Coherence-based attack detection
US-12147528-B2 · Nov 19, 2024 · US
US11636200B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-11636200-B2 |
| Application number | US-201816004571-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Jun 11, 2018 |
| Priority date | Jun 11, 2018 |
| Publication date | Apr 25, 2023 |
| Grant date | Apr 25, 2023 |
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The following relates generally to defense mechanisms and security systems. Broadly, systems and methods are disclosed that detect an anomaly in an Embedded Mission Specific Device (EMSD). Disclosed approaches include a meta-material antenna configured to receive a radio frequency signal from the EMSD, and a central reader configured to receive a signal from the meta-material antenna. The central reader may be configured to: build a finite state machine model of the EMSD based on the signal received from the meta-material antenna; and detect if an anomaly exists in the EMSD based on the built finite state machine model.
Opening claim text (preview).
The invention claimed is: 1. A system for detecting an anomaly in an Embedded Mission Specific Device (EMSD), comprising: a meta-material antenna configured to receive a radio frequency signal from the EMSD; a central reader configured to receive a signal from the meta-material antenna, the central reader further configured to: build a finite state machine model of the EMSD based on the signal received from the meta-material antenna; and detect if an anomaly exists in the EMSD based on the built finite state machine model. 2. The system of claim 1 , wherein the finite state machine model of the EMSD is built using machine learning to analyze the signal received from the meta-material antenna. 3. The system of claim 1 , wherein the central reader is further configured to build the finite state machine model by: forming a plurality of clusters of execution traces from a set of execution traces; and computing a separate finite state automation (FSA) for each cluster within the plurality of clusters. 4. The system of claim 1 , wherein: the meta-material antenna length and width are both less than λ/40; and λ is a wavelength of operation of the meta-material antenna which is in the megahertz (MHz) range. 5. The system of claim 1 , wherein the meta-material antenna comprises a sticker configured to be placed on the EMSD. 6. The system of claim 1 , wherein the central reader is further configured identify a particular attack based on: a library of attack vectors and their corresponding instruction sequences; and the finite state machine model. 7. The system of claim 1 , wherein the central reader is further configured to: in response to detection of an anomaly in the EMSD, shut down the EMSD. 8. The system of claim 1 , wherein the built finite state machine model is a normal model, and the central reader is further configured to detect if an anomaly exists in the EMSD based on a ratio between a likelihood of the normal model and a likelihood of an abnormal finite state machine model of the EMSD. 9. The system of claim 1 , wherein the central reader is further configured to: build the finite state machine model of the EMSD based on a temperature gradient of the EMSD. 10. The system of claim 9 , wherein the finite state machine model of the EMSD is built using machine learning to analyze the temperature gradient. 11. The system of claim 1 , wherein the central reader is further configured to: build the finite state machine model of the EMSD based on a power trace of the EMSD. 12. The system of claim 11 , wherein the finite state machine model of the EMSD is built using machine learning to analyze the power trace. 13. A method for detecting an anomaly in an Embedded Mission Specific Device (EMSD), comprising: receiving, with a meta-material antenna, a radio frequency signal from the EMSD; with a central reader: receiving a signal from the meta-material antenna; building a finite state machine model of the EMSD based on the signal received from the meta-material antenna; and detecting that an anomaly exists in the EMSD based on the built finite state machine model. 14. The method of claim 13 , wherein the finite state machine model of the EMSD is built using machine learning to analyze the signal received from the meta-material antenna. 15. The method of claim 13 , further comprising building the finite state machine model of the EMSD based on a temperature gradient of the EMSD. 16. The method of claim 15 , wherein the finite state machine model of the EMSD is built using machine learning to analyze the temperature gradient. 17. The method of claim 13 , further comprising building the finite state machine model of the EMSD based on a power trace of the EMSD. 18. The method of claim 17 , wherein the finite state machine model of the EMSD is built using machine learning to analyze the power trace. 19. A system for detecting an anomaly in an Embedded Mission Specific Device (EMSD), comprising: a meta-material antenna configured to receive a radio frequency signal from the EMSD; one or more processors configured to receive a signal from the meta-material antenna, the one or more processors further configured to: build a finite state machine model of the EMSD based on the signal received from the meta-material antenna; and detect if an anomaly exists in the EMSD based on the built finite state machine model. 20. The system of claim 19 , wherein the one or more processors are comprised in a thin client, smart phone, or laptop.
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