Secure fine timing measurement exchange
US-2017257758-A1 · Sep 7, 2017 · US
US11617154B2 · US · B2
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Publication number | US-11617154-B2 |
| Application number | US-202117494969-A |
| Country | US |
| Kind code | B2 |
| Filing date | Oct 6, 2021 |
| Priority date | Nov 5, 2020 |
| Publication date | Mar 28, 2023 |
| Grant date | Mar 28, 2023 |
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A method and measuring station to determine the geo-location of a wanted target station in the presence of rogue responder stations are disclosed. One method includes: transmitting a packet with a fictitious address not corresponding to the wanted target station address; transmitting a packet with the wanted target station address; determining at least one of: a first difference between a round trip time (RTT) associated with a response packet from a responder station and an RTT associated with a response packet from the wanted target station; and a second difference between a time of arrival (TOA) associated with the responder station's response packet and a TOA associated with the wanted target station's response packet; and distinguishing between the response from the responder station and the response from the wanted target station based on at least at least one of the first difference and the second difference.
Opening claim text (preview).
What is claimed is: 1. A method in a measuring station to determine a geo-location of a wanted target station in an environment that includes at least one rogue responder station, the method comprising: transmitting a packet with a fictitious address of a station that does not correspond to an address of the wanted target station; transmitting a packet with the address of the wanted target station; determining at least one of: a first difference between a round trip time (RTT) associated with a packet received from a responder station in response to the transmission of a packet with the fictitious address and an RTT associated with a packet received in response to the transmission of a packet with the address of the wanted target station, an RTT being a time elapsed between a time of transmission of a packet having an address and a time of reception of a packet received in response to transmission of the packet having the address; and a second difference between a time of arrival (TOA) associated with the packet received from the responder station in response to the transmission of a packet with the fictitious address and a TOA associated with the packet received in response to the transmission of a packet with the address of the wanted target station; and distinguishing between a response from the at least one rogue responder station and a response from the wanted target station based at least in part on at least at least one of the first difference and the second difference; and determining the geo-location of the wanted target station based at least in part on responses determined to be responses from the wanted target station. 2. The method of claim 1 , wherein distinguishing between a response from the at least one rogue responder station and a response from the wanted target station includes: comparing the determined first difference to a first threshold; and when the determined first difference is greater than the first threshold, then using the packet received in response to transmission of a packet with the wanted target station address to determine the geo-location of the wanted target station. 3. The method of claim 2 , further comprising: when the determined first difference is less than the first threshold, then: comparing the determined second difference to a second threshold; and when the determined second difference is greater than the second threshold, then using the packet received in response to transmission of a packet with the wanted target station address to determine the geo-location of the wanted target station. 4. The method of claim 3 , wherein the second threshold is obtained by multiplying the first threshold by a ratio of a velocity of the measuring station to a speed of light. 5. The method of claim 4 , wherein an RTT associated with a packet received in response to transmission of a packet with the wanted target station address is compared to a plurality of RTTs associated with packets received in response to transmission of packets with multiple fictitious addresses. 6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the fictitious address includes a random number to achieve a likelihood that the fictitious address does not match an address of a rogue responder station. 7. The method of claim 6 , wherein the fictitious address is included in a medium access control (MAC) address that includes three octets of the MAC containing the random number. 8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the transmissions of packets with the fictitious address and the wanted target station address alternate. 9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising retaining an RTT of a response to a transmission of packets with fictitious addresses in memory only when the RTT is less than the first threshold. 10. The method of claim 1 , wherein at least one of the first threshold and the second threshold is based at least in part on at least one of a speed and altitude of the measuring station. 11. A measuring station configured to determine a geo-location of a wanted target station in an environment that includes at least one rogue responder station, the measuring station comprising: a transceiver configured to: transmit a packet with a fictitious address of a target station that does not correspond to an address of the wanted target station; and transmit a packet with the address of the wanted target station; and processing circuitry in communication with the transceiver, the processing circuitry configured to: determine at least one of: a first difference between a round trip time (RTT) associated with a packet received from a responder station in response to the transmission of a packet with the fictitious address and an RTT associated with a packet received in response to the transmission of a packet with the address of the wanted target station, an RTT being a time elapsed between a time of transmission of a packet having an address and a time of reception of a packet received in response to transmission of the packet having the address; and a second difference between a time of arrival (TOA) associated with the packet received from the responder station in response to the transmission of a packet with the fictitious address and a TOA associated with the packet received in response to the transmission of a packet with the address of the wanted target station; and distinguish between a response from the at least one rogue responder station and a response from the wanted target station based at least in part on at least at least one of the first difference and the second difference; and determine the geo-location of the wanted target station based at least in part on responses determined to be responses from the wanted target station. 12. The measuring station of claim 11 , wherein distinguishing between a response from the at least one rogue responder station and a response from the wanted target station includes: comparing the determined first difference to a first threshold; and when the determined first difference is greater than the first threshold, then using the packet received in response to transmission of a packet with the wanted target station address to determine the geo-location of the wanted target station. 13. The measuring station of claim 12 , wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to: when the determined first difference is less than the first threshold, then: compare the determined second difference to a second threshold; and when the determined second difference is greater than the second threshold, then use the packet received in response to transmission of a packet with the wanted target station address to determine the geo-location of the wanted target station. 14. The measuring station of claim 13 , wherein the second threshold is obtained by multiplying the first threshold by a ratio of a velocity of the measuring station to a speed of light. 15. The measuring station of claim 14 , wherein an RTT associated with a packet received in response to transmission of a packet with the wanted target station address is compared to a plurality of RTTs associated with packets received in response to transmission of packets with multiple fictitious addresses. 16. The measuring station of claim 11 , wherein the fictitious address includes a random number to achieve a likelihood that the fictitious address does not match an address of a rogue responder station. 17. The measuring station of claim 16 , wherein the fictitious address is included in a medium access control (MAC) address that includes three octets of the MAC containing t
Responders; Transponders (teaching or practice apparatus for gun-aiming or gun-laying using reflecting targets or active targets F41G3/26) · CPC title
Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices · CPC title
Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent · CPC title
Round trip delays · CPC title
with additional information processing, e.g. for direction or speed determination · CPC title
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