Securing method for lawful interception

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-11943262-B2
Application number	US-202117322424-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	May 17, 2021
Priority date	Jun 24, 2013
Publication date	Mar 26, 2024
Grant date	Mar 26, 2024

Abstract

A method is presented for secure communication, the method including generating a signature using a private key, a nonce, and at least one of an identifier and a key component; and transmitting the signature, the nonce, a security parameter, and the at least one of the identifier and the key component, wherein the security parameter associates a user identity with a public key, the public key being associated with the private key.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A non-transitory computer readable storage medium comprising instructions which, when executed by a processor of an apparatus for secure communication, cause the apparatus to:
generate a Message Authentication Code (MAC) tag using a MAC key, a nonce, and at least one of an identifier or a key component generated by the processor based on private key information associated with the apparatus and a publicly known elliptic curve point, wherein the identifier is one of an International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI), a Globally Routable User Agent (UA) URI (GRUU), an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), or a Temporary International Mobile Subscriber Identity (TIMSI); and
establish, a secure communication session with at least one other electronic device based on generating the MAC tag and at least session security data associated with the at least one other electronic device.

2. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the nonce is one of a timestamp, a random number, or a sequence number.

3. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the instructions further cause the apparatus to generate the key component using a master key, the nonce, and a known elliptic curve point.

4. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the instructions further cause the apparatus to transmit at least the MAC tag, the nonce, and the at least one of the identifier or the key component.

5. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 4 , wherein the MAC tag is received and stored by a remote information processing system.

6. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 1 , wherein the instructions further cause the apparatus to receive the session security data, wherein the session security data comprises a second nonce, and at least one of a second identifier or a second key component.

7. A non-transitory computer readable storage medium comprising instructions which, when executed by a processor of an apparatus for secure communication, cause the apparatus to:
establish a secure communication session with at least one electronic device based on session security data associated with the at least one electronic device having been verified by at least one remote information processing system that is separate and distinct from the apparatus and the at least one electronic device, the session security data comprising a nonce, at least one of an identifier or a key component, and a Message Authentication Code (MAC) tag that was generated using the nonce, the at least one of the identifier or the key component, and a MAC key associated with the at least one electronic device, wherein the key component was generated by the at least one electronic device based on private key information associated with the one electronic device and a publicly known elliptic curve point, wherein the identifier is one of an International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI), a Globally Routable User Agent (UA) URI (GRUU), an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), or a Temporary International Mobile Subscriber Identity (TIMSI).

8. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 7 , wherein the instructions further cause the apparatus to establish the secure communication session based on receiving, from the at least one remote information processing system, at least the key component and the nonce associated with the at least one remote information processing system.

9. The non-transitory computer readable storage medium of claim 7 , wherein the nonce is one of a timestamp, a random number, or a sequence number.

10. An apparatus for secure communication, the apparatus comprising:
a memory comprising instructions; and
a processor coupled to the memory and configured to execute the instructions to cause the apparatus to:
generate a Message Authentication Code (MAC) tag based on a MAC key, a nonce, and at least one of an identifier or a key component, wherein the identifier or the key component is generated based on private key information associated with the apparatus and a publicly known elliptic curve point; and
establish, a secure communication session with at least one electronic device based on the MAC tag and session security data associated with the at least one electronic device.

11. The apparatus of claim 10 , wherein the identifier is a Globally Routable User Agent (UA) URI (GRUU).

12. The apparatus of claim 10 , wherein the identifier is one of an International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI), an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), or a Temporary International Mobile Subscriber Identity (TIMSI).

13. The apparatus of claim 10 , wherein the nonce is one of a timestamp, a random number, or a sequence number.

14. The apparatus of claim 10 , wherein the instructions further cause the apparatus to generate the key component based on a master key, the nonce, and a known elliptic curve point.

15. The apparatus of claim 10 , wherein the instructions further cause the apparatus to transmit the MAC tag, the nonce, and the at least one of the identifier or the key component to a remote information processing system.

16. The apparatus of claim 10 , wherein the instructions further cause the apparatus to receive the session security data, and wherein the session security data comprises a second nonce and at least one of a second identifier or a second key component.

17. The apparatus of claim 10 , wherein the apparatus or the at least one electronic device comprises a user equipment (UE).

18. The apparatus of claim 10 , wherein the nonce comprises a value specific to the apparatus.

19. The apparatus of claim 18 , wherein the instructions further cause the apparatus to generate keying information using the value specific to the apparatus.

20. The apparatus of claim 19 , wherein the instructions further cause the apparatus to signal the keying information to a target electronic device.

Assignees

• Malikie Innovations Ltd

Inventors

• Buckley Michael Eoin
• Hollatz Michael Charles
• Lambert Robert John
• Ebeid Nevine Maurice Nassif

Classifications

• H04L63/306 Primary

  intercepting packet switched data communications, e.g. Web, Internet or IMS communications · CPC title

• H04L9/0847

  involving identity based encryption [IBE] schemes · CPC title

• H04L9/14

  using a plurality of keys or algorithms · CPC title

• H04L9/3073

  involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing · CPC title

• H04L9/3252

  using DSA or related signature schemes, e.g. elliptic based signatures, ElGamal or Schnorr schemes · CPC title