Authenticating a networked camera using a certificate having device binding information
US-2019089696-A1 · Mar 21, 2019 · US
US11625470B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-11625470-B2 |
| Application number | US-202016859449-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Apr 27, 2020 |
| Priority date | Apr 27, 2020 |
| Publication date | Apr 11, 2023 |
| Grant date | Apr 11, 2023 |
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Visually enrolling a camera using an optical code and a picture file, including: receiving the picture file and the optical code from the camera, wherein the optical code includes a public key of the camera; generating a visual challenge using a nonce created by a random number generator; transmitting the visual challenge to a user of the camera to capture the visual challenge; receiving the captured visual challenge from the camera; extracting a response from the captured visual challenge; comparing the response to the nonce to verify a signature of the captured visual challenge using the public key of the camera and to convert the optical code received from the camera into a valid certificate; and enrolling the camera and adding the valid certificate to a key store.
Opening claim text (preview).
The invention claimed is: 1. A method for visually enrolling a camera having a public key and a private key, the method comprising: receiving, at a verifier, a picture file including an essence image and a signature of the essence image sent from the camera, wherein the signature is a cryptographic signature of the essence image generated by the camera using the private key of the camera; calculating, at the verifier, a cryptographic hash of the received essence image using the public key of the camera; determining, at the verifier, whether the cryptographic hash matches the signature generated by the camera; generating, at the verifier, a visual challenge in the form of an encoded optical code using a nonce created by a random number generator when the verifier determines that the cryptographic hash matches the signature; transmitting the encoded optical code to the camera with the camera capturing an image of the optical code and sending the image back to the verifier to verify that the camera has the private key corresponding to the public key of the camera; receiving and extracting, at the verifier, the image of the optical code captured by the camera; comparing, at the verifier, the extracted image of the optical code to the nonce using the public key of the camera; and converting, at the verifier, the cryptographic signature of the essence image received from the camera into a valid certificate for the camera to be enrolled when the extracted image of the optical code matches the nonce. 2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the optical code includes a QR code. 3. The method of claim 1 , wherein converting the cryptographic signature of the essence image into a valid certificate comprises verifying that a format of the valid certificate is compliant. 4. The method of claim 1 , wherein converting the cryptographic signature of the essence image into a valid certificate comprises verifying that a trusted certification authority signed the valid certificate. 5. The method of claim 1 , wherein converting the cryptographic signature of the essence image into a valid certificate comprises verifying that the public key was not revoked. 6. The method of claim 1 , further comprising aborting enrolling the camera when the cryptographic signature of the essence image does not include the valid certificate. 7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising: launching a timer to generate a time limit; and aborting enrolling the camera when the cryptographic signature of the essence image cannot be extracted from the camera within the time limit.
involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements (network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823) · CPC title
involving digital signatures · CPC title
using certificates (cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263) · CPC title
involving random numbers or seeds · CPC title
Self-signed certificates · CPC title
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