AMF re-allocation due to slicing

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-12185176-B2
Application number	US-202017634614-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Aug 14, 2020
Priority date	Aug 19, 2019
Publication date	Dec 31, 2024
Grant date	Dec 31, 2024

Abstract

In a wireless communication network implementing network slicing (NS), an Initial Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) for a user equipment (UE) in one NS is able to re-allocate a UE to a Target AMF in a different NS, despite not being able to directly communicate with the Target AMF due to NS security restrictions. In a first embodiment, the Initial AMF transfers the UE context—including its security context—to a Default AMF. The Default AMF has the capability to communicate with network functions in different NSes. The Default AMF transfers the UE context to the Target AMF. In a second embodiment, a security key Kamf′ is horizontally derived in a manner that avoids NS security conflicts. The derived key is transferred to the UE and Target AMF, which establish a security context. In a third embodiment, the Initial AMF allocates a Token, and transfers it, along with the UE security context (directly or via RAN) to the Default AMF. The Default AMF then transfers the security context to the Target AMF.

First claim

The invention claimed is:

1. A wireless device operative in a wireless communication network, the wireless device comprising:
processing circuitry; and
communication circuitry operatively connected to the processing circuitry;
wherein the processing circuitry is configured to cause the wireless device to establish a security context with a Target Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) that is in a second network slice by sending a registration request message to an Initial AMF that is in a first network slice and is unable to communicate with the Target AMF; and
wherein the Initial AMF and the Target AMF are both able to securely communicate with a Default AMF.

2. The wireless device of claim 1 , wherein the registration request message includes network slicing information.

3. The wireless device of claim 1 , wherein the registration accept message is protected according to the security context between the wireless device and the Initial AMF.

4. A first core network node operative as an Initial Access and Mobility Management Function (Initial AMF) for a wireless device for transferring control of the wireless device to a Target AMF; the first core network node comprising:
processing circuitry; and
communication circuitry operatively connected to the processing circuitry;
wherein the processing circuitry is configured to cause the first core network node to:
establish a security context with the wireless device;
receive a Registration Request message from the wireless device;
determine that the Target AMF should control the wireless device, the Target AMF being in a different network slice; and
transfer the security context for the wireless device to a Default AMF which is able to securely communicate with both the Initial AMF and the Target AMF.

5. The first core network node of claim 4 , wherein the processing circuitry is configured to cause the first core network node to determine that the Target AMF should control the wireless device by making the determination based local configured information or information received from a Network Slice Selection Function (NSSF).

6. The first core network node of claim 5 , wherein the information received from NSSF includes the network address of one or both of the Default AMF and the Target AMF.

7. The first core network node of claim 4 , wherein the processing circuitry is configured to cause the first core network node to transfer the security context for the wireless device to a Default AMF by sending a message directly to the Default AMF or sending a message to the Default AMF via a Radio Access Network.

8. The first core network node of claim 7 :
wherein the message includes a Globally Unique AMF Identifier of the Initial AMF; and
wherein the processing circuitry is configured to cause the first core network node to:
receive a request from the Default AMF for the security context; and
send, in response to the request from the Default AMF for the security context, the security context for the wireless device to the Default AMF.

9. The first core network node of claim 8 , wherein the processing circuitry is configured to cause the first core network node to, prior to sending the security context for the wireless device to the Default AMF:
send the Default AMF a cryptographic token;
receive the cryptographic token from the Default AMF;
verify the authenticity of the cryptographic token; and
send, in response to verifying the authenticity of the cryptographic token, a Registration Request message to the Default AMF in clear text with the security context.

10. The first core network node of claim 4 , wherein the processing circuitry is configured to cause the first core network node to derive security keys for securely communicating the security context prior to transferring the security context for the wireless device to a Default AMF.

11. A second core network node operative as a Default Access and Mobility Management Function (Default AMF) for a wireless device across network slices for transferring control of the wireless device from an Initial AMF to a Target AMF, the second core network node comprising:
processing circuitry; and
communication circuitry operatively connected to the processing circuitry;
wherein the processing circuitry is configured to cause the second core network node to:
receive a security context for the wireless device from the Initial AMF in a first network slice; and
transfer the security context for the wireless device to the Target AMF in a second network slice.

12. The second core network node of claim 11 , wherein the processing circuitry is configured to cause the second core network node to receive the security context for the wireless device from the Initial AMF by receiving the security context in a message directly from the Initial AMF or receiving the security context from the Initial AMF via a Radio Access Network.

13. The second core network node of claim 12 :
wherein the message includes a Globally Unique AMF Identifier of the Initial AMF; and
wherein the processing circuitry is configured to cause the second core network node to:
send a request to the Initial AMF for the security context; and
receive, in response to the request, the security context for the wireless device from the Initial AMF.

14. The second core network node of claim 11 , wherein the processing circuitry is configured to cause the second core network node to derive security keys for securely communicating the security context prior to transferring the security context for the wireless device to the Target AMF.

Assignees

• Ericsson Telefon Ab L M

Inventors

• Wifvesson Monica
• Tsiatsis Vlasios
• Hedman Peter

Classifications

• H04W36/0038

  of security context information · CPC title

• H04W72/0453

  Resources in frequency domain, e.g. a carrier in FDMA · CPC title

• H04W48/16

  Discovering, processing access restriction or access information · CPC title

• H04W48/06

  based on traffic conditions · CPC title

• H04W36/06

  Reselecting a communication resource in the serving access point · CPC title