Microwave reflectometry for physical inspections
US-2019227003-A1 · Jul 25, 2019 · US
US12416593B1 · US · B1
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-12416593-B1 |
| Application number | US-202117329370-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B1 |
| Filing date | May 25, 2021 |
| Priority date | Jun 1, 2017 |
| Publication date | Sep 16, 2025 |
| Grant date | Sep 16, 2025 |
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Systems and methods for measuring unique microelectronic electromagnetic signatures are provided. A method includes injecting a nondestructive signal as input into a port of an object. The method may further include receiving as output from a signal path within the object a unique frequency dependent complex spectrum comprising a reflection spectrum or a transmission spectrum. The method may also include generating a unique object signature based upon the port and the received spectrum. The method may still further include differentiating the object from a different object based upon a comparison of the unique object signature of each.
Opening claim text (preview).
The invention claimed is: 1. A method for non-destructively testing an electronic suspect object to determine whether the suspect object is counterfeit or authentic, the method comprising: injecting, via a signal injector, a known signal into one or more ports of a suspect object while the suspect object is in a powered-off state, the known signal comprising a non-destructive radio frequency signal; identifying a signal response comprising a received spectrum responsive to the injecting of the known signal into the one or more ports of the suspect object; generating a unique suspect object signature of the suspect object based at least in part on the signal response; obtaining, from a memory, information indicative of a unique authentic object signature, wherein the unique authentic object signature is based at least in part on a signal response of an authentic object; generating a dataset comprising a plurality of object signatures including the unique suspect object signature and the unique authentic object signature; performing a principal component analysis on the dataset comprising the plurality of object signatures such that principal component data points of unique objects are grouped into distinct clusters; utilizing a probability density function and a transform after the principal component analysis to determine a confidence interval; and differentiating the suspect object from the authentic object based at least in part on the principal component analysis. 2. The method of claim 1 , wherein injecting of the known signal into the one or more ports of the suspect object comprises injecting through a direct and physical connection between the signal injector and the one or more ports of the suspect object. 3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the known signal is measured using passive radio frequency injection spectrometry for characterizing a unique microelectronic electromagnetic signature of the known signal. 4. The method of claim 1 , wherein injecting of the known signal into the suspect object generates a reflected wave, wherein the reflected wave is measured to determine a distance the known signal travels into the suspect object. 5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the information indicative of the unique authentic object signature includes at least one of a manufacturer, data code, usage wear, wafer, packing house, fabrication location, age, environmental effects, or manufacturer effects. 6. The method of claim 2 , wherein there is a physical link between variation sources and real-space circuit locations and electromagnetic frequencies of the suspect object. 7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the signal response is measured at suspect object ports other than at a point of injection. 8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising: storing a dataset comprising a plurality of unique object signatures from a plurality of objects. 9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the received spectrum comprises a unique frequency dependent complex spectrum comprising a reflection spectrum or a transmission spectrum. 10. The method of claim 1 , wherein the unique suspect object signature is based further in part on the one or more ports of the suspect object. 11. A system comprising at least one data processor and at least one non-transitory memory storing computer executable instructions that when executed by the at least one data processor cause the system to carry out actions comprising: injecting, via a signal injector, a known signal into a plurality of ports of a suspect object while the suspect object is in a powered-off state, the known signal comprising a non-destructive radio frequency signal; identifying a signal response comprising a received spectrum responsive to the injecting of the known signal into the plurality of ports of the suspect object; generating a unique suspect object signature of the suspect object based at least in part on the signal response and the plurality of ports of the suspect object; obtaining, from a memory, information indicative of a unique authentic object signature, wherein the unique authentic object signature is based at least in part on a signal response of an authentic object; generating a dataset comprising a plurality of object signatures including the unique suspect object signature and the unique authentic object signature; performing a principal component analysis on the dataset comprising the plurality of object signatures such that principal component data points of unique objects are grouped into distinct clusters; utilizing a probability density function and a transform after the principal component analysis to determine a confidence interval; and differentiating the suspect object from the authentic object based at least in part on the principal component analysis. 12. The system of claim 11 , wherein the known signal is injected into the plurality of ports of the suspect object while the suspect object is in the powered-off state. 13. The system of claim 12 , further comprising a plurality of suspect objects, wherein each suspect object of the plurality of suspect objects is injected with the known signal to generate a unique object signature for each suspect object. 14. The system of claim 11 , wherein the signal injector comprises a multi-port vector network analyzer system and each multi-port vector network analyzer of the multi-port vector network analyzer system is configured for collecting information indicative of the suspect object between any two ports of the multi-port vector network analyzer system. 15. One or more non-transitory, computer readable media storing computer-executable instructions that, when executed by a processor, perform a method of performing non-destructive testing on a suspect object by comparing the suspect object with a known object using unique object identifiers, the method comprising: injecting, via a signal injector, a known signal into one or more ports of a suspect object while the suspect object is in a powered-off state, the known signal comprising a non-destructive radio frequency signal; identifying a signal response comprising a received spectrum responsive to the injecting of the known signal into the one or more ports of the suspect object; generating a unique suspect object signature of the suspect object based at least in part on the signal response; obtaining, from a memory, information indicative of a unique authentic object signature, wherein the unique authentic object signature is based at least in part on a signal response of an authentic object; generating a dataset comprising a plurality of object signatures including the unique suspect object signature and the unique authentic object signature; performing a principal component analysis on the dataset comprising the plurality of object signatures such that principal component data points of unique objects are grouped into distinct clusters; utilizing a probability density function and a transform after the principal component analysis to determine a confidence interval; and differentiating the suspect object from the authentic object based at least in part on the principal component analysis. 16. The media of claim 15 , the method further comprising generating a cluster, wherein similar objects will form the cluster, with an unknown object appearing at a point some distance away from a centroid or an outer bounds of the cluster. 17. The media of claim 16 , wherein an unknown object that is a distance past a predetermined threshold is deemed to have failed a counterfeit detection test and a dist
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