Distributed blockchain ledger for vehicular systems
US-10880070-B1 · Dec 29, 2020 · US
US12283192B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-12283192-B2 |
| Application number | US-202218084228-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Dec 19, 2022 |
| Priority date | Dec 20, 2021 |
| Publication date | Apr 22, 2025 |
| Grant date | Apr 22, 2025 |
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Disclosed is a method of detecting spoofing of a traffic alert and collision avoidance system, known as a TCAS, the TCAS having a Mode A, a Mode C and a Mode S for communicating with surrounding aircraft. The method includes: querying a suspected spoofing aircraft via Mode S of the TCAS and receiving a response to this query; deducing from the response at least some data, known as Mode S data, relating to the suspected spoofing aircraft; and validating Mode S data by querying the suspected spoofing aircraft via Mode A or Mode C of the TCAS.
Opening claim text (preview).
The invention claimed is: 1. A method for spoofing detection of a traffic alert and collision avoidance system, called TCAS; the TCAS having a Mode A, a Mode C and a Mode S for communicating with surrounding aircrafts; the method comprising the following steps: querying a suspected spoofing aircraft via Mode S of the TCAS and receiving a response to this query; deducing from said response data, called Mode S data, relating to the suspected spoofing aircraft; validating the Mode S data by querying the suspected spoofing aircraft via Mode A or Mode C of the TCAS. 2. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 , wherein the validation step is repeated N times, the suspected spoofing aircraft being recognised as false when the Mode S data traffic is not validated by any iteration. 3. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 , wherein: N is greater than or equal to 3; at least one iteration of the validation step is implemented when the suspected spoofing aircraft becomes a threat in both altitude and distance; at least one iteration of the validation step is implemented prior to the triggering of a traffic alert in relation to the suspected spoofing aircraft; at least one iteration of the validation step is implemented prior to the triggering of a resolution advisory in relation to the suspected spoofing aircraft. 4. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 , further comprising a step of retrieving a transponder code of the suspected spoofing aircraft via Mode S. 5. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 4 , wherein the step of retrieving the transponder code is implemented: in passive mode when the suspected spoofing aircraft is not a threat in altitude or distance; in querying mode when the suspected spoofing aircraft is a threat in altitude or distance. 6. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 4 , wherein said Mode S data validation step comprises: querying via Mode A; identifying a response to this querying of the suspected spoofing aircraft by comparing the received transponder code with that retrieved in the retrieval step; designating Mode S data as validated when the response from the suspected spoofing aircraft has been received within a time window determined by that Mode S data; the Mode S data comprising a relative distance to the suspected spoofing aircraft. 7. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 , wherein said Mode S data validation step comprises: querying via Mode C; designating Mode S data as validated when there is a response to this query with carried/deducible data corresponding to Mode S data; the Mode S data comprising a relative distance, bearing and altitude of the suspected spoofing aircraft. 8. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 , further comprising a behavioural analysis step consisting of analysing the behaviour of the suspected spoofing aircraft in terms of the physical capabilities of an aircraft and/or a regulation. 9. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 8 , wherein the behavioural analysis comprises analysing at least one of the following: speed of the suspected spoofing aircraft; variation in the speed of the suspected spoofing aircraft; detection of a fixed transmitter. 10. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 , further comprising a step of displaying in the TCAS a symbol representative of the suspected spoofing aircraft in the event of non-validation of Mode S data, said symbol being different from a symbol representative of any other aircraft whose Mode S data has been validated. 11. A traffic alert and collision avoidance system, called TCAS, comprising a query module, a reception module, a behavioural analysis module, a validation module and a display module configured to implement the method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 .
Anti-collision systems · CPC title
Transmission of traffic-related information between aircraft · CPC title
of aircraft or spacecraft · CPC title
for communication related to vehicles · CPC title
using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal · CPC title
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