Security key hopping
US-2018287796-A1 · Oct 4, 2018 · US
US11792003B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-11792003-B2 |
| Application number | US-202016950852-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Nov 17, 2020 |
| Priority date | Sep 29, 2020 |
| Publication date | Oct 17, 2023 |
| Grant date | Oct 17, 2023 |
A practical reading order for non-experts. Skip the full description unless you need deep technical detail.
What the patent document calls the invention.
A short plain-language summary of the technical disclosure.
Who owns or filed the patent and who is credited as inventor.
Filing, priority, publication, and grant dates set the timeline.
The legal scope of protection — read this for what is actually claimed.
Technology tags used to group this patent with similar filings.
Prior art links and similar publications in this corpus.
Official abstract text for this publication.
Distributed storage system and method for transmitting storage-related messages between host computers in a distributed storage system uses a handshake operation of a first-type communication connection between a source data transport daemon of a source host computer and a target data transport daemon of a target host computer to derive a symmetric key at each of the source and target data transport daemons. The two symmetric keys are sent to a source data transport manager of the source host computer and to a target data transport manager of the target host computer. The source and target data transport managers then use the same symmetric keys to encrypt and decrypt storage-related messages that are transmitted from the source data transport manager to the target data transport manager through multiple second-type communication connections between the source and target data transport managers.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A computer-implemented method for transmitting storage-related messages between host computers in a distributed storage system, the method comprising: executing a handshake operation of a first-type communication connection between a source data transport daemon of a source host computer in the distributed storage system and a target data transport daemon of a target host computer in the distributed storage system that results in a symmetric key at each of the source and target data transport daemons; sending the symmetric key of the source data transport daemon from the source data transport daemon to a source data transport manager of the source host computer; sending the symmetric key of the target data transport daemon from the target data transport daemon to a target data transport manager of the target host computer; transmitting storage-related message from the source data transport manager to the target data transport manager through a second-type communication connection between the source and target data transport managers, wherein the storage-related message is encrypted and decrypted using the symmetric keys at the source and target data transport managers; and transmitting additional storage-related messages from the source data transport manager to the target data transport manager through additional second-type communication connections, wherein the additional storage-related messages are again encrypted and decrypted using the same symmetric keys at the source and target data transport managers. 2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first-type communication connection between the source and target data transport daemons is a Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection. 3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the second-type communication connection between the source and target data transport managers is a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection or a remote direct memory access (RDMA) connection. 4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the source and target data transport daemons are running in a user space of their respective host computers and the source and target data transport managers are running in a kernel space of their respective host computers. 5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising: adding a replay count in a header of the message at the source data transport manager, wherein the replay count is equal to a replay count of a previous message sent from the source data transport manager to the target data transport manager plus a predefined value. 6. The method of claim 5 , further comprising: computing a media authentication code (MAC) at the source data transport manager based on at least the replay count of the message using the symmetric key of the source data transport manager and adding the MAC in the header of the message; and verifying the MAC in the message at the target data transport manager by comparing the MAC with a verification MAC that is computed based on at least the replay count of the message using the symmetric key of the target data transport manager. 7. The method of claim 5 , further comprising: when the message is received at the target data transport manager, using the replay count of the message and a previous replay count of a previous message received from the source data transport manager to determine whether to process the received message as a valid message, an invalid message or a duplicate message. 8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising: performing a rekey operation when a predefined period of time has lapsed or a predefined number of messages been transmitted from the source data transport manager to the target data transport manager since the symmetric keys were derived, the rekey operation including: executing another handshake operation of the first-type communication connection between the source data transport daemon of the source host computer in the distributed storage system and the target data transport daemon of the target host computer in the distributed storage system that results in a new symmetric key at each of the source and target data transport daemons; sending the new symmetric key of the source data transport daemon from the source data transport daemon to the source data transport manager of the source host computer; and sending the new symmetric key of the target data transport daemon from the target data transport daemon to the target data transport manager of the target host computer, wherein the new symmetric keys of the source and target data transport managers are used to encrypt and decrypt subsequent storage-related messages transmitted from the source data transport manager to the target data transport manager through new second-type communication connections between the source and target data transport managers. 9. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium containing program instructions for transmitting storage-related messages between host computers in a distributed storage system, wherein execution of the program instructions by one or more processors of a computer system causes the one or more processors to perform steps comprising: executing a handshake operation of a first-type communication connection between a source data transport daemon of a source host computer in the distributed storage system and a target data transport daemon of a target host computer in the distributed storage system that results in a symmetric key at each of the source and target data transport daemons; sending the symmetric key of the source data transport daemon from the source data transport daemon to a source data transport manager of the source host computer; sending the symmetric key of the target data transport daemon from the target data transport daemon to a target data transport manager of the target host computer; transmitting storage-related message from the source data transport manager to the target data transport manager through a second-type communication connection between the source and target data transport managers, wherein the storage-related message is encrypted and decrypted using the symmetric keys at the source and target data transport managers; and transmitting additional storage-related messages from the source data transport manager to the target data transport manager through additional second-type communication connections, wherein the additional storage-related messages are again encrypted and decrypted using the same symmetric keys at the source and target data transport managers. 10. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 9 , wherein the first-type communication connection between the source and target data transport daemons is a Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection. 11. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 10 , wherein the second-type communication connection between the source and target data transport managers is a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection or a remote direct memory access (RDMA) connection. 12. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 9 , wherein the source and target data transport daemons are running in a user space of their respective host computers and the source and target data transport managers are running in a kernel space of their respective host computers. 13. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 9 , wherein the steps further comprise: adding a replay count in a header of the message at the source data transport manager, wherein the replay count is equal to a replay count of a previous message sent from the source data transport manager to the target data transport manager plus a predefined value. 14. The co
using a plurality of keys or algorithms · CPC title
where tasks reside in different layers, e.g. user- and kernel-space · CPC title
including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system {or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials} · CPC title
Layer-2 addresses, e.g. medium access control [MAC] addresses · CPC title
Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage · CPC title
Related publications grouped by family.
Answers are generated from the same data shown on this page.