Methods and apparatus for validating wireless access card authenticity and proximity

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-12223787-B2
Application number	US-202318138608-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Apr 24, 2023
Priority date	Mar 11, 2021
Publication date	Feb 11, 2025
Grant date	Feb 11, 2025

Abstract

A method includes performing, by a terminal with an access card, a first relay attack check for the access card in accordance with a local value associated with the terminal and a local value associated with the access card; determining, by the terminal, that the access card has passed the first relay attack check, and based thereon, performing, by the terminal with the access card, an authentication check of the access card in accordance with the local value associated with the terminal, the local value associated with the access card, and a local challenge value associated with the terminal; and determining, by the terminal, that the access card has passed the first relay attack check and the authentication check, and based thereon, validating, by the terminal, the access card.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method, comprising:
transmitting, by a proximity coupling device to a proximity integrated circuit card, a terminal enabler value that is a unique randomly generated value associated with the proximity coupling device, the transmitting comprising transmitting the terminal enabler value in first portions;
receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a remote enabler value that is a unique randomly generated value associated with the proximity integrated circuit card, the receiving comprising receiving the remote enabler value in second portions; and
detecting a relay attack in response to a duration between transmitting the terminal enabler value in first portions and receiving the remote enabler value in second portions being greater than a maximum time threshold.

2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising a local challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device;
receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, an enabler value of a device initiating the relay attack;
receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message; and
detecting a relay attack in response to determining that a signature of the second authentication message is generated in accordance with the enabler value of the device initiating the relay attack, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device.

3. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising a local challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device;
receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, an enabler value of a device initiating the relay attack;
receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message; and
detecting a relay attack in response to determining that a signature of the second authentication message is generated in accordance with the enabler value of the device initiating the relay attack, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with the device initiating the relay attack.

4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising a local challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device;
receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message; and
detecting a relay attack in response to determining that a signature of the second authentication message is generated in accordance with the remote enabler value, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with a device initiating the relay attack.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the proximity coupling device and the proximity integrated circuit card are part of a system for gaining access to an automobile system, the method further comprising denying access to the automobile system in response to detecting the relay attack.

6. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
receiving the remote enabler value from the proximity integrated circuit card; and
authenticating the proximity integrated circuit card in response to:
validating values associated with the terminal enabler value, the remote enabler value, and a local challenge value associated with a system comprising the proximity coupling device and the proximity integrated circuit card, and
a duration between transmitting the terminal enabler value and receiving the remote enabler value being less than or equal to a maximum time threshold.

7. The method of claim 6 , further comprising:
transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising the local challenge value;
receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message comprising a signature generated in accordance with a first key of the proximity integrated circuit card, the remote enabler value, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with the system; and
verify the signature in accordance with a second key of the proximity integrated circuit card, the terminal enabler value, the remote enabler value, and the local challenge value.

8. A method, comprising:
transmitting, by a proximity coupling device to a proximity integrated circuit card, a terminal enabler value that is a unique randomly generated value associated with the proximity coupling device, the transmitting comprising transmitting the terminal enabler value in first portions;
receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a remote enabler value that is a unique randomly generated value associated with the proximity integrated circuit card, the receiving comprising receiving the remote enabler value in second portions; and
detecting a relay attack in response to a duration between transmitting the terminal enabler value and receiving the remote enabler value being less than or equal to a minimum time threshold.

9. The method of claim 8 , further comprising:
transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising a local challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device;
receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, an enabler value of a device initiating the relay attack;
receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message; and
detecting a relay attack in response to determining that a signature of the second authentication message is generated in accordance with the enabler value of the device initiating the relay attack, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device.

10. The method of claim 8 , further comprising:
transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising a local challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device;
receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message; and
detecting a relay attack in response to determining that a signature of the second authentication message is generated in accordance with an enabler value of a device initiating the relay attack, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with the device initiating the relay attack.

11. The method of claim 8 , further comprising:
transmitting, by the proximity coupling device to the proximity integrated circuit card, a first authentication message comprising a local challenge value associated with the proximity coupling device;
receiving, by the proximity coupling device from the proximity integrated circuit card, a second authentication message; and
detecting a relay attack in response to determining that a signature of the second authentication message is generated in accordance with the remote enabler value, the terminal enabler value, and a remote challenge value associated with a device initiating the relay attack.

Assignees

• St Microelectronics Srl

Inventors

• Cimino Carlo
• Di Cosmo Luca

Classifications

• G07C9/00174

  Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys (mechanical locks with electric permutation E05B49/00; arrangements for sensing or reading record carriers G06K7/00; electronic switching H03K17/00) · CPC title

• G07C2009/00769

  with data transmission performed by wireless means · CPC title

• G06F2221/2111

  Location-sensitive, e.g. geographical location, GPS · CPC title

• G07C2009/00341

  keyless data carrier having more than one limited data transmission ranges · CPC title

• G06F2221/2103

  Challenge-response · CPC title