Secure electronic transactions using transport layer security (setutls)
US-2024146767-A1 · May 2, 2024 · US
US12368756B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-12368756-B2 |
| Application number | US-202318223786-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Jul 19, 2023 |
| Priority date | Jul 19, 2023 |
| Publication date | Jul 22, 2025 |
| Grant date | Jul 22, 2025 |
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Methods, systems, and apparatuses are described herein for protecting sensitive data even when Transport Layer Security (TLS) communication sessions are compromised. A computing device may send, via a web browser plugin of a web browser application executing on the computing device and to one or more remote servers, a request for a server secret that comprises a device fingerprint, an identification of the web browser application, and an identification of the web browser plugin. The computing device may receive the server secret and a public certificate associated with the remote server. The computing device may establish, via the web browser application, a TLS session with the one or more remote servers. The computing device may generate a session key. The computing device may receive data comprising unencrypted data and encrypted data. The computing device may decrypt the encrypted data based on the session key.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A computing device configured to protect sensitive data even when Transport Layer Security (TLS) communication sessions are compromised, the computing device comprising: one or more processors; and memory storing instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the computing device to: send, via a web browser plugin of a web browser application executing on the computing device and to one or more remote servers, a request for a server secret that comprises: a device fingerprint of the computing device, and an identification of the web browser plugin; receive, from the one or more remote servers and in response to the request for the server secret: the server secret, and a public certificate associated with the remote server; establish, via the web browser application, a TLS session with the one or more remote servers; generate a session key based on: the server secret, the public certificate, the device fingerprint of the computing device, the identification of the web browser plugin, a unique identifier of a user of the computing device, and a nonce string; receive, from the remote server and via the TLS session, data comprising unencrypted data and encrypted data; and decrypt the encrypted data based on the session key. 2. The computing device of claim 1 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the computing device to: determine the nonce string on a periodic basis. 3. The computing device of claim 1 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the computing device to: generate, via the web browser plugin, a first public-private key pair; sign, using a first public-private key pair, the server secret and the public certificate; and store the signed server secret and the signed public certificate. 4. The computing device of claim 1 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the computing device to: store the session key in temporary storage associated with the web browser plugin, wherein the temporary storage is configured to be deleted based on one or more of: closing of the web browser application; or expiration of a period of time. 5. The computing device of claim 1 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the computing device to: generate the device fingerprint of the computing device by executing, in the web browser, code received from the one or more remote servers. 6. The computing device of claim 1 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the computing device to: send, to the remote server, a request for sensitive data, wherein the encrypted data comprises the sensitive data. 7. The computing device of claim 1 , wherein the device fingerprint identifies one or more of: hardware components of the computing device, or a name of a network used by the computing device. 8. A method for protecting sensitive data even when Transport Layer Security (TLS) communication sessions are compromised, the method comprising: sending, by a computing device, via a web browser plugin of a web browser application executing on the computing device, and to one or more remote servers, a request for a server secret that comprises: a device fingerprint of the computing device, and an identification of the web browser plugin; receiving, by the computing device, from the one or more remote servers, and in response to the request for the server secret: the server secret, and a public certificate associated with the remote server; establishing, via the web browser application, a TLS session with the one or more remote servers; generating, by the computing device, a session key based on: the server secret, the public certificate, the device fingerprint of the computing device, the identification of the web browser plugin, a unique identifier of a user of the computing device, and a nonce string; receiving, by the computing device, from the remote server, and via the TLS session, data comprising unencrypted data and encrypted data; and decrypting, by the computing device, the encrypted data based on the session key. 9. The method of claim 8 , further comprising: determining the nonce string on a periodic basis. 10. The method of claim 8 , further comprising: generating, via the web browser plugin, a first public-private key pair; signing, using a first public-private key pair, the server secret and the public certificate; and storing the signed server secret and the signed public certificate. 11. The method of claim 8 , further comprising: storing the session key in temporary storage associated with the web browser plugin, wherein the temporary storage is configured to be deleted based on one or more of: closing of the web browser application; or expiration of a period of time. 12. The method of claim 8 , further comprising: generating the device fingerprint of the computing device by executing, in the web browser, code received from the one or more remote servers. 13. The method of claim 8 , further comprising: sending, to the remote server, a request for sensitive data, wherein the encrypted data comprises the sensitive data. 14. The method of claim 8 , wherein the device fingerprint identifies one or more of: hardware components of the computing device, or a name of a network used by the computing device. 15. One or more non-transitory computer-readable media storing instructions configured to protect sensitive data even when Transport Layer Security (TLS) communication sessions are compromised, wherein the instructions, when executed by one or more processors of a computing device, cause the computing device to: send, via a web browser plugin of a web browser application executing on the computing device and to one or more remote servers, a request for a server secret that comprises: a device fingerprint of the computing device, and an identification of the web browser plugin; receive, from the one or more remote servers and in response to the request for the server secret: the server secret, and a public certificate associated with the remote server; establish, via the web browser application, a TLS session with the one or more remote servers; generate a session key based on: the server secret, the public certificate, the device fingerprint of the computing device, the identification of the web browser plugin, a unique identifier of a user of the computing device, and a nonce string; receive, from the remote server and via the TLS session, data comprising unencrypted data and encrypted data; and decrypt the encrypted data based on the session key. 16. The non-transitory computer-readable media of claim 15 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the computing device to: determine the nonce string on a periodic basis. 17. The non-transitory computer-readable media of claim 15 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the computing device to: generate, via the web browser plugin, a first public-private key pair; sign, using a first public-private key pair, the server secret and the public certificate; and store the signed server secret and the signed public certificate. 18. The non-transitory computer-readable media of claim 15 , wherein the instructions, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the computing device to:
using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263) · CPC title
for supporting key management in a packet data network (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08) · CPC title
based on web technology, e.g. hypertext transfer protocol [HTTP] · CPC title
Identity-dependent · CPC title
Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption · CPC title
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