Verification of biometric templates for privacy preserving authentication

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-11831780-B2
Application number	US-202218063640-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Dec 8, 2022
Priority date	Oct 23, 2020
Publication date	Nov 28, 2023
Grant date	Nov 28, 2023

Abstract

Secure protocols for external-facing authentication are provided for both user templates stored on their devices and the biometric measurement captured by external sensors of an access device. The protocols provide different levels of security, ranging from passive security with some leakage to active security with no leakage. A packing technique is also provided. Zero-knowledge techniques are used during enrollment to validate a norm of user templates and knowledge of the plaintext biometric template. Once enrolled, the verifier can sign the encrypted template for use in a later matching phase with an access device.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method comprising performing by a user device:
obtaining a set of parameters, wherein the set of parameters comprises a user public key of the user device, a biometric vector x, and an encrypted biometric vector c, wherein the user public key includes a first modulus N, and wherein the encrypted biometric vector c is generated using the biometric vector x and a random vector r;
generating a random value s and a random coin u;
encrypting, using the user public key, the random value s using the random coin u to obtain an encrypted mask;
sending, to a verifier device, the encrypted mask;
receiving, from the verifier device, a random challenge vector e;
determining a first response by aggregating the random value s and an inner product of the biometric vector x and the random challenge vector e and by using the first modulus N;
determining a second response using the random vector r, the random challenge vector e, a generator g of the user public key, the random coin u, and the first response; and

sending the first response and the second response to the verifier device thereby enabling the verifier device to validate the first response and the second response are consistent with the encrypted mask, the encrypted biometric vector c, and the random challenge vector e.

2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
the user device generating a proof-of-knowledge indicator, indicating the biometric vector x is normalized to a normalization value, to be confirmed by the verifier device via a cryptographic process, wherein the normalization value is a public value y; and
sending the proof-of-knowledge indicator to the verifier device.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the user device generates the proof-of-knowledge indicator before a time of authentication.

4. The method of claim 2 , wherein the confirmation that the biometric vector x is normalized is obtained using a Euclidean norm.

5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
receiving, by the user device, a digital signature of the encrypted biometric vector c from the verifier device.

6. The method of claim 5 , further comprising:
providing, to an access device having a biometric sensor, the digital signature as part of a matching phase with the access device to obtain access to a resource.

7. The method of claim 6 , further comprising, as part of the matching phase:
sending the user public key and the encrypted biometric vector c to the access device;
receiving a first message from the access device, the first message including an encrypted similarity metric, the encrypted similarity metric computed with the encrypted biometric vector c and a biometric measurement using homomorphic encryption with the user public key, the encrypted similarity metric corresponding to a similarity metric encrypted with the user public key, the biometric measurement obtained by the biometric sensor;
decrypting the encrypted similarity metric to obtain a decrypted similarity metric; and
sending a response message to the access device, the response message indicating whether the decrypted similarity metric exceeds a threshold.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein obtaining the set of parameters includes generating, selecting, or retrieving the set of parameters from memory by the user device.

9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
the user device sending the user public key and the encrypted biometric vector c to the verifier device.

10. The method of claim 1 , wherein the user device and the verifier device are the same device.

11. The method of claim 1 , wherein the random vector r includes a random value for each biometric value in the biometric vector x.

12. A method for verifying that an encrypted biometric vector corresponds to a biometric vector x, the method comprising performing by a verifier device:
obtaining a set of parameters, wherein the set of parameters comprises a user public key of a user device and an encrypted biometric vector c, and wherein the encrypted biometric vector c is generated using the biometric vector x and a random vector r, wherein the random vector r contains a number of elements equal to a number of elements of the biometric vector x;
receiving, from the user device, an encrypted mask, wherein the encrypted mask is obtained by encrypting a random values using a random coin u and the user public key;
generating a random challenge vector e;
sending, to the user device, the random challenge vector e;
receiving, from the user device, a first response and a second response;
validating, the first response and the second response are consistent with the encrypted mask, the encrypted biometric vector c, and the random challenge vector e;
encrypting, using the user public key, the first response using a randomness defined by the second response to obtain an encrypted response; and
confirming the encrypted response matches a product of the encrypted mask and elements c e from the encrypted biometric vector c and the random challenge vector e.

13. The method of claim 12 , wherein obtaining the set of parameters includes generating, selecting, or retrieving the set of parameters from memory by the verifier device or receiving the set of parameters from the user device.

14. The method of claim 12 , further comprising:
receiving, by the verifier device, the user public key and the encrypted biometric vector c, from the user device.

15. The method of claim 14 , further comprising:
checking, by the verifier device, that the user public key received from the user device is well-formed, wherein a well-formed user public key is trusted by the verifier device.

16. The method of claim 12 , further comprising:
confirming that the biometric vector x is normalized to a normalization value via cryptographic process, wherein the normalization value is a public value y.

17. The method of claim 16 , wherein confirming that the biometric vector x is normalized is completed before a time of authentication.

18. The method of claim 16 , wherein confirming that the biometric vector x is normalized comprises checking that a public proper norm for the biometric vector x with a modulo N equals a Euclidean norm.

19. The method of claim 12 , further comprising:
generating, using a verifier private key of the verifier device, a signature of the encrypted biometric vector c; and
sending, by the verifier device, the signature of the encrypted biometric vector c, to the user device.

20. The method of claim 19 , further comprising:
providing, to an access device having a biometric sensor, a verifier public key corresponding to the verifier private key, thereby enabling the access device to verify the signature as part of a matching phase between the access device and the user device.

Assignees

• Visa Int Service Ass

Inventors

• Badrinarayanan Saikrishna
• Rindal Peter
• Mukherjee Pratyay

Classifications

• H04L9/3231 Primary

  Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using biometrical features in a packet data network H04L63/0861) · CPC title

• H04L9/0866

  involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics · CPC title

• H04L9/30

  Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy · CPC title

• H04L9/3271

  using challenge-response · CPC title

• H04L9/3218 Primary

  using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs · CPC title