprint, wherein the certificate fingerprint is configured to verify a chain-of-trust in the public key. 19. The method of claim 11 , wherein the hash of the corrections data is signed with the private key using an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm.
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