Direct host access to storage device memory space
US-2021124692-A1 · Apr 29, 2021 · US
US12034749B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-12034749-B2 |
| Application number | US-202117408942-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Aug 23, 2021 |
| Priority date | Aug 23, 2021 |
| Publication date | Jul 9, 2024 |
| Grant date | Jul 9, 2024 |
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A traffic anomaly detector of a Peripheral Component Interconnect express (PCIe) system, including filters configured to filter headers of PCIe transaction layer packets (TLPs) based on respective filter criterion; a classifier configured to trigger an event based on one of the filter criterion or a logical combination of a plurality of the filter criteria; an event counter configured to count a number of the events; and a processor configured to detect, based on a value of the event counter, an anomaly in the PCIe TLP traffic.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A traffic anomaly detector of a Peripheral Component Interconnect express (PCIe) system, comprising: filters configured to filter headers of PCIe transaction layer packets (TLPs) based on respective filter criterion; a classifier configured to trigger an event based on one of the filter criterion or a logical combination of a plurality of the filter criteria; an event counter configured to count a number of the events; and a processor configured to detect, based on a value of the event counter, an anomaly in the PCIe TLP traffic. 2. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 1 , wherein the classifier is configured to trigger the event based a logical combination of the plurality of filter criteria. 3. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 1 , wherein one of the filters is configured to filter a type field or a format field such that only memory TLPs result in a trigger. 4. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 1 , wherein the respective filter criterion are selected from the group of fields consisting of type, address, length, and format. 5. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 1 , wherein if a traffic anomaly is detected, the processor is further configured to initiate a countermeasure. 6. A PCIe controller, comprising: the traffic anomaly detector of claim 1 . 7. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 1 , further comprising: a read counter; a push controller; and a trigger controller configured to trigger the push controller to push the value of the event counter from the event counter to the read counter. 8. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 7 , wherein the trigger controller is configured to trigger the push controller to push the value of the event counter from the event counter to the read counter based on time, software control, and/or when the value of the event counter exceeds a threshold. 9. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 1 , wherein the classifier is configured to trigger a plurality of events, each of the events based on one of the filter criterion or a logical combination of a plurality of the filter criteria. 10. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 9 , further comprising: a plurality of event counters corresponding with the plurality of events; a plurality of read counters corresponding with the respective plurality of event counters; and a trigger controller configured to trigger a push controller to push values of the plurality of event counters from the plurality of event counters to the respective plurality of read counters simultaneously. 11. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 1 , further comprising: a trigger controller configured to read the value of the event counter. 12. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 11 , wherein the trigger controller is further configured to trigger a reset controller to reset the event counter. 13. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 11 , wherein the trigger controller comprises a timer, and the trigger controller is further configured to notify a monitor of the value of the event counter periodically. 14. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 11 , wherein the trigger controller is further configured to notify a monitor when the value of the event counter exceeds a threshold. 15. The traffic anomaly detector of claim 14 , wherein the trigger controller is further configured to trigger the reset controller to reset the event counter based on time, software control, or if the value of the event counter exceeds a threshold. 16. A method of detecting a traffic anomaly in a Peripheral Component Interconnect express (PCIe) system, comprising: filtering, by filters, headers of PCIe transaction layer packets (TLPs) based on respective filter criterion; triggering, by a classifier, an event based on one of the filter criterion or a logical combination of a plurality of the filter criteria; counting, by an event counter, a number of the events; and detecting, by a processor based on a value of the event counter, an anomaly in the PCIe TLP traffic. 17. The method of claim 16 , triggering, by the classifier, the event based a logical combination of the plurality of filter criteria. 18. The method of claim 16 , further comprising: periodically notifying, by a trigger controller, a monitor of the value of the event counter. 19. The method of claim 16 , further comprising: reading, by a trigger controller, the value of the event counter; and notifying a monitor if the value of the event counter exceeds a threshold. 20. The method of claim 16 , further comprising: initiating, by the processor, a countermeasure if a traffic anomaly is detected.
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