Determining correct location in the presence of GNSS spoofing

Patent metadata

Field	Value
Publication number	US-11709274-B2
Application number	US-202117236862-A
Country	US
Kind code	B2
Filing date	Apr 21, 2021
Priority date	Apr 22, 2020
Publication date	Jul 25, 2023
Grant date	Jul 25, 2023

Abstract

A method of determining a location of a mobile device in the presence of a spoofing signal includes obtaining current position information associated with the mobile device, determining a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signal search window for acquiring GNSS signals associated with a satellite based on the current position information, searching a GNSS signal associated with the satellite based on the GNSS signal search window, and determining updated position information of the mobile device based on at least information of the GNSS signal associated with the satellite.

First claim

What is claimed is:

1. A method of determining a mobile device location resistant to Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing, the method comprising:
determining a non-GNSS position of the mobile device based on position information from one or more non-GNSS data sources;
receiving, at the mobile device, a first GNSS signal;
determining, for a predicted frequency and a predicted code phase based on the non-GNSS position, that the first GNSS signal comprises:
a frequency having a frequency difference with the predicted frequency greater than a first predetermined threshold,
a code phase having a phase difference with the predicted code phase greater than a second predetermined threshold,
or both;

receiving a second GNSS signal within a search window based on the non-GNSS position, the threshold frequency difference, and the threshold code phase difference; and
determining a measurement for the second GNSS signal.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the position information from one or more non-GNSS data sources comprises:
multi-lateration of the mobile device based at least in part on signals from terrestrial transceivers,
Wide Area Network (WAN) cell sector center,
Access Point (AP) location,
map data,
sensor data, or
dead reckoning positioning information, or
a combination thereof.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the sensor data comprises data from:
a motion sensor,
a magnetometer,
a wheel sensor,
a camera,
a radar,
a LIDAR, or
a sonar sensor,
or combination thereof.

4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising receiving the non-GNSS position at a GNSS receiver of the mobile device from an application processor of the mobile device.

5. The method of claim 4 , wherein the non-GNSS position is based on a previous position estimation for the mobile device.

6. The method of claim 1 , further comprising selecting the search window such that the first GNSS signal is outside of the search window.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the search window is implemented using one or more tracking loops.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the search window is a part of a two-dimensional tracking grid including different combinations of code phase offsets and signal frequencies.

9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising determining an updated position of the mobile device based on the measurement for the second GNSS signal.

10. The method of claim 1 , further comprising determining the first GNSS signal to be a spoofing signal.

11. The method of claim 10 , wherein determining the first GNSS signal to be a spoofing signal is based, at least in part, on the spoofing signal having a signal strength greater than a threshold value.

12. The method of claim 11 , wherein the threshold value is determined based on a GNSS signal strength level in open sky condition.

13. The method of claim 10 , wherein further comprising subtracting the spoofing signal from a plurality of received signals to receive the second GNSS signal.

14. The method of claim 10 , wherein determining the first GNSS signal to be a spoofing signal comprises:
determining a position fix of the mobile device based on received signals comprising the first GNSS signal and additional GNSS signals from a plurality of GNSS satellites; and
identifying, based on determining that the position fix is inconsistent with the non-GNSS position, the received signals as including the spoofing signal.

15. The method of claim 10 , wherein determining the first GNSS signal to be a spoofing signal comprises:
identifying the first GNSS signal as the spoofing signal based on determining that a location determined from a pseudorange of the first GNSS signal is inconsistent with map data.

16. The method of claim 10 , wherein determining the first GNSS signal to be a spoofing signal comprises:
determining that a difference between a signal frequency of the first GNSS signal and a signal frequency of a previously captured GNSS signal is greater than the first predetermined threshold.

17. The method of claim 10 , wherein determining the first GNSS signal to be a spoofing signal comprises:
obtaining two sets of self-consistent signals, wherein one set of the self-consistent signals comprises the first GNSS signal;
determining a respective position fix of the mobile device based on each of the two sets of self-consistent signals; and
identifying, based on a difference between the two respective position fixes, the one set of the self-consistent signals comprising the first GNSS signal as including the spoofing signal.

18. The method of claim 10 , wherein determining the first GNSS signal to be a spoofing signal comprises:
identifying the first GNSS signal as the spoofing signal based on:
determining a change of a code phase of the first GNSS signal greater than the second predetermined threshold,
determining a change of a frequency of the first GNSS signal greater than the first predetermined threshold,
or both.

19. The method of claim 10 , wherein determining the first GNSS signal to be a spoofing signal comprises:
acquiring the first GNSS signal; and
identifying the first GNSS signal as the spoofing signal based on determining rate-of-change of a code phase, a frequency, or both, of the first GNSS signal being different than a previously-determined or predicted rate-of-change beyond a threshold value.

20. The method of claim 10 , wherein determining the first GNSS signal to be a spoofing signal is based, at least in part, upon determining that the first GNSS signal is from a first constellation and is inconsistent with a location of the mobile device determined using a second constellation.

21. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first GNSS signal is received by the mobile device via a first frequency or GNSS constellation and the second GNSS signal is received by the mobile device via a second frequency or GNSS constellation.

22. A mobile device for determining a location resistant to Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing, the mobile device comprising:
an antenna configured to receive GNSS signals;
a memory; and
one or more processing units communicatively coupled with the antenna and the memory, wherein the one or more processing units are configured to:
determine a non-GNSS position of the mobile device based on position information from one or more non-GNSS data sources;
receive, via the antenna, a first GNSS signal;
determine, for a predicted frequency and a predicted code phase based on the non-GNSS position, that the first GNSS signal comprises:
a frequency having a frequency difference with the predicted frequency greater than a first predetermined threshold,
a code phase having a phase difference with the predicted code phase greater than a second predetermined threshold,
or both;

receive, via the antenna, a second GNSS signal within a search window based on the non-GNSS position, the threshold frequency difference, and the threshold code phase difference; and
determine a measurement for the second GNSS signal.

23. The mobile device of claim 22 , wherein the position information from one or more non-GNSS data sources comprises:
multi-lateration of the mobile device based at least in part on signals from terrestrial transceivers,
Wide Area Network (WAN) cell sector center,
Access Point (AP) location,
map data,
sensor data, or
dead reckoning positioning information, or
a combination thereof.

Assignees

• Qualcomm Inc

Inventors

• Gum Arnold Jason
• Tuck David

Classifications

• G01S19/215 Primary

  issues related to spoofing · CPC title

• G01S19/21

  Interference related issues {; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service} · CPC title

• G01S19/48

  by combining or switching between position solutions derived from the satellite radio beacon positioning system and position solutions derived from a further system · CPC title

• G01S19/37

  Hardware or software details of the signal processing chain · CPC title

• G01S19/485

  whereby the further system is an optical system or imaging system · CPC title